Essays on housing and monetary policy by Nam, Min-Ho
ESSAYS ON HOUSING AND MONETARY POLICY
Min-Ho Nam
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
2013
Full metadata for this item is available in
Research@StAndrews:FullText
at:
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3681
This item is protected by original copyright
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License
Essays on Housing and Monetary Policy
Min-Ho Nam
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of
PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
January 2013
Essays on Housing and Monetary Policy
Min-Ho Nam
School of Economics & Finance
University of St Andrews
January 2013
I, Min-Ho Nam, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 69,000 words
in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and
that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
Date: January 15, 2013. Signature of candidate:
I was admitted as a research student in September 2009 and as a candidate for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in September 2009; the higher study for which this is a
record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2009 and 2012.
Date: January 15, 2013. Signature of candidate:
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and
Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St
Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that
degree.
Date: January 15, 2013. Signature of supervisor:
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations
of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested
in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand that the title and the
abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to
any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible
for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below,
and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as
required to ensure continued access to the thesis. We have obtained any third-party
copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration,
or have requested the appropriate embargo below. The following is an agreed request
by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis:
Access to printed copy and electronic publication of thesis through the University of St
Andrews.
Date: January 15, 2013. Signature of candidate:
Date: January 15, 2013. Signature of supervisor:
To the people distressed by the sub-prime crisis,
especially to those whose houses were foreclosed by bankers
partly because of the failures of monetary policy and monetary economics
Preface
In the midst of the housing boom period in the last decade, there were heated debates inside
and outside the central banking community whether the then level of house prices overshot
the level consistent with economic fundamentals and whether central banks should intervene
by raising policy rates. The orthodox answers from the Federal Reserve to such questions
exercised the predominant influence on the opinions of other central banks: it is extremely
hard to identify ‘bubbles’ and interest rates are a blunt instrument which may not have ex-
pected effects. Again, the conventional mop-up at once strategy beat alternative strategies.
However, I chose to be among the sceptics asking myself the following questions: whether
there is really no criterion for detecting housing bubbles, how economic agents form expecta-
tions about future house prices, what factors affect their expectations, whether low interest
rates bolstered the housing boom in the last decade and, if so, how that can be substantiated,
and whether the attempts of central banks to curb the development of a housing bubble are
always ineffective and sub-optimal. This scepticism ignited my academic voyage thereafter.
The initial task of this voyage was to acquire a good command of technical tools useful for
answering these questions and to have a firm understanding of past research findings on the
dynamics of house prices. Though challenging, the process was quite enjoyable and it was
additionally delightful to read such classics as Wicksell, Cassel, Keynes, Schumpeter, Fisher,
Minsky, etc. As my understanding of the relationship between the housing market and mone-
tary policy deepened, more questions were added to the initial set: what role the developments
and deregulations in housing finance as well as the overall financial sector played in gener-
ating the volatile trajectory of housing prices, whether there are any transmission channels
of monetary policy affecting housing prices which central banks may not have noted when
forecasting the developments of the housing market and their repercussions on the overall
economy.
Such questions have acted as a lighthouse during the voyage. However, some of the queries
have not been tackled in sufficient depth in my study. For example, I was initially optimistic
that heterogeniety of expectations can be modeled to explain house price fluctuations, but
this still remains merely an idea. Nevertheless, my voyage has been rewarding in several ways.
I have had time to establish my views not only on the issues raised in the first phase of my
voyage but also on broader topics such as; what macroeconomists should do to contribute to
preventing economic catastrophes, in which direction modern capitalism should evolve, and
what the societal obligations of central bankers should be in the context of recent economic
crisis for which they are also partly responsible for laying the foundations alongside other
government agencies and banks.
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As in the case of other people, my research voyage was demanding and underwent plenty of
stormy weather and harsh waves. Among certain things I came to realize during the journey
is that I could not have arrived at this humble port without the support of other people. Most
of my academic achievements are owed to the dedicated help from my supervisor, Professor
Kaushik Mitra. The discourses with him helped pinpoint drawbacks in the logics presented in
each chapter and showed me how to improve them. In addition, he has vast experience of the
psychological up-and-downs of researchers and hence was able to give useful advice on how
to proceed without stranding a ship at a strange beach. I also appreciate his considerations
of not only my academic but also personal circumstances during the past three years. Dr.
Taesu Kang has spurred me to deepen my understanding of macro-modeling and answered my
questions in developing DSGE models in this thesis. He has been with me unceasingly from
the very beginning and is a lifetime benefactor of mine. Dr. Paolo Gelain currently working
at the Norges Bank introduced me to New-Keynesian models and has given me valuable di-
rections to best lead the life of a Ph.D candidate when he stayed as a research fellow at St
Andrews. Dr. Seong-Hoon Kim, who attended the same university for undergraduate study
as me and came to St Andrews as a member of the teaching staff, has stimulated my research
in various dimensions and shared the agonies about my research. Dr. Ozge Senay encouraged
me to proceed with warm consolations when I felt depressed by my failure to make progress.
Regarding the third chapter of this thesis, I should pay a special tribute to Dr. John V. Duca,
the vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, for having provided the loan-to-value
ratio data estimated by him and his co-authors. In addition, he sent warm solaces and stimuli
for my study once in a while. Orachat Nyomsuk, who spent several years together with me
as another Ph.D candidate in our school, also encouraged me to make progress. Dr. Ruth
King at the School of Math & Statistics allowed me to audit the module of Bayesian Inference
she taught. Other staff members of the School of Economics & Finance were very helpful in
terms of both my research and living in general. The kind support of Angela and Caroline,
the administrative staff at the school office, is much appreciated. The smiles by some students
who heartily expressed their gratitude for the tutorials I taught in the Candlemas Semester
of 2010 were the most invigorating for me since my mood then was the lowest.
Psychological support from my friends outside academia are memorable as well: James
Long and Robert Wix in Nottingham Kendo Club, the members of St Andrews Kendo Club
and Dunfermline Kendo Club who used to practice Kendo with me and David Ross who gave
great solace to me during the final stage of my study.
Looking far back, there are more benefactors who helped me embark on this voyage. My su-
periors at the Bank of Korea, Director Hee-Sik Jung and Ju-Hyun Kim, and Senior Economist
In-Sun Hwang imbued me with a fundamental motivation to study economics to a higher level.
Director Myung-Jong Lee encouraged me to finish my ph.d study. I should also express enor-
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mous gratitude to my friends who sent warm support from outside the U.K.; Gil-Won Kang,
Gi-Cheon Son, Ho-Gil Choi, Soo-Young Kim and other friends and my colleagues at the Bank
of Korea. Anthony Scott, my British friend currently living in Korea, gave precious comments
on some expressions in this thesis. The mental support from my lifetime guru, Mr. Byoung-
Cheol Oh, is greatly appreciated.
I appreciate the financial support from the Bank of Korea and the generous scholarship from
Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE). Their financial assistance was pivotal to
my being able to continue my research in the U.K.
I express special gratitude to Professor Kap-Young Jeong, President of Yonsei Univer-
sity, and Professor Seunghwan Suh of the same university and Professor Young-Han Kim at
Sungkyunkwan University who wrote recommendation letters as my referees when I applied
for a place to do Ph.D study.
Lastly, the support of my family was essential and indispensable in surmounting the hard-
ships I have experienced. My wife, Seon-Jeong Kim, and my children, So-Mi and Ho-Beom,
have been with me even on rainy days shedding beautiful sunlight on my soul. She, in par-
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homesickness. I cannot express in words how much I feel indebted, sorry and thankful to her.
I also feel so grateful to my sisters and brothers for their concern about our lives.
My mother, Ms. Young-Ja Park, who continued sending warm consolations and was waiting
patiently for my family and I to return to Korea contributed the most to this thesis.
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Abstract
This thesis, motivated by my reflections about the failings of monetary policy implementation
as a cause of the sub-prime crisis, attempts to answer the following inquiries: (i) whether in-
terest rates have played a major role in generating the house price fluctuations in the U.S., (ii)
what are the effects of accommodative monetary policy on the economy given banks’ exces-
sive risk-taking, and (iii) whether an optimal monetary policy rule can be found for curbing
credit-driven economic volatilities in the model economy with unconventional transmission
channels operating.
By using a decomposition technique and regression analysis, it can be shown that short-
term interest rates exert the most potent influence on the evolution of the volatile components
of housing prices. One possible explanation for this is that low policy rates for a prolonged
period tend to encourage bankers to take on more risk in lending. This transmission channel,
labelled as the risk-taking channel, accounts for the gap to some extent between the forecast
and the actual impact of monetary policy on the housing market and the overall economy. A
looser monetary policy stance can also shift the preference of economic agents toward hous-
ing as theoretically and empirically corroborated in the context of choice between durable
and nondurable goods. This transmission route is termed the preference channel. If these
two channels are operative in the economy, policy makers need to react aggressively to rapid
credit growth in order to stabilize the paths of housing prices and output.
These findings provide meaningful implications for monetary policy implementation. First
of all, central bankers should strive to identify in a timely fashion newly emerging and state-
dependent transmission channels of monetary policy, and accurately assess the impact of
policy decisions transmitted through these channels. Secondly, the intervention of central
banks in the credit or housing market by adjusting policy rates can be optimal, relative to
inaction, in circumstances where banks’ risk-taking and the preference for housing are overly
exuberant.
JEL Classification: E32, E42, E44, E51, E52, E53
Keywords: Housing cycle; Monetary policy; Interest rates; Expectation; Risk-taking chan-
nel; LTV ratio; Borrowing constraint; Housing preference; Risk-taking channel; Credit-driven
volatilities
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Introduction
The global financial crisis crippled the functioning of the financial system and brought about
unprecedented damages to the real economy. These huge negative repercussions caused by
the vicious housing cycle of some advanced and developing economies devastated the everyday
lives of the common people. For example, according to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(FCIC, 2011) published by the U.S. government, homes of about four million families have
been foreclosed and another four and a half million are subject to the foreclosure process.
More astounding is the growth rate of household debt. According to the report, the increase
in U.S. household debt over the six year period from 2001-07 matched the level of indebtedness
over the entire history of the country prior to 2001. During the recession following the housing
market crash, the rate of unemployment soared to 10% in October 2009 from the pre-crisis level
of about 4% and still hovers around 8% as of 2012. According to the U.S. Labor Department
reports, about 7 million people lost their jobs between 2007 and 2009 and the number has
increased even further since then.
Evidently and admittedly, there is no sole reason for the calamity. With the benefit of
hindsight, financial deregulation, inadequate financial supervision, deflation-averse monetary
policy for a prolonged period, bounded rationality of economic agents and global saving glut
are recognized as the main reasons for the sub-prime crisis. For example, FCIC (2011) con-
cludes that the following factors fed the housing boom and triggered the crisis: widespread
failures in financial regulation and supervision, failures of risk management at financial in-
stitutions, a combination of excessive borrowing and risky investments, inconsistent policy
1
Introduction
stance of the government, a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics, and deterio-
rating mortgage-lending standards. Stiglitz (2009) points out as the causes of the ‘free fall’
of the U.S. economy; low interest rates, excessive risk-taking by banks, lax regulation and
securitization worsening the problems of imperfect information. Obstfeld (2010) considers
monetary policy to be the single most important factor for the occurrence of the crisis; the
low interest rate environment brought about housing price inflation, exuberance in mortgage
lending, substantial home equity withdrawal and excessive leverage by financial market par-
ticipants. Duca et al (2010) provides a superb review of the existing views while giving more
emphasis to the role of innovations in housing finance, expectations about house prices and
the combined effect of all the main factors. Rajan (2010), while agreeing with the consensus
view, recognizes the inequality problems which exacerbated since the 1970s as the deep-seated
cause of the crisis. He regards credit expansion and poor regulation as the secondary causes.
Diamond and Rajan (2009) stress large bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities alongside
the usual reasons.
In contrast to the aforementioned reasonings, some emphasize the effects of the huge influx of
foreign capital from emerging markets. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) designate as fundamental
reasons a huge inflow of foreign capital and more accommodative regulatory policy. Greenspan
(2010) asserts that subdued long-term interest rates maintained by the persistent and large
demand for U.S. Treasury Bills initiated and fed the housing bubble and that the ultimate
driver of the crisis was the innately greedy nature of humankind. He adds that short-term
interest rates which can be manipulated by the Fed were not responsible for triggering the
housing boom.
In spite of these findings, research is still ongoing into what was the root reason was and
how the housing prices in the U.S. could reach such an unsustainable level. Just after the
crisis erupted, it was maintained that the extra loose policy stance of the Federal Reserve
over an extended period had driven housing prices to the unsustainable level and hence it
should take responsibility for the subsequent burst of the housing market bubble and the rip-
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ple effects on the overall economy.1 Although the assertion was refuted by staff at the Fed2,
numerous empirical findings reveal that low interest rates propelled the housing market into
the overheated phase, induced overheated investments in housing and caused excessive credit
expansion feeding the housing bubble.3 Unfortunately, the debate terminated inconclusively
because any decisive evidence was not provided. Still, as history has taught us, we need to
do our utmost to illuminate further the role played by monetary policy in the crisis forma-
tion process and derive lessons for monetary policy implementation to evade similar kinds of
economic disasters in the future. In light of that, efforts to answer the following questions
will shed some light on future policy decisions. Are interest rates the main driver of housing
boom-bust cycles and, if so, how do they change housing prices? Why did policy makers fail
to forecast the full impacts of the housing cycle on the overall economy? Was the failure
due to a misunderstanding of monetary policy transmission channels? If another exuberant
episode in the housing market or other asset markets occur, how should central banks react?
There already exist some answers to these questions. Regarding the question of whether
interest rates are important in driving housing prices, Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010) find that
house prices are fairly sensitive to monetary policy shocks and Iossifov et al (2008) concludes
that interest rates are a prime determinant of house prices. In terms of transmission channels
of monetary policy, Borio and Zhu (2008) and Rajan (2006) point out the missing channels
through which low interest rates abet the risk-taking by economic agents. Recent empirical
findings, representatively Jime´nez et al (2008), support that hypothesis. Regarding the final
question proposed above regarding whether central banks should react to abnormal expansion
of credit or rapid rise of house prices, Parie´s and Notarpietro (2008) and Kannan et al (2009)
provide evidence that central banks should intervene in the housing and credit markets by
adjusting policy rates.
1 Taylor (2007) holds this viewpoint.
2 Dokko et al (2009) and Bernanke (2010) insist that monetary policy decisions during the first half of the last
decade were appropriate even from the perspective of the Taylor rule and there is no evidence for the causal
link between such decisions and the housing boom.
3 Other arguments have been proposed as well. Kahn (2009) attributes the housing boom in the U.S. to
resurgence in productivity. Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) assign importance to population and income
growth in addition to interest rates.
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This thesis is another attempt to answer these questions. Starting from a review of the
long-debated issues regarding the implications of housing price inflation for monetary policy,
it explores the role of interest rates in generating cyclical movements in housing prices. Next,
it introduces the previously neglected transmission channels of monetary policy, namely the
risk-taking channel and preference channel, and finally concludes that central banks should
react to growth of asset prices or credit to enhance macroeconomic stability in case these
channels are operative.
Specifically, the first chapter summarizes the previous discussions on the issues surrounding
the identification of bubbles, accountability of monetary policy for housing bubbles and the
necessity for central banks to intervene in the housing market. In the prevalent viewpoint, the
identification of or judgement as to the existence of a bubble has been considered the most
daunting task and feasible only after a bubble bursts. The main findings from the empirical
research published before the housing market crash in the U.S. are introduced and a critical
review of these findings is added. Thereafter theoretical reasoning about how monetary policy
decisions influence housing prices and the related empirical evidence are provided. The last
part of the chapter compares the competing stances of the Fed and ECB in terms of whether
central banks should take action against a persistent rise in housing prices.
The second chapter examines the validity of the assumption underlying the debate on
whether monetary policy decisions were responsible for the recent boom-bust episode of the
U.S. housing market. Irrespective of conflicts between the two stances, it was implicitly
assumed that interest rates were the main driver of the bubble in house prices. However the
empirical literature provides inconclusive evidence for the dominant role of interest rates in
house price dynamism. Based on a comprehensive review of existing literature combined with
my own work, a hypothesis is proposed that not only just interest rates but also expectation
play major roles in rendering house prices more volatile. To examine its validity, a different
regression strategy from the one commonly adopted is employed. In the common type of
regression model, the dependent variable is a measure of cyclical component rather than the
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level of the house price itself extracted from a series on house prices by a filtering technique.
The empirical results obtained using the U.S. data support the hypothesis proposed above;
namely they confirm the primacy of interest rates in generating house price fluctuations and
the importance of the expectation channel in transmitting the effects of interest rates.
The third chapter aims to analyze the transmission effects of accommodative monetary
policy on the overall economy through the risk-taking channel operating in the mortgage
market within a DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) framework. To achieve
this, the analysis involves two steps. Firstly, the relationship between short-term rates and
LTV (loan-to-value) ratio is estimated using U.S. data from 1980 to 2007 to verify the existence
of the risk-taking channel. Secondly, the estimated relationship is incorporated in a general
equilibrium model featuring borrowing constraints and the housing market to construct the
virtual economy in which the risk-taking channel takes effect. The results from the first-
stage empirical analysis confirm that the channel has operated in the U.S. mortgage market;
the LTV ratio has an upward trend if the federal funds rate decreases. The ensuing DSGE
analysis reveals that if the risk-taking channel comes into force, a positive monetary policy
shock to the economy generates further deviations of consumption and debt from the steady
state than otherwise. Moreover, if lenders adjust the LTV ratio after taking into account their
expectations of policy rates and housing prices, the channel exerts a stronger influence on the
economy. These results suggest that under a low interest rate environment, monetary policy
analysis needs to take the risk-taking channel into account. In addition, regulatory reactions
to excessive risk-taking behaviours in the banking sector can be an appropriate measure for
smoothing the path of real and financial activities.
The fourth chapter aims to illustrate that an expansionary monetary policy shock renders
the economy more volatile once transmission impacts through the preference for housing
and bank’s risk-taking are considered in addition to through the traditional transmission
channels. To achieve this aim, I modify a workhorse DSGE model by incorporating the
impact of policy rates on housing preference and LTV ratio based on empirical evidence.
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Since an easier monetary policy stance likely increases the LTV ratio by lowering the risk
perception of bankers and consequently expanding the demand for housing, credit grows
rapidly and the economy becomes more volatile as in the run-up to the sub-prime crisis.
An optimal reaction of monetary policy to this credit-driven economy from the perspective
of macroeconomic stability is also examined in this chapter. Comparing the performances of
various alternative policy rules, the rule requiring an aggressive response to credit fluctuations
ensures a better performance than a standard Taylor rule when faced with an exuberant
predilection for housing and excessive risk-taking by banks.
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Issues on the Relationship between
Housing and Monetary policy
In this chapter, the theoretical issues on the relationship between housing and monetary
policy and the related empirical findings are summarized with a critical review. The issues
are (i) whether a certain observed level of housing price can be defined as a ‘bubble’ or not,
(ii) whether monetary policy decisions are accountable for bubbles, (iii) whether monetary
policy should respond to house price appreciation, and lastly (iv) to what extent and through
what channels house price fluctuations influence real economic activities. These questions are
closely interconnected and particularly important from a policy point of view. For example,
if the current level of housing prices proves to be sustainable and on a path of equilibrium
consistent with economic fundamentals such as income growth, consideration of the remaining
questions becomes largely irrelevant.
The practical implications for monetary policy can be clarified by taking the Federal Reserve
(Fed) as an example during the boom phase of the housing market. Considering the stance
expressed in the articles by the Fed staff and speeches by the members of Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, the then likely answers to the questions in 2006 can be inferred as follows:
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(i) it is hard to conclude a bubble exists in the housing market even though the housing
prices are rising rapidly, (ii) it is uncertain that a housing market boom can be accounted
for by the accommodative stance of the Fed, (iii) monetary policy decisions are ineffective for
curbing the speed of house price inflation and the artificial bursting of the bubble before its
peak costs substantially more compared with waiting for a natural collapse, and (iv) housing
affects overall economic growth and employment via consumption and residential investment.1
These answers lead to a scenario for taking policy actions as follows: if the prospective housing
downturn is more likely to induce an economic recession, policy interest rates need to be kept
low to attain full employment and price stability. This scenario was realized as we all observed.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.1, issues on the def-
inition of and identification of a bubble are summarized, and the related empirical findings
are introduced. In section 1.2, it will be discussed whether monetary policy is responsible for
bubbles. Section 1.3 tackles a practical issue of whether central banks should react to bubbles
and compares the stances of the Fed and ECB in respect of that issue. In the last section,
the empirical findings about the influences of changes in house prices on consumption and
investment activity are provided.
1.1 Does a Bubble Exist?
1.1.1 Definition of Bubble
The question whether there exists a bubble in housing prices arises repeatedly whenever the
price level in real terms is approaching or surpassing its previous peak. For that reason, the
debate on the existence of a bubble was reignited during the period of the boom phase, namely
2004-2007, in the U.S. The starting point in the debate, as in the previous ones, was to derive
a definition of a bubble as there was no firmly established one. The most frequently cited
definition by researchers in that field comes from Stiglitz (1990):
1 These answers are inferred from the stance expressed in Kohn (2006).
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If the reason that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling
price will be high tomorrow-when fundamental factors do not seem to justify such a price-
then a bubble exists. (pp.13)
Case and Shiller (2003) underscore the part of “investors believe” in that definition rather
than “fundamental factors”:
The notion of a bubble is really defined in terms of people’s thinking: their expectations
about future price increases, their theories about the risk of falling prices, and their worries
about being priced out of the housing market in the future if they do not buy. (pp. 301)
Their definition misses the connection between expectation and other economic factors. In
reality, it may be rare that investors’ expectations depend solely on pure belief or passively
accept what other investors perceive. Rather, a bubble is generated and magnified by support
from economic fundamentals and credit supply. Several objective conditions, such as ample
liquidity or low borrowing cost, should be met for a bubble to emerge as noted by Kindleberger
(1978).
In my opinion, it seems more appropriate to use the term ‘bubble’ to refer to the extent
to which house prices deviate from an equilibrium level justifiable by underlying economic
activities. In other words, the term seems to be related to degree rather than substance. In
light of these points, I define a bubble as follows.
A bubble refers to the phenomenon in which asset prices exceed a certain critical level
which can be justified by fundamental determinants of the demand for and supply of
housing.
Besides, a bubble can be defined as below from a retrospective viewpoint:
A certain level of asset prices can be regarded as a bubble if the asset prices turned down-
ward quickly responding sensitively to a minute change in one of the objective conditions
which had previously supported that level.
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1.1.2 Measuring a Bubble and Judging its Existence
As can be perceived with ease, the definitions above hardly provide any practical guidance on
how to judge whether the observed level of house prices are overvalued because no quantitative
criterion is included there. This is the very reason why most of the past debates on a bubble’s
existence before its burst terminated inconclusively. However, even though there has been no
agreement on what measure should be used to confirm the presence of a bubble, two ratios are
still being prevalently employed: house price-to-income ratio and rent-to-price ratio. Price-
to-income ratio reflects investors’ average affordability of housing. Rent-to-price ratio is the
measure for judging whether the current price level is in line with the fundamental value of
housing on the premise that rents represent the changes in the determinants of housing prices
just as dividends from equity are viewed as a proxy for the intrinsic future value of a company.
A different reasoning can be derived from the rent-to-price ratio. If the current level of house
prices were overvalued, market participants would choose to rent a house instead of buying.
As a result, the demand for housing for the purpose of owning decreases and house prices
decline.
During the first several years of this century, economists outside central banking and aca-
demic circles mainly resorted to these two indices to maintain that the U.S. housing market
was already in a bubble state and the trend in the housing market would reverse in the near
future. For example, Baker (2002) regards the rise in housing prices in the U.S. since 1995 as
a bubble based on the fact that the gap between the subindex of rent in the CPI (Consumer
Price Index) and the housing price index widened and historically such a discrepancy has been
reduced by subsequent falls in housing prices. Hatzius (2006) speculates that house prices in
2005 were overvalued by 15% according to the price-to-income ratio.
However, McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg et al (2005) raise doubts about
these assertions. The former starts from the criticism that the conventional measures fail to
reflect the effects of low mortgage interest rates. This obscures the significant implications for
affordability and for the equilibrium return on housing which equals rent-to-price ratio. If the
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decline in mortgage interest rates are appropriately reflected in calculating the ratios, it turns
out that the maximum amount of loans increased almost 130% from 1990 to 2003 and the price
of a standard single-family home can be regarded as reasonable from a cash flow standpoint.
Turning to rent-to-price ratio, they criticize the conventional way of computing the ratio based
on the fact that the subindex of rent in the CPI, the numerator in the ratio, controls for quality
change whereas the home price index compiled by OFHEO, the denominator, disregards it.2
To overcome such shortcomings, they modify the conventional computation process in two
ways. Firstly, the OFHEO house price index is replaced by the constant-quality new home
price index compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.3 Secondly, by subtracting interest
rates and property tax rate from the rent-to-price ratio computed by the first way, an adjusted
ratio is calculated.4 The two types of rent-to-price ratio show a relatively more stable path
compared to the ratio estimated in the conventional way. These findings lead them to conclude
that house price increases are driven chiefly by low mortgage interest rates and growth in
income, and thus there is no evidence of house price overvaluation.
Himmelberg et al (2005) share the spirit of McCarthy and Peach (2004) in that they employ
the user cost of capital as a conceptual instrument for judging whether housing is mispriced
and criticize the conventional computation for not taking the time series pattern of real long-
term interest rates into account. The imputed rent to actual rent ratio and imputed rent to
income ratio devised by them are used to judge whether the level of these indices as of the
end of 2004 are at or near the previous peak. They maintain that the concept of the user
2 The OFHEO refers to the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight which was merged into the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) based on the law “Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008” on July
30, 2008.
3 It is dubious whether identical quality adjustment method is used in compiling the constant-quality rent in
CPI and house price index.
4 Based on the reasoning of Poterba (1984) and the formula of user cost defined by Jorgenson (1963), the
arbitrage condition between renting and purchasing of a house is specified as below.
Rt = Pt[(1− τyt )(it + τpt ) + δt − E(piHt )]
where Rt denotes the implicit rent of the structure, Pt is the home price index, τ
y
t is the income tax rate, τ
p
t
is the property tax rate, δt is the depreciation rate, and E(pi
H
t ) is expected capital gains from the housing
asset. MaCarthy and Peach (2004) modifies this formula for calculating the adjusted rent-to-price ratio as
below.
(Rt/Pt)− [(1− τyt )(it + τpt ) + δt] = E(piHt )
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cost, the annual cost of home ownership termed the imputed rent, has an advantage over the
common rent-to-price ratio approach in that the concept of user cost is closer to the economic
cost of renting a house. The formula of the user cost, ut, defined in terms of the cost per
dollar for owning a house, is given as
ut = r
rf
t + ωt − τt(rmt + ωt) + δt − gt+1 + γt (1.1)
where rrft and r
m
t denote risk-free interest rate equivalent to the opportunity cost of buying
a house and mortgage interest rates respectively. ωt is property tax rate and τt is income tax
rate. The multiplicative term τt(r
m
t + ωt) means the mortgage interest and property taxes
deducted from income tax. δt refers to maintenance costs, gt+1 is expected capital gains
in the next period and γt is the risk premium accrued to homeowners. According to their
speculation, fluctuations in user costs, caused by, for instance, changes in interest rates or
taxes, lead to predictable changes in the rent-to-price ratio which reflect not bubbles but
fundamentals.
Based on the finding that the imputed rent to actual rent ratio as well as imputed rent to
income ratio measured at the end of 2004 are not as high as the levels of previous peaks, they
argue that mispricing in the housing market cannot be verified. An additional finding follows
that the two ratios are more volatile and distinct in the era of historically high or low interest
rates than other periods. It concludes that this finding suggests the observed housing boom
was being propelled by economic fundamentals.
Case and Shiller (2003) also contradict the evident existence of a bubble by implementing
a different approach. They employ not only the conventional measures but also the results of
a survey which investigates the motives for home buying and expectations about the future
path of house prices. Its main finding is that home price appreciation is driven by economic
fundamentals such as income growth and low interest rates, which is consistent with the
conclusions of McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg et al (2005). However, they also
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emphasise the survey result which indicates that speculative components in home prices were
observed in several metropolitan cities.
1.1.3 Comments
Firstly, it is worth questioning whether the judgments in the literature above prove to be
consistent with the subsequent evolution of the housing market thereafter. As can be seen in
Figure 2.1, housing prices increased persistently until the second half of 2007 and decreased
afterwards. With hindsight, there seems to be no denying that evidently there existed a
bubble as even Greenspan (2010) acknowledges (although he did not indicate so during his
tenure at the Fed). However, the ex-post discerning of the bubble does not contradict the
findings of the literature introduced above in that the researchers utilized the time series of
house price index before 2003 or 2004. Furthermore, as I defined earlier, the term bubble
should refer to degree rather than substance. In light of that, it remains unclear whether or
not the judgements in the literature were creditworthy at the time. However, it appears that
the researchers underestimated the strength of the momentum driving the upward phase of
the housing market.
Secondly, apart from the estimation and quality adjustment issues in calculating price-to-
income and rent-to-price ratios, the shortcoming in defining a bubble in Himmelberg et al
(2005) needs to be discussed. They define a housing bubble as below:
We think of a housing bubble as being driven by home buyers who are willing to pay
inflated prices for houses today because they expected unrealistically high housing appre-
ciation in the future. (pp. 1)
This definition, alongside Case and Shiller (2003), highlights only expectational aspects in
the motive of investors to purchase housing while ignoring that expectations evolve depending
on the developments in objective economic conditions such as overall financial state, monetary
policy and economic growth. Their definitions are based on the assumption that market
participants are irrational and unrealistic, expressed as irrational exuberance or excessive
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Figure 1.1. Housing Prices in U.S. after 1990s
Note: The index is seasonally-adjusted purchase-only index.
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
optimism, in a certain period and the objective conditions bear no relationship with these
expectations.
In my view, the role that monetary policy played in the process of expectation formation
is disregarded in the literature. The continued low interest rates appear to have not only
increased the affordability of housing but also have reinforced the expectations of further
house price appreciation. The causal link running from interest rates and liquidity to housing
prices, which will be elaborated on in the following section, was possibly perceived to a
certain extent by the market participants. Furthermore, the ‘benign’ neglect of the boom in
the housing market by the Fed may have motivated the public to expect that at least house
prices would not depreciate rapidly. It is because investors conjectured that a swift fall in
housing prices would certainly be detrimental to the overall economy and hence the central
bank would take rescue measures, including lowering of interest rates, to boost the overall
economy.
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Lastly, the failure in the forecasting of future house prices in Case and Shiller (2003) ex-
emplifies the shortcomings of excessive dependence on the psychological aspects of investors.
They foretold as of 2003 that the house price level would decline in the near future based on
their findings that investors’ confidence about future appreciation of real estate prices was
not as strong as in the late 1980s. The forecast proved to be wrong as house prices began to
decline only after the second half of 2007 as Figure 2.1 shows.
1.2 Is Monetary Policy Accountable for Bubbles?
Voluminous literature reports empirical findings about the relationship between monetary
policy (or its main instrument) and housing price inflation. Since these research findings will
be presented in great detail in the subsequent chapters, here I will provide only three selected
perspectives about how monetary policy accounts in part for bubble formation.
1.2.1 Theoretical Basis for Role of Monetary Policy in Housing Bubbles
The following three perspectives are widely recognized in the literature of how monetary policy
induces housing price inflation: the user cost perspective, the liquidity perspective and the
expectation perspective. All of these perspectives are related to the changes on the demand
side.5
First, the user cost perspective has provided the most potent and convenient tool for ex-
plaining changes in house prices since the early 1980s. If policy makers decide to lower policy
rates, the decision diminishes the opportunity cost of buying a house and provides the pos-
sibility of capital gain if housing prices respond normally to the change in interest rates.
Consulting the formula of the user cost can help understand this reasoning more clearly. To
5 Chapter 2 provides various perspectives about how housing prices are determined in terms of both supply
and demand in the housing market. Based on the assumption that supply of housing is fairly inelastic, we
confine our interest to here the demand side.
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rewrite the formula6 specified above,
ut = r
rf
t + ωt − τt(rmt + ωt) + δt − gt+1 + γt (1.2)
If the central bank lowers policy rates, the risk-free interest rate rrft which influences the
opportunity cost of owning a house will fall. As ownership becomes more attractive than
previously, the demand for housing increases. Moreover, if potential home buyers expect that
housing prices are more likely to rise in that low interest rate environment, the future capital
gains gt+1 will increase.
Second, different from the user cost perspective, the liquidity perspective puts more weight
on the indirect channel of interest rates via liquidity effect under the assumption that a more
accommodative monetary policy leads to ampler liquidity through the traditional monetary
policy transmission mechanism. Meltzer (1995) represents the typical logic of monetarists
about the influence of monetary shock on real asset prices. An expansionary monetary policy
shock lessens the relative level of marginal utility of money against other assets by increasing
the stock of money. To restore equilibrium by enhancing the marginal utility of money,
economic agents spend the surplus money in buying financial and real assets, which results in
asset price inflation. He takes the housing market collapse in Japan in the early 1990s as an
example for this asset market model. The growth rate of money in the late 1990s accelerated
as the Bank of Japan absorbed the U.S. dollars earned by exports to the U.S. to maintain the
fixed exchange rate agreed between the two governments. Sterilization necessarily entailed
expansion of domestic liquidity. In turn, the speedy increase of money raised the level of
expected inflation and as a consequence raised the demand for housing.
Third, the expectation perspective, explored initially by Case and Shiller in the research on
housing, mainly pertains to the derivative effects of house price appreciation on psychological
motivation to purchase housing. Notably, this is related to the lack of action on the part of the
6 Explanation for the notations in the equation were presented on pp. 12.
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central bank rather than any action on its part. As noted previously, Himmelberg et al (2005)
mention that neglecting a bubble by a central bank (rather than trying to burst it) can build
the expectations that house prices will not fall in the short-term. This inaction may incite risk-
taking by home buyers and expand the demand for housing. On the other hand, observing
house prices inflate continuously imbues anxiety into potential first-time home-buyers that
they may be priced out of the market. This anxiety also contributes to strengthening the
motive to buy homes in the short-term.
1.2.2 Review of Empirical Findings
It is worth mentioning several summary points of the empirical research to be introduced
below. Firstly, among empirical studies, Detken and Smets (2004) and Adalid and Detken
(2007) seek the theoretical foundation for their findings from Meltzer (1995). In other words
they adopt the liquidity perspective of monetarists. Secondly, most studies employ VAR
techniques while Detken and Smets (2004) use a filtering method and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) employ a DSGE framework. Thirdly, all studies except for Negro and Otrok (2007)
validate the hypothesis that the environment of lower interest rates is one of the drivers of
the housing boom.
To begin with, Detken and Smets (2004) elicit stylized facts about the economic devel-
opments associated with past asset price booms in 18 OECD (Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development) countries. Although the aggregate real asset price index con-
structed in the paper includes not only real residential estate prices but also real commercial
estate prices and real equity prices, the stylized facts derived can be true of housing and the
methodology for discovering the facts provides a useful guidance for future study.7
The first step in the methodology is estimating the trend of the index by employing a one-
sided Hodrick-Prescott Filter and then calculating the asset price gap which is defined as the
7 The weights used to compute aggregate prices are the relative share of each of the three assets in the wealth
of the private sector. The weight given to real asset prices is far higher compared with to other two.
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discrepancy between the actual level of the index and the extracted trend. The second step is
to identify the boom periods; this is defined as a period in which the aggregate real asset price
index exceeds the trend by more than 10%. The final step is to calculate the medians of asset
prices and a variety of economic variables and then look for differences in the medians of the
variables in the three artificially segmented periods which are pre-boom, during-boom and
post-boom periods.8 The pre-boom and post-boom periods are defined as two years before
and after the identified boom period.9
Three stylized facts are notable. First, growth rate is higher immediately before and during
the boom period. Second, policy rates are lower than the Taylor rule prescriptions by 2
percentage points in the during-boom periods. Third, the growth rates of real credit and
real money are robust before and during the boom. Additionally, the growth rates of credit
and money decelerate more appreciably after a considerable slowdown in economic activity
following the high-cost booms which by definition are the booms followed by a fall of over
3 percentage points in average real growth. This suggests that high-cost booms may be
correlated with looser monetary conditions. These facts can be true of the housing sector
since the aggregate asset price index constructed moves in tandem with real residential estate
prices. A caveat follows that these findings merely about an association between monetary
policy and asset price booms, and have nothing to say about a causal connection.
Adalid and Detken (2007), based on the findings of Detken and Smets (2004), explicitly
aim to estimate the causal relationship between liquidity and real estate prices by eliminating
the endogeneity problem which arises as the growth of liquidity interacts with asset price
fluctuations. To attain this aim, a VAR approach is employed using the sample statistics
from 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2004. Although the effectiveness of the VAR approach
in eliminating the endogeneity problem is uncertain, the results obtained by a panel VAR
8 The variables include real and monetary variables. The real variables are Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
consumption and investment. The monetary variables are credit growth, money gap and the Taylor gap.
9 The paper also applies the same procedure to high-cost booms (which by definition are booms followed by a
fall of over 3 percentage points in average real growth) to examine the distinguishing features of economic
development during high-cost booms.
18
Chapter 1. Issues on Housing and Monetary Policy
analysis reveal that real residential estate prices appreciate slightly over 1% subsequently if
money grows by 1% on average in the previous six quarters.
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) pay more heed to the interplay among money variables,
house prices and real economic variables based on theoretical considerations. However, the
theoretical basis is not firmly verified and includes the more or less ambiguous relationship
between economic variables. The main argument is that house prices, credit and consumption
via the wealth and collateral effects and residential investment are closely interrelated. The
paper, in particular, especially highlights the interaction between credit and house prices
whereas the previous literature emphasized only a one-directional link running from liquidity
to housing prices. Apart from testing this interaction, they examine an additional hypothesis
that monetary shocks have more impact on house prices during the boom periods in the
OECD countries.
It might be informative to review shortly the empirical model in understanding these find-
ings.
Yi,t = At +A(L)Yi,t + εi,t (1.3)
where Yi,t is a vector of endogenous variables, At is a matrix of country-specific fixed effect,
A(L) is a matrix of polynomial in the lag operator.10 Through Granger causality tests, they
find that monetary variables and house prices exerta significant mutual influence, on the one
hand, and on future GDP growth on the other hand. However, in terms of future CPI, only
money growth turns out to be important. A separate analysis with a VAR model augmented
with a dummy variable shows that monetary shocks are more influential on house prices in
the boom period.
The following three empirical studies focus on the U.S. housing boom. Jarocinski and Smets
10The vector of endogenous variables consists of 6 differenced variables, real GDP (∆y), consumer price index
(∆cpi), short-term nominal interest rate (∆ir), the nominal residential house prices (∆hp) nominal broad
money (∆m), nominal private credit (∆c). All the variables are in log difference form except for the nominal
interest rate.
Y = [∆y,∆cpi,∆ir,∆hp,∆m,∆c]′
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(2008) use a Bayesian VAR (BVAR) model to assess the role of housing and monetary policy
in the U.S. business cycle from 1987 Q1 to 2007 Q2. The following 9-variable BVAR models of
order five are specified both in levels and in growth rates. The vector of endogenous variables
in the level-VAR (L-VAR) and the differences-VAR (D-VAR) are given respectively as below:
L-VAR : [y, c, p, HI/Y, hp− p, cp, i, s, m]
D-VAR : [∆Y, ∆c, ∆p, HI/Y, ∆hp−∆p, ∆cp, i, s, ∆m]
(1.4)
where i denotes the federal funds rate, s is the long-term interest rate spread, HI is the
residential investment and Y is nominal GDP. y is real GDP, c is real consumption, p is the
GDP deflator, hp is nominal house prices, cp is commodity prices and m is money stock. ∆
in the D-VAR is a lag operator. The authors assign more credibility to the results of D-VAR
than L-VAR. One of their important findings is that a substantial fraction of housing price
inflation during 2004 to 2005 can be accounted for by the low level of short and long-term
interest rates, but not by GDP developments. However, the developments in GDP are proven
to explain the continued growth of house prices after the economic slowdown in 2001 and
2002.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) develop a DSGE model which features common New Keynesian
assumptions such as sticky nominal prices and wages, borrowing constraints and heterogeneity
among the two production sectors for housing and non-housing goods. Furthermore, housing is
assumed to directly affect the utility functions of households and can be provided as collateral
for bank loans. The model is estimated using quarterly U.S. data over the period 1965 Q1 to
2006 Q4. The main aim of the model estimation is in gauging the extent to which the housing
market has contributed to business fluctuations in the U.S. However, the relationship between
monetary policy and house prices is derived from the structural nature of the model and this
makes it possible to recognize the structural factors that have driven house prices in the past.
One of the main estimation result is that looser monetary conditions maintained by the Fed
explains a considerable part of the house price inflation from 2000 to 2005. In addition, the
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low level of short and long-term interest rates are found to have bolstered the housing boom
during from 2004 to 2005.
Lastly, Negro and Otrok (2007) delve into the magnitude of response of house prices to
the monetary policy shocks during the (housing) boom period after 2000. To resolve the
well-known problem that the aggregate housing price index blurs the unique properties of
housing markets in each state, a dynamic factor model is employed and the aggregate housing
price index is decomposed into three hierarchical levels which are national, regional and state
level. It finds that the impact of the monetary policy shock alone is not negligible, but the
magnitude of its influence is trivial compared to the influence of the high growth rate of house
prices. However, it is questionable whether the maintained assumption is plausible; that house
prices can be decomposed into three distinct dimensions and monetary policy influences only
the national factor. This assumption might result in underestimating the effects of monetary
policy since local factors presumably are influenced by changes in policy rates.
To synthesize the empirical findings mentioned above (setting aside model uncertainty and
robustness issues), loose monetary policy conditions and strong credit growth are likely to
have been a main cause of the housing market booms, at least for the most recent boom
in the U.S. The limitation of these studies is that the theoretical exposition of the causality
running from monetary policy to housing prices is not adequate and it is difficult to derive
implications for monetary policy implementation in the future.
1.3 Should the Central Bank Respond to House Price Appre-
ciation?
Arguments for the normative role of the central bank in periods of asset price appreciation
appears repeatedly in the history. The most recent examples are the arguments for aggressive
intervention by the central bank during the U.S. high-tech boom in the late 1990s and the
housing market booms in several industrialized countries from 2000 to 2007. In this section,
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we discuss various arguments about whether central banks should intervene in the midst of
bubble expansion. Depending on the arguments for the necessity of central banks to raise
interest rates in reaction to bubbles, the stances can be classified into three categories: these
stances of the Fed, the ECB and leaning against the wind strategy.
1.3.1 Stance of the Fed: Conventional Strategy
The Fed has never enunciated its stance about whether it should react to asset price bubbles.
If any, governors at the Fed have expressed their opinions in speeches with the familiar caveat
that their own opinion should not be misunderstood as the official stance of the Fed or a
consensus among their colleagues. However, one can derive a consistent position from these
speeches.11
The conclusions implicit in these speeches can be summarized as follows: the best strategy
in tackling asset price bubbles is to wait until a bubble bursts by itself and then minimize its
adverse aftereffects on the overall economy by lowering the federal funds rate. This stance is
expressed relatively clearly in Greenspan (1999).
Such straying above fundamentals could create problems for our economy when the in-
evitable adjustment occurs. It is the job for economic policymakers to mitigate the fallout
when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.
There are several arguments for this implicit stance. The first is the difficulty in discerning
bubbles. The argument goes that a bubble is inherently unidentifiable in a timely fashion be-
cause uncertainty is substantial surrounding the measures and models for judging the presence
of a bubble.
The second argument against extra action is based on scepticism about the effectiveness of
11The relevant speeches are Greenspan (2002), Bernanke (2002), Ferguson (2005), Kohn (2006, 2007, 2008),
Mishkin (2008) and the related article is Mishkin (2007).
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monetary policy in decelerating the appreciation speed of targeted asset prices.12 The scep-
ticism arises from the following three considerations. First, monetary policy is an ineffective
instrument for aiming at a specific type of asset class in that changes in policy rates influence
not only other asset prices but also real economic activities. In that context, monetary policy
is viewed as a tool mainly for achieving maximum employment under stable inflation. Second,
it is hard to estimate the scale of speculative component latent in the observed price level of
an asset. Furthermore, the impact of monetary policy on the speculative elements have been
barely understood. The Fed believes that a moderate measure such as a 1 or 2% rate hike
has proven to be ineffective in curbing the evolution of bubble. It is because expected capital
gains during boom periods usually exceed the increase in opportunity cost caused by the rate
hike to a considerable extent. These effects are compounded by the lags involved in policy
affecting asset prices. There seems to be a belief shared among the Fed staff that the width of
policy rate hike enough to suppress exuberant atmosphere in asset markets is likely to bring
about substantially subdued economic activities.
The third argument for not adopting the extra action strategy is the view that the po-
tential benefits of checking speculation in asset markets do not suffice to justify the central
bank’s intervention. Raising interest rates inevitably induces the side-effect of slower eco-
nomic growth and volatile expectations about future inflation. Furthermore, the Fed insists
that such side-effect should be smaller than that of reduced economic activities brought about
by the self-correction in asset markets. As Bernanke (2001) shows by means of a simulations,
the benefit in terms of reduced output-gap of responding to stock prices is overwhelmed by
the increased variability of inflation. However, Kohn (2008) concedes that considering the
magnitude of negative repercussions caused by the collapse of the housing market in the U.S.,
the gain of extra action in this episode might have been larger than expected before the
sub-prime crisis fully unfolded.
12The term extra action was coined by Kohn (2006) which refers to a tighter policy stance to confront the
inflation in asset prices while the conventional strategy means the policy where the central bank responds
to asset price developments only when they have crucial implications for future output and inflation. The
former action is referred to proactive and the latter as reactive monetary policy by Bordo and Jeanne (2002).
Trichet (2005) labels the former the orthodox view.
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1.3.2 Leaning Against the Wind
The strategy of leaning against the wind refers to a circumspect response to raise policy
rates in reaction to asset price bubbles while accommodating a deviation of inflation from the
targeted level of price stability. The preconditions for the implementation of the strategy are
that the existence of a bubble is perceived and its harmful implications for the overall economy
are evident. The greatest benefit of the principle is recognized as the prevention of possible
moral hazard which can be fostered under the conventional strategy. As stated previously,
if economic agents expect the implementation of a simple reactive strategy by the central
bank, the bubble can inflate more due to a higher level of risk-taking compared with the case
of leaning against the wind. Hence, taking extra action can reduce disruptive repercussions
following the bursting of a bubble. Despite the potential benefits, leaning against the wind
is recommended under the following strict conditions. First, the probability of the bubble
bursting should be low. Second, asset prices should react swiftly to changes in interest rates
and finally the overall efficiency loss in the economy should be proportional to the magnitude of
the bubble. An additional condition is that the misalignment of asset prices with fundamentals
should be the result of underlying structural imbalances which can be corrected by prudential
regulations.
1.3.3 Stance of the ECB
Whereas the Fed has never announced its official stance about whether to intervene in asset
markets while adhering to the tacit conventional strategy, the ECB explicitly and formally
admits that it can resort to leaning against the wind strategy in special circumstances.13
Trichet (2005) represents the position of the ECB in a lucid way.
As discussed a moment ago, allowing some short-term deviation from price stability in
order to better ensure price stability over more extended horizons might (under very
restrictive assumptions) be the optimal policy to follow. The principle behind it should
13Related references are Issing (2003), ECB (2005), Trichet (2005) and Papademos (2006). Issing (2003)
differentiates the cautious intervention of the ECB from leaning-against-the wind because he regards the
latter as equivalent to popping bubbles.
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not be misunderstood as a systematic reaction to asset price booms, but rather as a
selective response based on the careful analysis of all the available information.
As recognized widely, the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability which
is defined as below and close to 2% with a medium-term orientation. This medium-term
horizon, the ECB asserts, allows it to tolerate short-term disparity between the actual and
the desired level of inflation on the premise that asset price misalignments have significant
implications for price stability over the medium-term. The prime argument for implementing
this cautious approach is that monetary policy intervention during asset price booms can
prevent the problem of moral hazard by maintaining symmetry in policy response.
It would be interesting to investigate where the difference in the stances of the Fed and ECB
originate from. Even though it requires a separate study, possible sources for the different
views may include: (i) the disparate stipulation about their objectives,14 (ii) the relative
weight placed on the role of monetary analysis, (iii) the ECB’s confidence about the strong
correlation between money and asset prices and (iv) the different time horizons of policy
implementation.
1.4 Effects of Changes in House Prices on Real Economy
Evaluating the magnitude of the effect of house price changes on economic sectors is essential
for forecasting the future path of the economy after house price deflation and choosing proper
policy measures to support its resilience. For example, Leamer (2007) demonstrates that the
eight recessions in the U.S. economy happened mainly because of the significant slowdown
in residential investments. The channels through which changes in house prices influence
consumption and investment can be summarized as three: wealth channel, collateral channel
14Article 105 in The Treaty stipulates that the objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability and without
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB (European System of Central Banks) shall support the
general economic policies in the Community whereas Section 2a in the Federal Reserve Act specifies the goals
of monetary policy as to maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with
the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.
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and Tobin’s Q channel. The first channel affects household consumption whereas the second
influences all types of entrepreneurial investment as well as consumer spending. The last
channel is mainly about residential investment.
1.4.1 Wealth Effect
The wealth effect is widely recognised since the life-cycle hypothesis states that increases
in wealth affect consumption positively irrespective of the type of wealth. Households try
to smooth their consumption path by spending unexpected gains on their wealth as own-
ers of houses show tendency to consume more in the presence of house price appreciation.
Even though several issues regarding the wealth effect remain controversial, empirical find-
ings mostly assign a positive sign to this effect.15 The size of that effect differs depending on
empirical findings. Mishkin (2007) states that the long-run marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth in the U.S. is estimated as 3.75% in the Fed model. Jarocinski and Smets (2008)
estimate the impulse response of real consumption to be 7.5% after four quarters in response
to a 1% permanent increase in real house prices. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) find that the
estimated house price elasticity of consumption is 7%; a figure similar to that in Jarocinski
and Smets (2008).
1.4.2 Collateral Effect
The collateral effect has gained prominence gradually since the financial liberalisation of the
1980s and more rapidly in the past decade. Bernanke et al (1999) provide a theory on
the important linkage between the value of collateral and demand for bank lending. Here
the information asymmetry problem produces cost to lenders as they try to verify the true
economic state and future cash flow of borrowers. The cost acts as an additional premium
to the risk-free interest rate. As a result, the value of collateral is negatively associated with
15The first issue is whether the effects differ depending on the type of wealth. A second issue is whether the
increase in housing wealth may dampen consumption as future home buyers increase savings. Mishkin (2007)
provides detailed explanations.
26
Chapter 1. Issues on Housing and Monetary Policy
the finance premium. If the value of collateral rises, it reduces the possible loss in the event
of default on loans as well as the information cost incurred by monitoring whether borrowers
undertake riskier projects. In turn, increases in the value of collateral lead to decreases
in the finance premium. Thus, the improved balance sheet caused by rises in house prices
induces lenders to be willing to supply credit at lower interest rates. That can stimulate
further borrowing by households as well as firms facing credit constraints. Subsequently,
credit expansion fuels consumption and entrepreneurial investment.
On the other hand, increases in home value also directly raise the maximum borrowing
amount even if the loan-to-value ratio remains constant since collateral value also affects the
ceiling on borrowing. As we observed during the housing boom period, the so-called mort-
gage equity withdrawal (MEW) increased appreciably as house prices rose. Evidently, the
quantitative effect of housing price appreciation on the amount of credit available expands
consumption positively especially in the case of financially constrained households. In addi-
tion to the effect on consumption, the collateral effect can be applicable to entrepreneurial
investment as well because firms finance bank funding by providing collateral such as lands
and machinery.
Related research has became livelier after the credit extended to the private sector grew
rapidly as a result of house price inflation in the run-up to the financial crisis. I take Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) as a representative case for the purpose of brevity. In their model, households
are classified as patient and impatient ones. While patient households lend funds to firms and
impatient households, impatient households provide the minimum level of wealth required for
a down payment on their home and are facing a collateral constraint in their borrowing. This
constraint is expressed as:
bt ≤ m Et(qt+1htpit+1/Rt) (1.5)
where bt refers to borrowing, m is loan-to-value ratio, qt+1 is the real price of housing, ht is
the stock of housing, pit+1 is the overall level of inflation and Rt is nominal interest rates.
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This constraint states that the amount of borrowed money should not exceed a fraction m,
the LTV ratio, of the expected house price in the next period. They confirm the impact of
the collateral constraint on consumption imposed in their model because the coefficient of
housing wealth in a reduced-form regression of consumption differs widely depending on the
level of m. A basic regression in their model is given as below.
∆logCt = 0.004 + 0.123 ∆logHWt−1 (1.6)
where Ct is consumption and HWt−1 is housing wealth in the previous period. The estimated
coefficient of housing wealth decreases to 0.099 in the absence of collateral effects, namely
m = 1, whereas it rises to 0.150 when m is set to 0.5. They conclude that their model is in
line with the theoretical reasoning that the higher is the proportion of households who use
their home as collateral, the stronger is the wealth effect on consumption.
1.4.3 Tobin’s Q Effect
One of the stylized facts found by Detken and Smets (2004) is that the growth rate of real
GDP is close to a 3.5% per annum when the housing boom is in progress and immediately
before the boom begins. On the other hand, it drops to 1.3% after the boom ends. To a con-
siderable extent, the variations are due to fluctuations in residential investment. Intuitively,
the simple dynamics of supply and demand can explain the effects of changes in housing
prices on residential investment. As the level and growth rate of house prices increase, the
user cost of home ownership decreases owing to positive capital gains. In turn, the demand
for housing expands and, responding to that, the supply side reacts to exploit more profitable
opportunities.
The hypothesis above can be supported by theoretical considerations from Cummins et al
(2006) and Topel and Rosen (1988). Cummins et al (2006) postulate that investment is a
positive function of the shadow price of capital. In the model, a firm maximizing the expected
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present discounted value of future profits considers the relationship between investment and
the shadow price of capital. It is formulated as follows.
It
Kt−1
= δ +
1
α
(qt − 1) + ωt (1.7)
where It denotes investment, Kt−1 is capital stock in the previous period, δ is the rate of de-
preciation, α is a constant, qt is the shadow price of capital and ωt is the productivity shock.
16
As they expound, in the Neoclassical framework marginal q becomes identical to Tobin’s Q
under the specific conditions of linear homogeneity in net revenue function and perfect com-
petition. If the Neoclassical proposition is combined with the conditional equivalence of q to
Tobin’s average Q, this implires that construction companies would expand new investment
should the equity price of the company rise on expectations about future profit increases.
Topel and Rosen (1988) present the relationship directly by associating housing value with
investment. A simplified form of the related equation is given as below.
ϕI(t) = θP (t)− τC(t) (1.8)
where It is investment, Pt is the price of one unit of housing, Ct is the cost function, and all
coefficients of ϕ, θ and τ are assumed to be positive and close to zero.17 Hence the investment
is positively affected by the price of housing.
It is still inconclusive empirically whether a rise in Tobin’s Q enhances new investment in
reality. Cummins et al (2006) finds that the elasticity of investment-capital ratio to a unit
16The derivation of this equation is based on profit maximization together with a standard adjustment cost
technology. The derivation is presented on pp.6-7 of Cummins et al (2006).
17The original equation is given by
(1 + rβD − βD2)I(t) =
(
β
C22
)
P (t)−
(
β
C22
)
[C1 + rC2 + C13y(t)] (1.9)
where the terms Ci and Cij are derivatives of cost function with respect to It, D is the first derivative
with respect to time, r is interest rate and β = C22/(C11 + rC21). The derivation process can be found on
pp.722-723.
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increase in Tobin’s Q is over unity in a panel data analysis of 4 years of sample data of
companies recorded in a database.18 Topel and Rosen (1988), based on the equation linking
house prices to investment, elicit a supply function of housing by regressing single-family
house prices and other variables on new housing starts over the period 1963 Q1 to 1983 Q4.
The basic regression function is given as follows.
It = β0 + β2Pt + β3yt + νt (1.10)
where It is new housing starts during the period t, Pt is the quality adjusted real house price
index and yt is the vector of variables shifting costs. The price elasticity of new housing invest-
ment implied by the estimate of β2 is 2.76 in the long run if the price change is permanent.
19
Turning to sensitivity to temporary changes in housing prices, the elasticity of investment to
a 1% change of housing price lasting for two years is 1.68 in the current period with the same
model specification.
In Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the baseline estimate of the house price elasticity of residential
investment is slightly over 3.5% in the first year in a reduced form regression. This is higher
than the estimate of Topel and Rosen (1988).
1.5 Concluding Remarks
The main issues regarding the relationship between the housing sector and monetary policy
has been reviewed; accountability of monetary policy for housing booms, an appropriate
strategy of central banks in reacting to the excessive inflation of house price and the spill-over
effects of the housing sector to the entire economy.
The first issue will be probed in greater detail through a review of the past studies on
18The finding is also true for real Q constructed by the authors using the expected earnings of analysts instead
of real earnings records.
19The authors view this as the best estimate among their estimation results which differ widely depending on
the model specifications.
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the determinants of house price. Chapter 2 will provide an additional answer through a
regression analysis to that question whether monetary policy has been a main driver of house
price fluctuations. This analysis is based on an empirical testing for the significance of the
impact of interest rates on housing cycles. The second issue will be tackled in Chapter 4 to
examine the relative efficiency of different policy rules if they are implemented in the model
economy similar to the pre-crisis circumstances in the last decade. Finally, the influence of
the housing sector on the whole economy will be analyzed by adopting a DSGE framework
in both Chapter 3 and 4.
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Housing Cycle and Interest Rates
2.1 Introduction
The main topics in the research on housing have changed to help solve the circumstantial
issues arising from a specific situation as in other research fields. In the 1970s, the era of
high inflation, researchers focused on the influence of inflation on housing prices and house-
holds’ affordability of housing. Later, as the baby boom generation in the U.S. exited from
the household formation cohort in the late 1980s, the influence of changes in demographics
emerged as the main issue in forecasting the future evolution of the housing market. From
the beginning of this century, various issues have been raised with regard to the observed
exuberant behaviour of all types of participants including households, banks and investors in
the housing markets of the U.S. and several European countries. During the same period,
researchers came to recognize more clearly that the role of the housing sector in terms of
business cycle and monetary policy conduct became increasingly important. The list of the
debated issues include the existence of a bubble, the accountability of monetary policy de-
cisions for the housing boom and the effectiveness of monetary policy intervention to curb
housing price inflation. While researchers’ interests in the first and last issue have waned to
some extent, the second issue is still receiving intense attention as the debate continues on
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whether the sub-prime crisis can be attributed to the accommodative policy stance adopted
during the first half of the past decade.1
In that debate, the side arguing for the responsibility of the extra loose monetary policy
for the crisis, represented by Taylor (2007), cites as the evidence that the actual level of
policy interest rates for the same period remained below the Taylor rule prescriptions in the
U.S. Adding to that, Jarocinski and Smets (2008) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) also find
through a VAR and DSGE approach, respectively, that the low level of policy rates affected
house price appreciation considerably at least during the period from 2004 to 2005.2 The
stance represented by Taylor, designated as the conventional wisdom by Greenspan (2010),
entailed a deluge of retorts from both inside and outside the central bank community. The
main issues raised in that discussion are firstly, the degree of accommodativeness in monetary
policy, secondly, the magnitude of the influence of the federal funds rates (FFR) as short-term
interest rates on housing demand, and lastly, the applicability of Taylor’s contention to other
countries which experienced a similar degree of house price appreciation as the U.S.
As regards the first issue, Dokko et al (2009) and Bernanke (2010) contend that the policy
decisions of the Fed during 2002-2006 were not so loose as initially perceived by observers
adhering to the conventional wisdom. This judgement is based on the finding that the Taylor
gaps estimated in Taylor (2007) by far exceed the gaps estimated by using an inflation in-
dex3 different from common CPI (Consumer Price Index) and unrevised data for output and
inflation in the Taylor rule formula.
For the second issue, Greenspan (2010) maintains that long-term interest rates were the
main driver of the housing boom since a considerable proportion of mortgages in the U.S.
is linked to 30-year fixed interest rates. Since long-term rates, he argues, were subdued for
1 The discussion on this topic appeared from at the beginning of this century as in BIS(2003, Ch 6. Financial
Markets), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) inter alia.
2 However, Dokko et al (2009) interprets the results as monetary policy accounting for only a small fraction of
house price increases in the same period. From my viewpoint, their interpretation appears to underestimate
the influential power of monetary policy in the results.
3 The index is the core PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditure) price index.
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Figure 2.1. House Price and Interest Rates in U.S.
Data Source: Federal Reserve, Standard and Poor’s Case & Shiller Index
Note: The shaded area represents to the period from the 3rd quarter of 2004 to the 2nd
quarter of 2006.
a prolonged period (presumably due to the global saving glut), he seems to conclude that
the tremendous stockpiles of savings in the Asian emerging markets were the root cause of
the housing boom. He also points out the limitation of implementing the Taylor rule in
investigating the issue since no input in the equation is related to housing demand and hence
a lower level of policy rate than the level calculated by the rule is not necessarily followed by
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house price inflation.
The last issue, i.e., the generality of the conventional wisdom, is examined by Kannan et al
(2009). They find that there is only negligible association in 21 advanced countries between
the accommodative degree of monetary policy identified by the negative Taylor residuals and
house price appreciation.
An additional ground for denying the conventional wisdom in Dokko et al (2009) and Kohn
(2008) is that monetary policy stance was tight during the most exuberant period of the
housing market from the third quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2006. However, even
though house prices peaked during that period, the growth rate continued decreasing during
the same period as can be observed in Figure 2.1. This fact reflects the gradually weakening
momentum of housing prices during that period and hence such period cannot be referred to
as ‘the most exuberant one’. Furthermore, considering the delayed response of house prices
to the changes in macroeconomic variables, their assertion hardly provides any implication
for solving that issue.
Despite the stark contrast in the two competing stances, they shared two assumptions.
Firstly, interest rates are the primary determinant of housing demand and secondly, the
increase in demand drove the housing boom. The participants in the debate take it for granted
that the demand for housing responds most sensitively to interest rates, be it short-term or
long-term, nominal or real, and variable or fixed. Even Greenspan (2010), who has ascribed
the crisis to an extraordinarily low level of risk aversion, admits that “the global house price
bubble was a consequence of lower interest rates.” However several questions naturally arise.
Does there exist evidence of the prime role of interest rates in house price determination?
Can we disregard the possibility that other usual house price determinants, such as income,
might affect house prices more than interest rates?
As regards the first question, there is conflicting evidence regarding the role interest rates
play in determining housing demand. Even with a cursory look at the existing empirical
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results summarized in Girouard et al (2006) and Iossifov et al (2008), wide variation in the
magnitude of the coefficient of interest rates can be noticed easily. For example, the estimated
interest rate elasticity of house prices ranges from -0.02 to -7.1. The former figure comes from
Annett (2005) for eight Euro-area countries during the period from 1970 to 2003 and the
latter one is estimated in OECD (2004) about Netherlands during the period 1970 through
2002.4
This huge discrepancy between the estimates of elasticity are possibly caused by differences
in sample period and countries, empirical models, and explanatory variables. Furthermore,
some of the empirical models used in the literature lack a sound basis for the causal chain
between house prices and the variables in an empirical model. To take an example, Drake
(1993) selects income, mortgage rates, housing starts as explanatory variables in the regression
equation without any discussion as to whether the choice of variables is plausible. To give
another example, Sutton (2002) includes stock prices among the variables in a VAR model.
The finding is that stock price fluctuations are as important as GNP (Gross National Product)
and interest rates in explaining house price variations. However, there hardly exists any robust
evidence for the interrelationship between stock and house prices except for a certain level
of correlation and even the correlation can be driven by a common factor. Considering that
the choice of explanatory variables may distort or misrepresent the unknown true effects of
interest rates on house prices, it is necessary to examine the robustness of resulting empirical
results.
Turning to the theoretical literature on the relationship between interest rates and house
prices, the reasoning related to the user cost of housing lends firm support to the channel
through which interest rates exert negative influences on house prices; see Mishkin (2007)
and Edge et al (2010). Poterba (1984) derived the concept of the user cost of housing from
the neoclassical type of investment model formulated by Jorgenson (1963). Still, theoretical
considerations to date are short of shedding light on the issues of what are the main drivers
4 OECD is the acronym for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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of house prices and whether interest rates are more important than other factors.
Considering the limitations of the foregoing empirical findings in answering the query of
whether interest rates have been the most forceful driver of house price fluctuations, my aim
in this chapter is to provide another contribution in this analysis. There are two notable
aspects making this chapter distinct from previous empirical research.
Firstly, this chapter provides an elaborate explanation about the causal relationship be-
tween house prices and its usual candidate determinants through extensive reviewing existing
theoretical and empirical findings. It also summarizes three existing approaches to housing
market equilibrium and empirical methods used in the field of housing research.
Secondly, the empirical analysis in this chapter focuses more on the volatile components
latent in house prices to evaluate the role of each determinant in generating house price volatil-
ity. Deviations of actual house prices from long-term trend, extracted by Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter, are regressed on the relevant variables identified by close review of existing empir-
ical studies. In contrast, past empirical studies have tried to explain the overall vicissitude of
house prices using the level or growth rate of house price while using an equilibrium approach
to the housing market and its derivative house price equations. Exceptionally, Agnello and
Schuknecht (2011) regresses the probability of the housing booms and busts on the determi-
nants of the phenomena. To explain in more detail, they first identify the determinants5 of the
booms and busts in industrialized countries and in the next stage measure their impacts on
the probability of the events. One notable common aspect exists between their approach and
that used in this chapter. The dependent variable in the regression equation is not the level
of house price but separate information extracted from house prices to discern the abnormal
phases of the housing market. The dependent variable is the cyclical components of house
prices in our analysis while it is the probability of occurrence of booms and busts in Agnello
and Schuknecht (2011).
5 The determinants are growth in per-capita real GDP, the level of short-term interest rates, the growth rate
of real credit to the private sector and the growth rate of working-age population.
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I will provide theoretical
reasoning about the causality between the price of housing and its determinants and review
the related empirical findings. In Section 2.3, previous empirical approaches are surveyed
first and a regression model for analysis is specified. Section 2.4 provides the results of the
empirical analysis. Section 2.5 is sets out my conclusion.
2.2 House Price Determinants
The determinants of house prices to be examined in this section include only demand-side
factors based on the assumption that the housing market is driven mainly by demand rather
than supply. This assumption derives from theoretical and empirical findings presented below.
Based on these findings, the proposition that equilibrium is determined mainly by the demand
side is judged to best befit the characteristics of the housing market although different views
exist.6
2.2.1 Survey of Different Approaches to Housing Market Equilibrium
Before house price determinants we will survey below, it is worth surveying the various ap-
proaches to the concept of equilibrium in the housing market. The approaches are categorized
into three types: the supply-demand approach, equilibrium price approach and demand-only
approach. 7
6 In contrast with the equilibrium approach, there have been attempts to explain house price movements by
the disequilibrium approach such as Fair (1972).
7 There can be a fourth approach to defining equilibrium price utilizing the asset market equilibrium condition.
This condition requires that the marginal cost, i.e., user cost of owning a house, be equal to the marginal
benefit of housing services, equivalently, that the return on housing investment should be the same as that
on other asset investments as Poterba (1984, 1991) states. However, since the user cost is virtually a function
of housing demand factors (to be explained in detail later), the asset market equilibrium approach can be
regarded as a variant of the demand-only approach elaborated in this section.
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2.2.1.1 Supply-Demand Approach
The supply-demand approach originates from earlier endeavours to model the owner-occupied
housing sector using the general framework of supply and demand. As in Hendry (1984), this
approach specifies first the demand and supply functions of housing. The main argument
of these functions is lagged house prices. Then the equilibrium relationship is derived by
equating demand and supply, and subsequently the housing price is defined as a function of
housing price determinants. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) summarize the traditional form
of the stock-flow approach for the residential housing market as below in which the housing
supply function is defined as a differential equation.
D = D(X1, HP,U,R)
∆S = C(X2, HP )− δS
(2.1)
where X1 and X2 are exogenous factors to the housing market. HP , U and R stand for
housing prices, financing costs and rents respectively. δ denotes the rate of depreciation. The
equilibrium price is determined by equating demand and supply D = S.8
HP = f(X1, X2, U,R) (2.2)
Adams and Fuss (2010) provide a more specific example to help understand this process.
In the paper, demand and supply functions are specified to elicit a regression model. Housing
demand equation is defined as a function of house price (HP ), economic activities (EA) such
as consumption and industrial production, and long-term interest rates (i).
D = α− β1HP + β2EA− β3 i+ ε (2.3)
8 In practice, the data on the quantity of supply can be obtained from housing stock statistics while the data
on the demand for housing is not available. Hence, equating demand and supply means making the quantity
estimated from a defined demand function equal to housing stock statistics. An example is presented on pp.
15 of DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994).
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Supply is determined mainly by HP and construction cost (C).
S = η + γ1HP − γ2C + v (2.4)
Solving the two equations above for house price delivers the following housing price function.
HP = α˜− θ1 i+ θ2EA− θ3C + ε˜ (2.5)
where θ1 =
β3
β1+γ1
, θ2 =
β2
β1+γ1
, θ3 =
γ2
β1+γ1
.9
2.2.1.2 Equilibrium Price Approach
The second approach to housing market equilibrium is termed the equilibrium price approach
since it specifies directly an equation for equilibrium house prices by employing past empirical
findings instead of deriving it from the supply and demand functions. As Capozza et al
(2004) succinctly expresses, this approach is based on the assumption that there is a stable
relationship between equilibrium house prices (P ∗) and a vector of exogenous variables (X)
as follows.
P ∗ = P (X) (2.6)
This assumption is embedded in the equilibrium models in numerous empirical studies,
inter alia, Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Malpezzi (1999). Especially the empirical
research using the cointegration model, for instance Annet (2005), can be considered to adopt
this approach implicitly. Notably the point distinguishing the equilibrium price approach from
the supply-demand approach is that the house price equation is a priori defined by virtue of
the past empirical findings while omitting this prior step for specifying the supply and demand
functions of housing. Moreover, this approach differs from the demand-only approach to be
9 The signs of several coefficients in the equation (3) and (4) can be opposite. For example, the sign of the
coefficient of house price in demand function can be positive if expectation about future housing price exerts
substantial power at the special phase of housing cycle. On the supply side, construction cost may not
influence housing supply since the main interest of suppliers lies in the profit rather than cost.
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described below in that the vector of exogenous variables X in the equation (2.6) includes
supply side factors such as construction cost. The advantage of this approach lies in that it
can provide a benchmark level of house price which can be used to assess whether there is
any deviation of the actual price from the estimated equilibrium. On the other hand, it is
vulnerable to the criticism that the choice of variables can be arbitrary to secure a statistically
significant equation while neglecting theoretical foundations. As a consequence, the estimated
equilibrium prices can differ considerably from the unknown true equilibrium level. In other
words, there is no proper measure for checking the robustness of estimation results because
the equilibrium level is inherently unobservable.
2.2.1.3 Demand-only approach
The last way of finding an equilibrium of the housing market is the demand-only approach
which pays special attention to low price elasticity of housing supply in the short-term mainly
because the minimum time required for planning and construction takes years as noted by
Zhu (2005). The rigidity in housing supply arises from the peculiar properties of the housing
market summarized as follows.
They are illiquid, investments are heterogeneous in the extreme (physically but especially
with respect to location), transactions costs are large, information is particularly costly,
and as a rough approximation every household consumes a housing unit whether its mem-
bers think housing a good investment or not. (Malpezzi, 1999; pp. 30)
The supply of property is intensively local; delivery of the new stock can take quite a
long time owing to the length of the planning and construction phases; rents can be very
sticky because of the use of long-term rental contracts; market prices lack transparency
and most transactions occur through bilateral negotiations; the liquidity of the market is
constrained because of the existence of high transaction costs; borrowers rely heavily on
external finance; real estate is widely used as collateral; and short sales are usually not
possible. (Zhu, 2005; pp. 10)
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Even though factors such as zoning regulation, land availability and the attitude of housing
suppliers towards risk can affect the extent of supply rigidity, they are not that influential.
Rather the high level of dependence on external financing in addition to the inherently large
scale and irreversibility of residential investment prevent construction companies from acting
preemptively. Thus, these factors are the essential reasons for the inelasticity of housing supply
which causes an inevitable time lag in matching demand and supply and hence disequilibrium
in the housing market. Several empirical findings lend firm support to this view. Bramley
(1993) clarifies that the supply of housing responds sluggishly to the house price change in the
U.K. and Meen (1996, 2002) find that the estimates of elasticity reported in British studies
are less than one.10 Taking this one step further, Barker (2004) argues that the proposition
that the response of housing supply to price changes is slow and weak has been accepted
without doubt among researchers. However, there exists evidence to the contrary. Topel and
Rosen (1988) report the estimate of the elasticity of housing supply in the U.S. as 1.68 in one
quarter and 2.76 in the long-run which is much higher than the estimate of 1.2 by DiPasquale
and Wheaton (1994).11 Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) report a broader range of the supply
elasticity between 6 and 13 for the U.S. during the post-war period. However, irrespective
of differences in the levels of the estimates in the U.S., it is an undisputed fact that housing
prices rose appreciably despite the huge expansion in supply as Woodward (1991) points out.
That implies demand predominates over all market fluctuations.
Following the above reasoning based on the inherent features of the housing market and
supportive evidence, it seems more plausible to assume that the observed level of housing price,
be it equilibrium or disequilibrium, is determined significantly by factors affecting housing
10The sources of the estimates are not identified in the paper.
11We can cast a doubt on the validity of the following baseline model in Topel and Rosen (1988)
It = β0 + β2Pt + β3yt + vt
where It denotes new house starts, Pt is real house price and yt is a set of cost shifters such as interest rates,
expected rate of inflation, wage and construction period. In the model, housing investment is determined
by house price of the current quarter which is far from the reality in that the decision of investment follows
house price change with time lags. Furthermore, it is possible that the omission of lagged price variables
implies that the error term vt positively correlated with Pt and hence cause upward bias in the magnitude
of β2 which in turn unduly increases the elasticity of supply.
42
Chapter 2. Housing Cycle and Interest Rates
demand. An additional justification for the demand-only approach in which the elasticity of
house supply is irrelevant to house price determination can be obtained by considering the
actual pricing behaviour of construction companies. They lower the sale price as demand stalls
in order to secure even smaller profits than in the housing boom period. This fact implies
that there is a large latitude for these companies to adjust prices depending on the level of
demand. This speculation requires support from separate empirical studies probing into the
relationship between the historical profit rates of the construction industry and changes in
the demand for housing.
The demand-only approach can be divided into two sub-categories according to whether
the quantity demanded is included as an independent variable in the equation for the house
price. In the inverted demand function approach, coined by Muellbauer and Murphy (2008)
and employed by Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and Cameron et al (2006), the house price
equation derives from the following demand function.
logH = −α logHP + β logy + Z (2.7)
where H denotes housing stock, HP is real house price, y is real income and Z is other demand
shifters. House price equation can be derived as follows by solving the above equation for
logHP .
logHP =
βlogy − logH + Z
α
(2.8)
The other type of demand-only approach specifies directly the house price function as a
set of exogenous variables influencing housing demand.12 For example, in the house price
equation of Iossifov et al (2008) below, independent variables are real economic variables such
as real GDP (y), interest rates (i), inflation (INF ), fiscal balance (G) and money growth
(M).
HP = f(y, i, INF,G,M) (2.9)
12This type of the demand-only approach is termed as the direct specification for convenience.
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Comparing these two kinds of the demand-only approach, the inverted demand function
approach appears to be more convincing than the direct specification which is the second
type of the demand-only approach in that the former is firmly based on the demand theory.
However, the awkward aspect of applying the inverted demand function approach to practice
is that the quantity demanded is not observable. That leads researchers to use housing stock
data as a proxy for the demand for housing. Conceptually, the quantity demanded means
the maximum amount which consumers are willing to buy for a given level of price. In
light of the definition, the actual level of housing stock in an economy may not be a good
indicator for housing demand at a certain time period when the market is in an unstable
state. Housing stock should instead be interpreted as the amount of housing already supplied
without retaining any relation to the demand for housing. Furthermore, the demand itself is
also the function of exogenous factors in the two-dimensional demand curve framework and
accordingly it is possible to specify the house price function only with exogenous factors while
neglecting the quantity demanded. All in all, the direct specification can better represent
house price dynamics and is more practical because it avoids the difficulty of measuring the
quantity demanded.
If the demand-only approach is accepted as an appropriate tool for describing housing
market equilibrium, the question arises as to which variables are more influential relative to
others in house price determination. The potential influential factors are, to enumerate all,
interest rates, expectations of future house price, income, inflation, demographic change, credit
availability and regulation, taxation on transactions and ownership, return on other assets and
additional psychological factors. Among the aforementioned candidates, the first six factors
will be discussed in detail to set up an effective strategy for identifying the determinants of
the housing cycle.
Before entering the main discussion, it is worth paying attention to the dual aspect of hous-
ing in order to better understand the house price dynamism. Obviously housing is considered
as a necessity for everyday living regardless of whether it is owner-occupied or rented. In that
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sense, it shares the general properties of other consumption goods, especially durable goods.
On the other hand, housing is considered to be among the major investments by the majority
of investors for acquiring capital gains while forsaking potential gains on alternative invest-
ments. Because of this use of housing as an investment, it is crucial to consider expectational
factors and the interaction between expectations and other economic variables.13
2.2.2 Interest Rates
2.2.2.1 Channels running from interest rates to house prices
In light of the practice that houses are purchased mainly by using borrowed funds such as
bank lending against housing as collateral, interest rates are the most important single factor
influencing the future cost of owning a house if the level of future disposable income flow is
fixed. Doubtless lower interest rates increase housing demand. Kearl et al (1976) identifies
three channels of the interest rate impact as real interest rate effect, monthly payment effect,
and the effect of expectations about future interest rates. Later, the idea was modified and
formulated theoretically based on the neoclassical asset market pricing approach. As stated
already, Poterba (1984) was the first to create the concept of the user cost of owner-occupied
housing. He highlights the aspect of housing as an asset by applying the concept of the user
cost of capital to housing.14 In that paper, the user cost is defined as a fraction of the real
house price and the fraction consists of the following arguments.
w = [(1− θ)(i+ τp) + δ +m− pie] (2.10)
where θ denotes marginal tax rate for home ownership, i is mortgage interest payment on
the one hand and the opportunity cost of investment in housing on the other hand, τp is
13Case and Shiller (1988, 2003) report that the absolute majority of responders answer positively to their
survey question asking whether housing is an investment. Table 6 on pp.35 in the former paper and Table.
8 on pp. 322 in the latter one include the survey results.
14Applying the concept of the user cost of capital in the neoclassical investment theory to housing research
was initiated by Hendershott and Slemrod (1983) but formal incorporation of the concept of asset market
equilibrium into a house price equation starts from Poterba (1984), as far as I understand.
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property taxes, δ is after-tax depreciation, m is repair cost and pie is expected capital gain on
the housing structure.15 Obviously, increases in interest rates raise the level of the user cost
and hence decrease the demand for housing.
The aforementioned user cost effect caused by interest rate changes represents the tradi-
tional standard channel running from interest rates to the demand for housing. However
interest rates have been perceived to exert further influence through extra channels than is
conventionally expected and its multidimensional influence has been overlooked by existing
studies. These extra channels are classified into three categories: expectation channel, risk-
taking channel and bank lending channel.
 Expectation channel
As in the period of house price appreciation during the first seven years of this century,
it has become common knowledge that the lowering of interest rates results in a decrease
in the cost of borrowing which leads to an expansion of the demand for housing and
eventually house price appreciation. In that situation, the forecasted interest rates for
the next period, alongside the observed growth rates of house prices, play a key role
for housing market participants in revising expectations about the future developments
of the housing market. In turn, the participants adjust their demand based on the
updated expectations. For example, if the central bank lowers its target rate by 0.25%p
in the midst of a housing boom, this can signal that future housing demand will be more
robust or at least the same as it is currently. On the other hand, taking an extreme
assumption, if the Fed had increased its target rate by, say, 3%p, optimism might have
evaporated rapidly. The influence of interest rates on house price levels via affecting the
public’s expectations of housing demand has been underlined only recently by Mishkin
(2007) and Boivin et al (2010). This channel has not been modeled in a theoretical
15 In Poterba (1991), the risk premium(α) required on an asset with the risk characteristics of housing is added
to the right hand side.
w = [(1− θ)(i+ τp) + δ + α+m− pie]
This original formula takes variant forms as in Himmelberg et al (2005), Girouard et al (2006) and Mishkin
(2007) for pedagogical and practical reasons.
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version and neither has it been verified empirically mainly because of the difficulty in
measuring the expected level of house prices. However there is no denying its existence
since the observed behaviour of home buyers is the strong evidence for it. The caveat to
the expectation channel of interest rates is that whether this channel takes effect or not
depends on the state of the overall economy and housing market. The housing market
situation after the sub-prime crisis exemplifies this qualification. Even though the Fed
decreased the policy rate to a level close to zero lower bound in response to the ongoing
economic recession, housing demand has instead dwindled appreciably. It implies that
real economic activities, the liquidity of financial markets and overall housing market
sentiment are given more weight than interest rates.
 Risk-taking channel
It has been pointed out that low interest rates for a continued period in the boom
phase of the housing market weakened the risk-aversion of economic agents and brought
about moral hazard of not only investors but also banks. For home buyers, the low level
of opportunity cost relative to expected capital gains during that period might result
in their underestimating future risks to housing prices and hence riskier investments.
Financial intermediaries were more likely to neglect the default risk of borrowers on
mortgages in the presence of house price inflation as collateral value was forecast to
continue to increase. Additionally, from the perspective of portfolio adjustment in a
low interest rate environment, housing-collateralized lending could be deemed the most
profitable investment among the safe class of assets.The effect of interest rates on housing
prices through banks’ portfolio adjustment will be separately elaborated on below by
the bank lending channel.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that a kind of myth has grown among the public that
the central bank would respond by lowering interest rates lest backlashes from the
housing market crash should subdue economic growth. The myth is based on the public’s
observations of the actual behaviour of monetary policy decisions by the Fed which
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apparently reacted by lowering policy rates amid the burst of the so-called tech bubble.
As can be noticed from ECB (2005), Trichet (2005) and Papademos (2006), the policy
makers in the ECB officially warned that an asymmetric approach to asset market
fluctuations may feed the belief about downward rigidity of asset prices and hence foster
overly risk-taking attitude in the boom period. However, this channel has received
relatively less attention and few research findings exist, and hence still needs to be
verified by future empirical studies.
Only recently, Borio and Zhu (2008) began paying explicit attention to this channel in
the context of monetary transmission mechanism. They define the risk-taking channel
as the influences of policy rate changes on risk-tolerance and risk-perception. The
effects from the channel affect portfolio composition, asset pricing and lending standards.
Fortunately, indirect evidence can be found. Research carried out on the observed
changes of the lending criteria of banks shows that deterioration in lending standards
during the low interest rate environment in the last decade is associated with the effects
generated through the risk-taking channel on the risk perception of banks. Chapter 3
will summarize the related empirical findings.
 Bank lending channel
This channel is based on the observation that banks facing a dearth of objects to invest
in during the low interest era expanded housing-collateralized lending. Commercial
banks relaxed lending criteria and as a result enabled potential buyers facing borrowing
constraints to afford houses as observed during the housing boom period before the
sup-prime crisis. In my opinion, the need to adjust portfolios during the era of low
interest rates necessarily entailed deterioration in lending behaviour. The logic is as
follows. Lower interest rates increase liquidity and subsequently the debt of commercial
banks as the increased liquidity flows into bank deposits. As a result, banks need
to decide where to invest the increased balance on the debit side among, to put it
simply, the three investments of bonds, stocks and lending. Banks tend to minimize
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exposure to risky assets such as stocks to satisfy minimum capital requirements and
to be prepared for unexpected deposit withdrawals. Hence, the exposure to stocks
is rigorously circumscribed. Bonds are the most unattractive investment in terms of
profitability since the price is already high. The most promising investment is lending
with collateral since banks can hedge against default risk by receiving collateral while
the interest margin between deposit and lending is higher than the yield of bonds such as
the Treasury Bill. To increase relatively safer and at the same time more profitable asset,
banks wage aggressive campaigns for expanding mortgages. The fierce competition leads
to easing lending criteria, lowering lending rates and supplying more favourable terms
such as an exemption from transaction fees. Consequently, potential buyers who would
not otherwise afford a house are able to enter the housing market, which in turn adds
to the total demand for housing. Thus if lending standards are liable to deteriorate as
interest rates decrease, lower interest rates stimulate a demand for housing still further.
The caveat is that certain preconditions, such as the robust growth of house prices and
income, should be satisfied in order for low interest rates to be transmitted through this
channel.
This line of reasoning about the bank lending channel is based on my own observations
of the actual behaviour of the commercial banks in Korea. Accordingly, it requires
support from future empirical analyses of the relationship between the interest rate level,
changes in the ratio of house-collateralized lending in the overall portfolio and variations
in lending standards. Dell′Ariccia and Marquez (2006) suggest a theoretical framework
in which banks are liable to loosen lending criteria in the presence of robust economic
growth since increases in the number of unknown projects make information asymmetry
less severe. More of the related empirical findings are introduced in Chapter 3. However,
there also exists an empirical finding running counter to the above reasoning. Lown and
Morgan (2006) assert that monetary policy shock hardly induces changes in lending
criteria applicable to businesses through a VAR analysis on the metrics of bank lending
standards.
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Separating the bank lending channel from the risk-taking channel may seem unnecessary
since the former is operating through the attitude of banks towards the risk surrounding
mortgages. The sole use of the bank lending channel lies in that it can bridge low interest
rates with credit expansion by banks’ portfolio adjustments.
2.2.2.2 Discussion on the relevant type of interest rate
Admitting that interest rates as a concept is one of the significant housing demand determi-
nants, one further issue remains as to which type of interest rate in practice is more effective
for explaining house price changes. There are two pairs of different kinds of interest rates: real
and nominal, and short-term and long-term interest rates.16 Regarding the first pair, there
was an active debate in the 1970s regarding which plays a more influential role in changing
housing demand. The background to the debate was a high rate of inflation which was a main
concern not only to housing policy implementation but also to academics who attempted to
solve the issue. The main issue of the debate at the time was whether the expected rate of
inflation, the difference between nominal and real interest rates by the definition of Irving
Fisher, can change housing demand. According to Schwab (1983), there are two competing
views. The first view argues that housing demand depends on real interest rates as well as
the expected rate of inflation. That view was prevalent earlier in the modeling housing de-
mand function.17 The second position, the monetarist view expressed in Arcelus and Meltzer
(1973), values only the effect of real interest rates based on the orthodox view of monetarists
that ultimately all the nominal variables increase at the same rate.
Obviously it is still moot which view is theoretically correct, but nominal interest rates
have been considered to be more pertinent in the research on house price determination for
the following reasons. Above all, from the perspective of the user cost of capital, Poterba
16There is another pair of interest rates in the practice of bank lending which are variable and fixed rate
corresponding to short-term and long-term interest rates respectively.
17Originally Schwab (1983) suggests three views on this topic. The remaining one maintains that housing
demand is the function of nominal interest rates. However, it seems to not be substantially different from
the first view.
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(1991) makes it clear that the interest rate as one of the user cost components is nominal.
Furthermore, Lessard and Modigliani (1975) exemplifies the speculation that expectations of
higher inflation tilts the stream of repayment forward even if real interest rates were constant.
In terms of the reasoning, Schwab (1983) adds empirical support that the cash flow effect of
the repayment schedule tilting forward caused by an increase in the rate of expected inflation
affects negatively the demand of those potential home buyers facing borrowing constraints.
To add my own speculation, potential home buyers tend to focus on the level of nominal
interest rates specified in borrowing contracts when judging whether debt servicing is feasible
based on their permanent level of nominal income.
Turning towards the second pair of short-term and long-term interest rates, the latter
seems more effective for housing demand from the viewpoint of the asset pricing principle.
According to this principle, the price of an asset is the sum of future cash flow emanating
from owning the asset discounted by an interest rate having the same maturity as the duration
of the asset. Based on this principle, Greenspan (2010) argues that the house price bubble
was fostered by low long-term interest rates. Even though the reasoning is theoretically
consistent, it is questionable whether the principle holds up in practice. Given that actual
interest rates instead of ones derived from the asset pricing principle are effective in practice
when deciding whether to buy a house, borrowers have the option of choosing the type of
interest rate (long-term or short-term) which they perceive to be the most cost-effective. By
these practical considerations, it is hardly acceptable that long-term interest rates exert more
effect than short-term interest rates. Rather, the issue should be solved by allowing for the
actual lending practice in which the short-term lending rate is variable while the long-term
rate is fixed through the period of a contract. It can be induced from the consideration that
long-term interest rates are more influential than short-term interest rates in the countries
where the fixed rate is prevalent in mortgage lending.18 However, considering the high level
of correlation implying the stable term structure between short-term and long-term interest
18Debelle (2004) sets out the prevalent type of interest rate in industrialized countries. (pp. 58) For a more
detailed version, consult Borio (1995, pp. 21, Table 9) and ECB (2003, pp. 50, Table. 5.1)
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rates, the two types of interest rates are possibly interchangeable. For example, the coefficient
of correlation between the monthly average of the Federal Funds Rate and 10-year Treasury
Bond yield rate is 0.90 during the sample period from February 1977 to April 2010. To
summarize, it appears to be more desirable to find out which type of interest rate is significant
by empirical analysis rather than by concluding in advance.19
2.2.2.3 Review of Empirical Findings about Effects of Interest Rate
As can be expected by the foregoing discussion on the effects of interest rates on the demand
for housing, the coefficient of interest rates, be it long-term or short-term and nominal or
real, turns out to have a negative sign and be statistically significant in the existing empirical
studies.20 Despite the consistency in the sign of the coefficient in regression models which is
interpreted as the interest rate elasticity of housing price, one conspicuous difference exists
among the findings. The magnitude of the coefficient from cross-country studies tends to
be noticeably lower than that from individual country studies even after allowing for the
differences in econometric models and variables employed. As Iossifov et al (2008) recognizes,
the absolute value of the coefficient of interest rate is less than unity in panel approach
pooling multi-country data whereas it is over three in most of the single country studies. For
example, Englund and Ioannides (1997) adopt a cross-country approach. They regress the
real house price changes in 15 OECD countries on the GDP growth rates, real interest rates
and one period lagged values of the dependent variable. The finding is that a 1% increase
in real interest rate leads to a decrease of 0.012% in real house prices. Further examples of
interest rate elasticity in international studies are -0.03 from Glindro et al (2008) for 9 Asia-
Pacific countries, -0.01 to -0.02 from Annett(2005) and -0.3 from Adams and Fu¨ss (2010).
19Aside from this issue, a further topic deserves notice: whether increases in adjustable rate mortgages which
are closely linked to short-term rates tend to expand demand.
20 Instead of interest rates, the user cost (including interest rates as a factor) is set as an independent variable
in estimating regression equations in numerous studies and the coefficient of it turns out to be significantly
high in most cases. However, the findings from the models do not have any implication for interest rate
elasticity since there is no disentangling the effect of the individual factor from each other in user cost. The
related literature includes Kearl(1979) and DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) for the U.S. case, Hendry (1984)
and Drake (1993) for the UK, Hort(1998) for Sweden, and Kennedy and Anderson (1994) for cross-country
study.
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The result from Kasparova and White (2001) is striking. They estimate the elasticity by
employing not only a panel approach but also a regression analysis for four single European
countries (including the U.K., Germany, Netherland and Sweden). In the resulting findings,
the coefficient of mortgage interest rates in the pooled data analysis proves to be insignificant
whereas it turns out to be significantly negative in the regression on Germany.
The starkest contrast in the magnitude of interest elasticity between cross-country and in-
dividual country study is found in OECD (2004) and Hofman et al (2005). These papers
report -7.1 and -9.4 respectively as the real interest rate elasticity of housing in the Nether-
lands.21 There are findings which obtain an estimate of the elasticity lower than these values;
for example, -4.6 for Finland in Oikarinen (2005), and -3.5 for the U.K. and -1.3 for the
U.S. in Meen (2002). The reasons for these differences in elasticities is not fully understood.
Presumably, the difference arises from the inherent limitation of panel data analysis that the
distinct characteristics and developments of individual housing market and financial system
are diluted by pooling the data from different countries. Furthermore, the definition and
compiling convention of the house price indices vary widely. The variations may distort the
effect of interest rates. In this sense, the findings of single country studies may be regarded as
more credible; a conjecture supported by the finding of Iossifov et al (2008) in which the real
short-term interest rate elasticity of housing prices is estimated to be -3.6 in a cross-section
analysis of 20 advanced countries.
2.2.3 Expectation
Expectation is the most elusive determinant of the demand for housing. It is primarily
because there is no practical measure for it. Furthermore, economic theory seldom sheds
light on the actual process of the expectation formation process, primary drivers of variations
in expectation and its interrelationship with other economic variables. Undoubtedly the
importance of expectation stems mainly from the characteristic of housing as an investment
21 It can be a topic of a separate study as to why the interest elasticity in the Netherlands is far higher than
that of other countries
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even though the public’s recognition of it started only several decades ago as Shiller (2007)
argues. In this subsection, I will discuss the findings to date on the property of expectation in
the housing market and then suggest a hypothesis stating that the excessive volatility of house
prices unjustifiable by economic fundamentals can arise from naive and irrational expectations
during the boom phase of the housing market.
The role that expectation about future house prices plays in determining the demand for
housing has been highlighted mainly by empirical studies rather than by theoretical literature.
The empirical studies have concentrated on checking whether the housing market is efficient,
in other words, whether the participants in the housing market are rational enough to utilize
all the information available to form expectations. By and large, the findings hint that
the expectations of home buyers tend to be extrapolative and backward-looking rather than
rational. The authentic origin of the study on non-rational expectations can be dated back to
Kindleberger (1978) who scrutinized the huge volume of historical records on the abnormal
volatilities observed in asset markets. He concludes “rationality is thus an a priori assumption
rather than a description of the world”. (Ibid ; pp.24).
However it was the survey research of Case and Shiller (1988) that ignited the subsequent
serious studies on the actual behaviour of expectation. They presume that the protracted
period of house price inflation could be driven by people’s expectations to a large extent.22
The motivation for the survey was the failure of Case (1986) in accounting for the substantial
part of the increases in housing prices observed in the 10 cities in Boston by the conventional
type of regression analysis. He attempted to explain the house price appreciation by employing
the structural supply-demand equation including the usual macroeconomic variables as the
determinants of house prices. The crucial findings in the survey research are, firstly, that
the dynamics of the housing market are driven mainly by expectation based on the past
record of house prices and, secondly, that the feedback loop between expectations and house
price changes foster the boom. Their incipient conjectural findings appear to be valid given
22 In my view, the literature on expectation in the housing market appears to explain the house price changes
by implicitly using the disequilibrium approach rather than the equilibrium framework.
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that house prices rose robustly in the U.S. during the period from 2004 to 2006 even though
interest rates increased only gradually but continuously.23 If investment in housing is a simple
function of objective economic conditions, such as income and interest rates, the house price
rally might have terminated after interest rates reached a certain threshold.
The ensuing studies also support their view which highlight the strong persistence of house
price change and excess returns on housing (Case and Shiller, 1989 and 1990; Cutler et al, 1991;
Meese and Wallace, 1994). Cutler et al (1991) emphasizes that the strong serial correlation
of the excess reruns on assets is caused mainly by the investment behaviour of the so-called
‘feedback traders’ who determine the demand solely through consulting the past returns.24
As Englund and Ioannides (1997) clarify, the strong serial correlation turns out to be modeled
best by the first-order autoregressive model, namely AR(1) process by common notation. The
positive short-term and negative longer-term serial correlation has been widely accepted as
the main feature of the house price time series.25 All of these findings are summarized in the
following remarks by Shiller (2007) based on the results of the questionnaire survey in Case
and Shiller (1988) and Shiller (2007).
Times and places with high home price increases show high expectations of future home
price increases, and when the rate of price increases changes, so too do expectations of
future price increases, in the same direction (pp. 96)
The predominance of expectations during the boom period based on the past price level of
housing necessitates a correction for the standard downward-sloping curve. If the expected
future house prices are so high that the rises in price fail to dampen demand, the demand can
depend positively, not negatively, on house prices. For example, in the boom phase, increasing
house prices can instead stimulate demand, which makes the demand curve upward-sloping.
23The survey results are elaborated on by Shiller (2005) and applied to the recent boom episode in the U.S.
by Shiller (2007).
24This paper is the formal and extended version of Cutler et al (1990).
25The time period of the first order is one quarter in the paper. However, it can be one year depending on the
specific frequency of the data.
55
Chapter 2. Housing Cycle and Interest Rates
The question follows as to what motivates people to purchase housing in the face of price
hikes. The first incentive without doubt is for earning capital gains. If the proportion of home
buyers with this incentive takes the majority, the status of housing as an investment dominates
the common property of housing as non-inferior consumption goods. Dusansky and Koc¸
(2007) present a possibility that the demand for owner-occupied housing may not necessarily
be downward-sloping. The assumptions underlying the proposition are that expectations
about future house prices are based only on their current level and that housing composes
the total wealth. Their empirical test using the 1990 survey data of Florida in the U.S. in
2007 supports their prediction that the effects of housing prices on the demand for housing is
positive.26 The second but not less important incentive is the anxiety, as Shiller (2007) also
notes, of first-time home buyers about their being priced out of the market. For these who
regard it as necessary to own a house, the rising price may act as a precipitant for buying a
house, not depressant. They become willing to buy homes even by borrowing a considerable
chunk of purchase expenditure in the presence of rapid housing price inflation.
However, despite the considerations stated above, there still remain two important qual-
ifications. Firstly, it can hardly be true that only past house prices are included in the
information set required for forming expectations. It seems to be more reasonable to assume
that the current level of other house price determinants and anticipation about the future
changes in these variables also affect the expected level of house prices. Harris (1989) shows
that expectation can vary by changes in interest rates since it is commonly known that in-
terest rates negatively influence house prices. Moreover, it is argued that the recent boom
episode in the housing market can be attributable in part to expectations of positive shocks
to future income.27 In light of that, the actual process of expectation formation can be better
described by the duality of being extrapolative and forward-looking. To illustrate an example
26However the study has various limitations. Representatively a cross-section analysis is not suitable for
revealing the dynamic relationship across time between demand and expectation(Ibid, pp.96).
27As mentioned in the Introduction, Kahn (2009) attributes the housing boom in the U.S. to a resurgence in
productivity.
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for this presumption,
HP et = Et−1(HPt|It−1)
where It−1 = {HPt−i, Ret+1, Y et+i} i = 1, 2, 3, · · · (2.11)
where Et−1 denotes expectation operator at the time t−1, It−1 is the information set available,
R is interest rate and Y is income level. Naturally, It−1 can include other variables such as
taxation on transaction, demographic factor, and so forth.
The second qualification is related to the heterogeneity of expectation among home buy-
ers and its state-dependent property. The behavioural aspects of the expectation formation
process can differ widely depending on the characteristics of home buyers and simultaneously
on the specific phase of house price developments. A certain group of buyers, representa-
tively real estate investment trusts (REITs), may maintain a relatively more rational way in
forecasting the future path of house prices utilizing more information available while another
group of buyers who are constrained in accessing or processing the information put more em-
phasis on the observed level of house prices. Furthermore, in the boom period, the achieved
capital gains may make even rational investors elated and complacent. In turn, the elation
is more likely to translate into overemphasis on the growth of house prices while giving less
weight than necessary to other variables relevant for the demand for housing. The more naive
become peoples’ expectations, the more distinct becomes this symptom.
Based on the above considerations, I suggest a simple idea in which different types of
expectations dominate in the specific phases of the housing cycle to explain the evolution of
the housing market. For simplicity, the housing cycle is divided into four phases, the turn-
around, mild-boom, exuberant and bust phase as illustrated by Figure 2.2. Investors or home
buyers are classified into three groups depending on the adopted type of expectation among
rational, adaptive, or naive forms. For convenience, each group is termed as the rational,
adaptive, or naive group following the main type of expectation of each group. The notable
point in the group division is that the members of each group vary depending on the phase
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of the housing cycle. For example, a rational investor can turn into a naive one during the
overly heated period of the housing market.
Figure 2.2. Phases of Housing Cycle in U.S.
Data Source: Federal Reserve, Standard and Poor’s Case & Shiller Index
During the phase coming out of the trough, the demand for housing is driven mainly by the
investors who expect house prices to increase through estimation results from an econometric
model employing almost all the available information. As such, the rational group ignites the
rally to the full-blown boom recognizing the favourable objective conditions for the upturn
of the housing market such as ample liquidity and robust economic growth. In this initial
phase, investors and buyers belonging to the adaptive group continue correcting the error
between their forecast and observed house price levels. The weight assigned to house prices
at each time point exponentially decreases as a time period becomes distant from present. At
a certain time point, the adaptive group joins the buying rally as their forecasts of the growth
rate of housing prices obtained by exponential smoothing are positive enough for investment.
By the increased demand from that group, the Mild-boom phase begins. As the house price
rally continues, the investors who focus only on a relatively higher return on housing or the
first-time home buyers who are anxious about housing becoming less affordable in the future
finally enter the market and accelerate the speed of house price appreciation. The necessary
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Table 2.1. Housing Cycle and Expectation
Dominant Expectation Model and Symptoms
Turn-around Phase
• Rational Expectation
HP et = Et−1(HPt | It−1)
· Recognition of positive signals from objective conditions such as:
- Low interest rate
- Robust economic growth
· Wider set of information utilized
Mild-boom Phase
• Adaptive Expectation
HP et = HP
e
t−1 + λ(HPt−1 −HP et−1)⇔HP et = λ
∞∑
i=0
(1− λ)iHPt−i−1
· Adaptive group joins the buying rally
· House price growth accelerates
· Ample liquidity and higher credit availability
Exuberant Phase
• Naive Expectation
HP et = λHP t−1, λ ≥ 1
· Excessive weight to house price growth in forming expectation
→ overriding negative signals from objective conditions
· Members of other groups also follow naive model
· Anxiety drives first home buyers into buying rally
· Negative signals from objective conditions ignored
- Interest rates increase
· Forced selling begins because of worse economic conditions
· Rational group starts realizing capital gains
Bust Phase •Rational Expectation
· High weight to house price changes in forming expectation
· Unfavourable objective conditions recognized
- Lending standards tightened
- Foreclosures increasing
· Negative sides of economic circumstance override positive signals
condition for their participation is easy access to loans to enable them to fulfill their naive
expectations. In this Exuberant phase, the immense scale of capital gains encourages a portion
of the rational group to ‘ride with the bubble’. Especially, the negative signals for the housing
market transmitted by a deterioration in objective economic conditions are neglected by overly
optimistic forecasts based mainly on the current growth rate of house prices. The most recent
example for the symptom can be found in the housing boom period from 2004 to 2007 during
which house prices continued appreciating amid monetary policy tightening. Basically, the
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belated response of house prices to negative signals originates from the strong inertia of naive
expectations. If the common naive expectation model HP et = HPt−1 is slightly modified, it
can be expressed as follows.
HP et = λ ·HPt−1 (2.12)
The level of λ, termed the reaction factor, remains over one in the Exuberant phase as only
the recent growth rate of house prices enters into the information set. Only the rational group
disposes of the houses they own and realize potential capital gains. Their sales pressurize
the housing market downward. On the other hand, the group of owners vulnerable to the
changes of objective conditions, for example, highly leveraged buyers, faced with the burden
of having to service interest rates on a large scale, resell houses to repay the debt. The growth
rate of house prices decelerates appreciably and at last a housing cycle reaches its peak.
The next phase, the Bust phase, is driven mainly by the rational form of expectations. As
the market returns to normality, the participants become aware of the negative signals from
new economic circumstances and subsequent aftermaths. In this phase, previously loosened
lending standards are tightened once again as a proportion of borrowers fail to refinance and
in extreme cases default on their mortgages because of decreases in the value of collateral.
Foreclosures are increasing and such shadow inventory dampens the housing market further.
Market participants with the intention to buy houses expect further depreciation not only
from naive expectations but also from a sober recognition of the worsening objective situation.
However, the speed of depreciation is curbed since there always exist people who buy homes
for their own use and bridge the gap to some extent between demand and supply.28
2.2.4 Income
Unquestionably, income is among the most important determinants of the demand for housing
since increases in income enhance affordability of housing, i.e., the ability to repay debt
28For the purpose of simplicity and clarity, this hypothesis on the heterogeneity of expectation needs to be
modelled theoretically by further research. The idea of the noise trading established in the analysis of
financial assets can shed light on this theoretical modelling.
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principal and interest specified in a contract of borrowing. This proposition is as lucid as
the common knowledge that consumers’ purchasing power of and demand for consumption
goods increase with income growth. For that reason income has been considered to be an
indispensable regressor in the regression equation for housing demand without any further
theoretical consideration. Only the issue of which definition of income is appropriate in
explaining house price fluctuations has been raised. Until now, there has been consensus on
the issue. Firstly, the concept of income should be disposable instead of gross. Secondly,
the median level rather than the overall mean of income per capita is more pertinent since
the income level of these who own a house has been proven to exceed the average in most
countries.29 Thirdly, there seems to be no objection to the view that income should be real, not
nominal. Nevertheless, one can pose the question whether there exists a kind of money illusion
on the part of home buyers. They tend to pay more attention to nominal income because
they observe first nominal house prices without bothering themselves with discounting them
by the overall price level to calculate real house prices.
As regards the related empirical findings, the income elasticity of house prices, if extreme
cases are excluded, ranges from 1 to 3 without no systematic difference between cross and
single country studies.30 The frequently cited estimates of income elasticity are 2.5 and 2.7
for the U.K. and U.S. in Meen (2002), 1.7 for the U.K. in Muellbauer and Murphy (1997).
In OECD (2004) and Hofman et al (2005), the estimates are 1.9 and 1.5 respectively for
Netherlands. Oikarinen (2005) reports 1.2 for Finland. Although there is no established
explanation about the variation of income elasticity among these countries, Meen (2002)
suggests the different level of housing supply elasticity as one possible reason. The simulation
results appearing in the paper show that the income elasticity plummets as supply becomes
more elastic. An additional noteworthy observation comes from Hort (1998) that there exists
a dichotomy between the two groups of countries. In one group which the U.K. and Denmark
belong to, the estimated elasticity ranges from 2 to 4, and it is nearly or below that for the
29A practical difficulty in implementing the consensus is that the median income level data are compiled on
an annual basis while the frequency of other data for other determinants is monthly or quarterly.
30Annett (2005) reports the pooled income elasticity as 0.1 to 0.4 for European countries.
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other group including the U.S. and other Nordic countries. However late empirical research
calls the existence of the dichotomy into question and contradicts any coherent chasm between
the two groups of countries.
2.2.5 Demographics
The forecast of the rapid fall in the rate of house price inflation in the U.S. between1987 and
2007 by Mankiw and Weil (1989) and the coincident decrease in real house prices commencing
from 1987 funneled the interests of researchers into demographics and provoked the intense
debate on the influence of demographic changes on house price fluctuations. Their logic
underlying the forecast was accepted as persuasive in the first instance. They argue that
firstly, the demand for housing is substantially high with the population cohort belonging to
the household formation age of 20-34, secondly, the demand is closely correlated with house
price changes, and lastly, as a consequence of the dwindling population at the age cohort
will decelerate the growth rate of house prices. Despite apparent plausibility, the argument
was immediately followed by criticism mainly aimed at the misspecification problem in the
regression model in the paper. Hamilton (1991) points out the problem of including the time
trend in the regression equation without specifying an underlying demand-supply equation.
Woodward and Hendershott(1991) maintain that the main problem of the regression model
was omission of expected capital gains as an explanatory variable. Engelhardt and Poterba
(1991) apply the same model used by Mankiw and Weil to Canada which experienced the
robust growth in housing prices in the 1970s with a similar demographic structure to the U.S.
case. They find that the forecasted extent of the decrease in house prices is fairly moderate
compared with that of Mankiw and Weil (1989). Moreover, they point out the possibility
of the spurious relationship between housing prices and demographic changes caused by the
non-stationarity of these two variables.31 Lastly, Peek and Wilcox (1991) suggest no evidence
for the influence of demographics on house prices during the period from 1970 to 1984 in
31All of these commentaries are included in Regional Science and Urban Economics vol.21 (1991) and the
rejoinder by Mankiw and Weil followed in the same volume published in 1992.
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which the growth rate of house prices was pronounced. The similar line of that conclusion
was followed by Englund and Ioannides (1997) and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997).
With hindsight, the original forecast of Mankiw and Weil (1989) seems inconsistent with
the actual path of house prices in the U.S. which shows an upward trend during the period
from the late 1990s to 2008. The essential reason for the weak predictive power originates
from their overemphasis on demographics in deriving the coefficient of age dummy variable in
the cross-section analysis. Nevertheless, as Poterba (1991, pp. 55-56) clarifies, house prices
are affected by demographic factors, representatively by the number of households. However,
he argues, the timing and the magnitude of the effect are hard to predict as these factors are
part of a broader set of economic forces influencing house prices. This conclusion is supported
by several empirical studies showing the positive impact of the demographic variable on house
prices (Green and Hendershott, 1996; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011).
2.2.6 Inflation
During the inflationary period of the 1970s and early 1980s, the relationship between inflation
and the demand for housing was underscored as it was the main assignment for researchers to
elucidate the influence of accelerating inflation on housing prices. However, the heated interest
in inflation as a determinant of housing demand dissipated rapidly after the 1990s, which
reflects the fact that inflation has been kept in a reasonably predictable range characterized
by the term ‘Great Moderation’. Recent studies appear not to consider it as seriously as in the
inflationary era. Still, it is worth taking a glimpse of conflicting views and empirical results
about the role of inflation in house price determination in that the topic is closely related
to interest rates and expectations. Different from other determinants, there is no established
consensus on whether inflation increases or reduces housing demand. This divergence has been
mainly caused by different approaches to the housing market and varying weight assigned
to the individual factor of the cost of owning a house. Lessard and Modigliani (1975), as
mentioned in subsection 2.2.2, present the simulation result that the real payment of mortgage
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is tilted forward under inflation in tandem with rising nominal interest rates and the tilting
intensifies as inflation accelerates.32 Nevertheless, the total sum of the real cost to borrowers
is constant irrespective of the rate of inflation and hence it cannot affect the buying decision
of the buyers without financial constraint.
However, households with low income and under borrowing constraints, for instance younger
households, can postpone or withdraw a purchasing decision in the presence of a ballooning
burden to repay in the initial period of a borrowing contract. Kearl (1979), reflecting this
consideration, inserted the term for initial payment sensitive to inflation into the conventional
housing demand function which includes the user cost of owning a house as a main argument.
Through regressing the time series of house prices on the demand determinants, he finds that
the coefficient of initial mortgage payment, which is also the function of nominal interest rates,
is negative and statistically significant for the U.S. data from 1961 to 1973. Moreover, from
the same motivation, Schwab (1983) obtains the negative coefficient of expected inflation in
the house price regression using the microeconomic data for Philadelphia in the U.S. from
1968 to 1975. Besides the initial payment effects, Kearl (1979) adds another noteworthy
reasoning about the depressing effect of inflation on the demand for housing. While nominal
interest rates reflect inflation relatively swiftly, nominal income is somewhat rigid and hence
the delayed response of income to price change diminishes the demand for housing by making
housing less affordable to potential buyers.
The opposite view maintains that inflation stimulates the demand for housing by lowering
the user cost in real terms. This argument is based on the assumptions that agents have a
perfect foresight and a steady state exists in the economy. This view is inconsistent with the
practical considerations and empirical results provided in the preceding paragraph. Poterba
(1984) formulates the user cost of housing utilizing the asset-market approach and derives
the partial derivative of the user cost with respect to inflation. In the steady state condition
requiring that the growth rate of nominal house prices should be identical to the overall
32The tilting effect arises as the discount factor for flat annual nominal payment exponentially rises rapidly.
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inflation rate, the sign of partial derivative is negative under a specific condition. To state
this more specifically, if both sides of the user cost equation (2.10) below are differentiated,
w = [(1− θ)(i+ τp) + δ +m− pie]
the equation below derives.
dw
dpi
= (1− θ) di
dpi
− dpiH
dpi
(2.13)
Because dpiH = dpi in the steady state, if
di
dpi <
1
(1−θ) making
dw
dpi < 0, inflation shock
can increase the quantity demanded by decreasing the real user cost defined as w · HP in
which HP denotes real house price. He argues that if the marginal tax rate, θ, is 0.25 and
nominal interest rates rise by less than 1.3%p for 1%p increase in the inflation rate, the
inequality always holds. The simulation results predict that real house prices appreciate by
13.6%p responding to 5% rate of inflation. This finding is contrary to the empirical findings
above highlighting the initial payment effect. Apparently, this stark contrast arises from the
assumption about elastic supply and rational expectations, and also from the restriction on
the changes of nominal interest rates corresponding to inflation.
Another line of reasoning supporting the positive influence of inflation on house prices is
based on the common knowledge that people tend to invest more in real assets to hedge against
decreases in the purchasing power of nominal assets caused by inflation. Evidently, housing
is a real asset and inflation has a positive effect on the demand for housing. However, without
empirical findings to verify whether this common knowledge is valid or not, the plausibility
of the speculation is strictly circumscribed in that only a limited fraction of all home buyers
have financial means to realize the incentive to hedge inflation risk. Additionally, the rate of
inflation needs to be high enough to stimulate the demand for hedging. For example, it is
not plausible that households under financial constraint would borrow substantial amounts
to buy a house in order to prevent the trivial loss in the real value of their nominal income
which is caused by a narrow increase in the rate of inflation while servicing interest on the
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funds borrowed to buy the house.
As discussed above, the direction in which inflation affects the demand for housing is left
open to further investigation as the disagreement between the two competing views remains
unresolved.
2.2.7 Credit Availability and Regulation
Generally speaking, the value of a house far exceeds the annual amount of savings of home
buyers and for that reason the demand for housing depends considerably on accessibility to
credit or liquidity. For example, a large down-payment is necessary for buying a new house
in the U.S. and the liquidity available for buyers influences the decision whether to purchase
a house (Stein, 1995). No doubt the accessibility varies among individuals depending on the
level of income and creditworthiness. It also varies across time as the regulations governing
the financial sector evolves. Disregarding individual differences, the total demand for housing
depends to a certain extent on credit availability varying with the developments of housing
finance.
In the 1980s, the crucial changes in housing finance can be epitomized by the term ‘liber-
alization’ which offers wider discretion to financial intermediaries. As Iacoviello and Minetti
(2003) summarize, the steps taken as a way of liberalization include abolishing the ceiling
on interest rates related to deposits as well as lending, expanding the latitude to determine
portfolio composition, lifting entry barriers to lending markets, and easing of restrictions on
the total amount of borrowing.33 Among the deregulation measures, Miles (1992) argues
that more opportunities to employ equity withdrawal, namely, lending against the collateral
of housing, represent the key feature of financial liberalization. In tandem with that, the
ceiling set by regulation on the maximum loan to value ratio (LTV) has been increased in
most OECD countries as Jappelli and Pagano (1994) records.34 Another tangible result of the
33A more detailed description is presented in Chapter 3 of IMF (2000).
34Table II on pp. 92 in the paper include the LTV ratio statistics.
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liberalization process might be the introduction of variable interest rates, synonymous with
adjustable rates, into lending contracts. Taken together, these phenomenal changes in housing
finance heighten the level of credit available to households under borrowing constraints and
accordingly increase the demand for housing.35
After the 1990s, the second-round effects of the financial liberalization on house prices
have attracted considerable attention in housing research. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Bernanke et al (1996, 1999) argue that the influences of a shock to the economy can be
amplified and also propagated through the initial changes in the value of collateral such
as land. Subsequently the amplification process causes changes in the borrowing capacity
of economic agents. In the same vein, the amplification mechanism can be applied to the
housing market. If a positive shock hits the economy such that the demand for housing
expands and consequently house prices appreciate, that leads to increases in the net worth
of the collateral. As this makes equity withdrawal easier and renders the regulation on LTV
looser, the capacity for buying houses becomes greater. Subsequently, the newly created
demand for housing, caused by an increase in credit accessibility following the initial shock,
accelerates the speed of house price inflation.
To verify whether the mechanism operates in the housing market, Lamont and Stein (1999)
classify the 44 cities into the two groups of the high and low-leverage city and regress the
house prices on income and the one-period lagged dependent variable over the period 1985-
1994. They find that both the sensitivity of house prices to income shock and the resulting
cumulative changes in house prices are higher in the case of the high-leverage city group
than in the case of the low-leverage group. To generalize this finding to an international
35Whether there exists robust correlation between credit and house price movements and whether there is any
causality running from the former to the latter are separate issues to be tested empirically. Even though
consensus on the existence of the close co-movements between bank lending or credit and real asset price
has been established by empirical findings, for example Goodhart and Hofmann (2004, 2008) and Gerlach
and Peng (2005) inter alia, the issue on causality remains inconclusive. Goodhart and Hofmann (2004) find
through VAR Impulse Response analysis that credit influences property prices in only a few of the twelve
sample countries over the period 1985-2001. But in the ensuing paper in 2008, they provide new evidence
that house prices and credit have a reciprocal effect using data from seventeen industrialized countries over
the period of 1970-2006. However, Gerlach and Peng (2005) argue that bank lending appears not to influence
property prices in Hong Kong based on the data from 1982 to 1998.
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level using the data from 26 countries from 1970 to 1999, Almeida et al (2006) confirms that
house prices respond more rapidly to income shocks in countries having a higher ceiling on
LTV ratios. On the basis of these two findings, it can be concluded that the liberalization
measures taken from the 1980s onwards have modified the way in which, and the extent to
which, house prices respond to changes in the house price determinants. As is widely noted,
financial liberalization is one of the sources of the greater volatility of housing observed in the
last decade compared to the period before liberalization was initiated.
Despite the theoretical and empirical findings introduced above, research on the relationship
between changes in credit availability caused by the institutional reforms in the mortgage
market and the demand for housing is relatively nascent compared to other topics discussed
in the preceding subsections. Hence, this issue requires further theoretical consideration
and empirical analysis which can provide firm evidence for the way the demand for housing
interacts with the evolution of housing finance.
2.2.8 Synthesis
The relationship between house prices and the six determinants which are supposed to be the
most influential have been discussed consulting the empirical and theoretical findings to date.
The interrelationships between the determinants and house prices are illustrated in Figure
2.4.36 These determinants, assuming that house prices are determined mainly by the demand
factors, change the demand for housing and hence house prices whether it be driven by equi-
librium or disequilibrium.37 Regarding the relative magnitude of the individual factor, we can
draw the following propositions from the empirical findings. Firstly, interest rates and income
are most important, but it is inconclusive which is more significant. Secondly, expectations
36This list of the influential determinants is not exhaustive especially in that the effect of taxation is omitted
from the list. Without doubt, alteration of tax treatment on ownership such as interest deductibility from
income tax and transaction tax (such as stamp duties) affects house prices irrespective of the magnitude of
the effect.
37For the empirical studies which consider the supply side, construction cost is included as an explanatory
variable in the regression equation for house prices. However, at least from my viewpoint, the quantity
supplied or to be supplied appears to be the function of house prices, more fundamentally of the quantity
demanded, not construction cost.
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have received muted attention relative to the preceding two factors considering its prior role
in leading the housing market into the exuberant phase. Thirdly, credit availability is a newly
highlighted factor and is claimed to have a connection with interest rates as well as with
regulatory changes. Fourthly, demographics and inflation retain a certain level of influence
even though the extent of the influence is deemed negligible compared to other factors. From
these observations, we can provisionally conclude that interest rates, expectations and income
are the key factors for explaining fluctuations in the demand for housing.
Even with the elaborate discussions above, it has not been clarified yet why the time series
of house prices have shown a markedly cyclical pattern like a business cycle instead of a trend-
stationary or purely stationary outlook. That question can be replaced by asking what are
the underlying forces which drive the demand for housing to such an extraordinary level and
induce the huge deviation of house prices from a stable path. Apparently, income appears
to have the least explanatory power for explaining the drastic volatility observed in house
prices. As illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.3, the level of disposable income per capita
in the U.S. has shown a stable upward trend while house prices fluctuated to a large extent
around the trend-stationary path of income level. This marked distinction arises from the
difference in the volatility of the growth rates of each variable. Turning to the right panel in
the same figure, the 4-quarter growth rate of income has changed within the by far narrower
band ranging from -1% to 5% relative to that of house prices ranging between -24% to 17%.
Without the assistance of high leverage, income alone can hardly explain that high level of
volatility.
The probable candidates affecting leverage, consulting the discussions on house price de-
terminants, are presumed to be interest rates and expectations. The speculation comes from
the reasoning above that changes in interest rates affect house prices through multiple chan-
nels. As confirmed by numerous empirical findings, the effects of the interest rate channel
have proven to be far more influential than previously thought since interest rates affect risk
preference, bank-lending and expectation as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Moreover, as illustrated
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in the same figure, expectations during the boom period amplify the volatility of house prices
since most market participants follow the naive type of expectations with the reaction factor
in the equation (2.12) greater than unity. This reasoning leads to a different regression strat-
egy from these of existing empirical studies in order to answer the question as to what are the
main drivers of the volatile components of house prices instead of house prices themselves.
Figure 2.3. Income and House Prices in U.S.
Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Standard and Poor’s Case & Shiller Index
2.3 Empirical Analysis of Housing Cycle Drivers
2.3.1 Review of Empirical Methods
The most prevalent empirical methods in the existing literature can be classified broadly into
three categories: single equation regression, cointegration and its derivative error-correction,
and vector autoregression (VAR).
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Figure 2.4. Determinants of Housing Price Cycle
· Inflation
· Tax Treatment
· Other Factors
Interest Rate
Expectation
Income
Demographics
Credit Availability
  - Deregulation
  - Lending Behaviour
  - Collateral Value
Cyclical Components
Trend Components
House Price
User Cost Channel
Expectation Channel
Risk-Taking Channel
Bank-Lending Channel
Feedback
Notes:
1. The type of line represents the different character of effect of the determinants on house prices.
 Dotted line: Indirect effect through other determinants
 Continuous line: Direct effect
 Blue & Thick continuous line: Feedback effect from house prices to the determinants
2. The expected value of future house prices is defined as the function of past house prices and other determinants.
Et(HPt+1) = f(r, I,HPt−i, D, . . .) i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
where Et is expectation operator, and r, I, HP , D are interest rate, income, house price, demographics respectively.
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2.3.1.1 Single Equation Regression
The simplest form of the single regression equation approach can be abstracted from diverse
instances as the following equation.
∆HP = f(X) (2.14)
whereX denotes a vector of the candidate determinants of housing prices which were discussed
in the previous section. In the equation (2.14), HP is the logarithm of the original level data
on house prices and hence ∆HP approximately equals the growth rate over a certain period.
The reason for taking the first-order difference of the log time series is mainly for preventing
spurious regression results by securing the stationarity of the dependent variable since the
level data on house prices in general have proven to be non-stationary.38 An example of this
approach can be found in Englund and Ioannides (1997).
HP gt = α+ β1GDP
g
t + β2 rt +HP
g
t−1 (2.15)
where HP gt and GDP
g
t denote the growth rate of house prices and GDP at time t respectively,
rt is the real interest rate and HP
g
t−1 refers to one period lagged dependent variable. Almeida
et al (2006) also uses this approach.
The variant form of this approach includes an error correction term as an explanatory
variable as follows.
∆HP = α+ βiX+ γ(HP −HP ∗) i = 1, 2, · · · , n (2.16)
where X is again a vector of house price determinants and HP ∗ refers to the level of estimated
38There are two conspicuous exceptions to the case. In the regression equations of DiPasquale and Wheaton
(1994) and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), the dependent variable takes level data and the models pass the
Durbin-Watson test successfully. However, the success arises from the inclusion of almost all the candidates,
far too many, determinants as explanatory variables in the model which ends in an extremely high level of
the coefficient of determination (R2).
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equilibrium house price. In the above equation, house price changes are accounted for not only
by usual candidate determinants but also by the deviation of the actual level of house price
from the fundamental level estimated by using a separate estimation equation. Obviously,
the assumption that house prices tend to revert to their equilibrium level makes it plausible
to include the error correction term. Abraham and Hendershott (1996) employ the idea by
the following equation. Their baseline model is
HP gt = (HP
g
t )
∗
+ t (2.17)
In this equation, the term t represents the linear combination of lagged growth rate and the
difference between the actual and equilibrium level of house price.
t = β0 + β1HP
g
t−1 + β2 (HP
∗
t−1 −HPt−1) + νt (2.18)
where νt is a random error. The error term, t in the equation (2.18) includes an error
correction term of β2 (HP
∗
t−1 −HPt−1).39 The growth rate of equilibrium real house prices,
HP ∗, is estimated using the following equation.
(HP gt )
∗
= ΓX (2.19)
where Γ is a vector of coefficients and X = [1, et, yt, rt] where et, yt and rt mean employment
rate, equilibrium income and real after-tax interest rate in sequence. Malpezzi (1999) and
Capozza et al (2004) follow a similar type of equation even though the dependent variable
is price-to-income ratio in Malpezzi (1999) and the explanatory variables are different from
these of the model above.
39This type of error correction term should be differentiated from the commonly called the equilibrium error
derived from the cointegrated relationship identified between the level data series of the variables in interest.
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2.3.1.2 Cointegration and Error Correction
The second prevalent empirical approach is the cointegration method developed by Engle
and Granger (1987) to identify a long-run equilibrium relationship between house prices and
other relevant economic variables. In this approach, the error correction model derived from
the equilibrium relationship is used for clarifying the short-term dynamics of house price
changes. A clear advantage of using the cointegrated relationship lies in the fact that it
preserves the information contained in the original level data and hence helps to identify a
stable long-term relationship among interrelated variables, provided one exists. This method
became predominant in the field of housing research, especially after mid-1990s, since it
enabled researchers to compare their empirical findings with theoretical models which exploit
the concept of level rather than change rates of housing prices. Furthermore, the error-
correction model was useful for capturing the dynamic movements of house prices toward the
equilibrium level over the short-term horizon. Drake (1993) applied the cointegration method
for the first time to estimate a long-term relationship between the house prices in the U.K.
and its determinants. Afterwards, the method has been popularly employed in analyzing the
housing market of a single country. Examples include Ashworth and Parker (1997), Hollar
(2003), IMF (2005), Honjo et al (2005, Ch 2.) for the U.K., Hort (1998) for Sweden, Hin
and Cuervo (1998) for Singapore, OECD (2004) and Hofman et al (2005) for Netherlands,
Oikarinen (2005) for Finland, Annett (2005) for 8 European countries. The testing procedure
has also been extended to panel data analysis to diagnose the cointegrated relationship among
the variables using pooled data. Kasparova and White (2001) and Adams and Fuss (2010)
use this panel cointegration method.
A typical example of the cointegration method applied to the housing context can be found
in Hollar (2003) which specifies a long-term relationship between house prices and housing
demand determinants as below.
HPt = α− β1 rt + β2 yt + εt (2.20)
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where HPt is the log level of house price at time t, rt is the real interest rate and yt is real
income per household. The consequent error-correction model is defined as follows.
∆HPt = Φ
3∑
i=1
Xt−i + γεt−1 + υt (2.21)
where Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3) in which each element represents the coefficients of the column vec-
tor X = (HP, r, y)′ at the time period of t − i. Despite its manifest benefits, the common
limitation of all the econometric methods is also true of this method. As Enders (2004, pp.
322) notes correctly, the equilibrium relationship in econometrics refers to any long-run re-
lationship among nonstationary variables and it can be simply a behavioural reduced-form
relationship among similarly trending variables. Therefore, without a solid theoretical foun-
dation, any implication obtained from a cointegrated relationship can be specious and hence
lead to misjudging the relationship between house prices and other economic variables. From
this perspective, a theoretical framework for defining the equilibrium of the housing market
is necessary for imbuing a simply statistically significant relationship with an economic im-
plication. There are several examples employing cointegration equations based on theoretical
considerations of the equilibrium in the housing market. Hollar (2003) and Annett (2005)
implicitly impose the demand-only framework while Kasparova and White (2001) and Adams
and Fuss (2010) lay down the supply-demand equilibrium framework for setting up regression
models for cointegration.
2.3.1.3 Vector Autoregression
The most recent approach to identify the relationship between house prices and other economic
variables is VAR pioneered by Sims (1980) in which all the related variables are regarded as
endogenous. The original motivation of VAR analysis is for taking into account interactions
between correlated economic variables and to prevent possible misspecification problems re-
sulting from improper restrictions on equations of the variables. For example, in the two
approaches of regression and cointegration, all the independent variables in the regression
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equations are assumed to be exogenous to house prices while in a VAR model the variables
are presumed to interact in a multilateral direction. The rationale for the presumption is, for
example, the observation that the changes in house prices can affect other economic variables,
such as income, by influencing the level of consumption and construction investments.
VAR has become a prevalent analysis tool in the research on housing after the reverse direc-
tion of the influences running from housing prices toward the overall economy was perceived
as crucial for forecasting future economic circumstances. The evident advantage of VAR over
the preceding methodologies is that the feedback loop operating between the variables of in-
terest can be revealed by impulse response function. Its additional practical advantage is that
it can be implemented without painstaking investigation into a causal chain or a theoretical
mechanism. The related literature includes Iacoviello (2000), Sutton (2002), Tsatsaronis and
Zhu (2004), Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) and Jarocinski and Smets (2008).40
Despite the advantages mentioned above, the VAR approach to housing market dynamism
has a couple of limitations setting aside the general problems such as the instability of a system
caused by fixed parameters and the indeterminacy of coefficient values as pointed out by Stock
and Watson (1996) and Robertson and Tallman (1999). Above all, no criterion for selecting
endogenous variables has been established in employing VAR. A firm basis for judging which
variables should be included in and excluded from a vector is crucial since inclusion and
omission of a certain variable can alter substantially the magnitude of the coefficients of other
variables. To provide convincing results through employing VAR, it is indispensable to closely
examine the level of endogeneity and correlation before selecting variables.
The second limitation of the VAR approach is that it is inherently not appropriate for
illuminating causality running from a variable to house prices especially because of the as-
sumption on endogenous relationships among all the variables included in a vector. The
40The specific form of VAR varies among the literature. The first three papers use Structural VAR (SVAR)
which imposes a restriction on the order of endogenous variables based on the judgement of the directions
of influence among the variables. The fourth uses a panel VAR as they pool the data from 17 industrialized
countries and the last one uses Bayesian approach (BVAR) to identify the distribution of the coefficients in
the model.
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assumed endogeneity among the variables is as strong a restriction as one imposed on the
simultaneous equation system which had been a prevalent econometric technique before VAR
was developed. Once the assumption of endogeneity is imposed, the causality is hard to
identify through the impulse response function because it describes interrelations rather than
causality. In that sense, what VAR presents fundamentally is not an anatomy of a rela-
tionship in question, but simply a description of a superficial outlook on the relationship.
Furthermore, as in the cointegration method, the description of the interrelationship can be
spurious. For instance, the empirical results found by Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) deviate
from the findings of past literature in that inflation explains the largest portion of house price
variations whereas income exerts a minimal influence.41 Acknowledging that inflation can
change the demand for housing and hence house prices, it can hardly be acceptable without
theoretical expositions that inflation assumes the most prominent role in determining house
prices. Considering these limitations, VAR should be used for the purpose of verifying the
validity of theoretical formulations rather than for eliciting a novel relationship.
To summarize the considerations about the three empirical tools used in the literature,
each individual method contains its own relative advantages and disadvantages. As a result,
there is no concluding which method is superior to the other ones. For example, if short-term
dynamics receive more interest, the cointegration method is a more appropriate tool while
VAR is superior to other econometric methods in capturing the interrelationships among a
set of variables. As can be noticed from the literature introduced above, all three methods
are still being employed by researchers and the results produced by one method vie with these
produced by the other ones.
41 In the model, the vector includes 6 endogenous variables: the growth rate of GDP, the rate of inflation, the
real short-term interest rate, the term spread between the yield of a long-term government bond and short-
term interest rate, bank credit, and the growth rate of house prices. The data comes from 17 industrialized
economies from 1970 to 2003.
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2.4 Alternative Approach to Housing Cycle by Decomposition
Method
Most of the empirical studies on the relationship between house prices and their determinants
have focused to date on explaining the overall house price fluctuations using the methods
described in the previous subsection. Only recently, Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) have
adopted a different strategy to identify the determinants of the booms and busts of the housing
market using a Probit model in which the probabilities of these events are the main variable of
interest. However, the empirical results still fall short of providing a definitive answer to the
question of what drives the regularly cyclical behavior of house prices. To answer the question,
a novel regression strategy is employed in this chapter which consists of two stages. At the
first stage, observed house prices are decomposed into stably changing trend components and
volatile cyclical components. At the second stage, the degree of deviation, measured by the
absolute value of the ratio of the cyclical component to the trend component at each time
period, is regressed on the candidate determinants of housing prices which were studied in
the previous section. The rationale for adopting this strategy is firmly based on the reasoning
that the volatility observed in the time series of house prices appears to be associated more
with interest rates and expectations than with trend-stationary variables such as income.
A hypothesis to be tested by the regression analysis derives from the reasoning that the
variations in the cyclical components of house prices can be explained mainly by changes in
interest rates and expectations rather than other housing price determinants. It is equivalent
to assuming that house prices would be on the path of a certain stable long-term upward
trend without interest rate changes and expectational effects.
2.4.1 Practical Issues
Two practical issues should be resolved to implement this strategy: choice of a proper decom-
position method and selection of a specific level of the parameter of the method. As regards
the first issue, the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) is preferred in that the filter has been
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popularly used not only by business cycle researchers to extract cyclical components from the
various macroeconomic variables but also by researchers in different fields, mainly the ECB
economists, to identify the boom and bust periods of asset or housing markets (Bordo and
Jeanne, 2002; Detken and Smets, 2004; Adalid and Detken 2007; Goodhart and Hofmann,
2008; Alessi and Detken, 2009; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011).42 However, it is still question-
able whether application of the HP filter to the time series of housing prices is appropriate since
the filtering method was originally devised for the time series containing long-term growth
components. Apparently, extending the HP filter coverage beyond the boundary of the busi-
ness cycle context seems to have been initiated by Gourinchas et al (2001) in which the trend
of credit-to-GDP ratio is estimated by the HP filter. The application of the HP filter in the
context of asset markets is based on the same assumption that “aggregate economic variables
in capitalist economies experience repeated fluctuations about their long-term growth paths”
as stated in Hodrick and Prescott (1981). In light of this, before applying the filter to the
time series of house prices, the question should be tackled whether the time series shows a
persistent growth path similar to that of consumption and investment. The data on housing
prices of the Case & Shiller Index in the U.S. is set out in Figure 2.5. The upward linear time
trend in the figure implies that certain forces have propelled the time series upward for the
last two decades. Based on the graph appearing in Figure 2.5, applying the filter to house
prices is compatible with the presumption of Hodrick and Prescott (1981).43
The second issue in operating the filter involves selecting the level of the smoothing param-
eter which determines the smoothness of the growth component series obtained by solving
42Moving average is another popular method to extract trend components. Borio and Lowe (2002) implicitly
use average growth rate plus its certain level of standard deviation as the trend.
43 It is questionable whether continuing upward trend also can be discerned if the time horizon of house prices
extend further back into the past. For the U.S. case, Shiller (2005) argues long-run upward trend appears not
to exist by presenting the longer series of house price index during the period from 1980 to 2004 constructed
by combining 5 source indexes (pp.12-25). However, another query can be raised about effectiveness of the
constructed index since the range of samples and compilation methods vary depending on the source index.
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Figure 2.5. Linear Time Trend of House Prices in U.S.
Data Source: Standard and Poor’s Case & Shiller Index
the following problem.
min
{gt}Tt=−1
{ T∑
t=1
ct
2 + λ
T∑
t=1
[(gt − gt−1)− (gt−1 − gt−2)]2
}
(2.22)
under the assumption that
yt = gt + ct t = 1, · · · , T (2.23)
where yt denotes a given time series, gt are growth components and ct are cyclical components
which measure the deviation of the time series from gt. If the parameter λ in the equation
(2.23) approaches infinity, the solution for the minimization problem is simply a linear time
trend. With λ=0, the solution is simply the given original time series.44 Hodrick and Prescott
(1981) select λ=1,600 based on their prior belief about the moderate level of volatility of the
growth and cyclical components. In order for the estimated growth component gt to be a
solution to the minimization problem under a set of assumptions,
√
λ is required to equal σ1/σ2
44Dejong and Dave (2007) interpret the parameter λ as a weight or value given to the smoothness of the growth
components (pp. 37). For example, the case of λ=0 means that smoothness receives no weight.
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where the numerator and denominator denote the standard error of cyclical components and
the second differences of the growth components respectively. The prior of the two standard
errors are 5 for σ1 and 1/8 for σ2. These values lead to the ratio of 40.
45
Thereafter the value 1,600 for the smoothing parameter has been accepted as the standard
level for quarterly business cycle data, 100 for annual data and 14,400 for monthly data
(Favero, 2001; pp.54). In stark contrast with the careful considerations on the choice of λ
in the business cycle literature, any rationale for selecting a certain level of the parameter is
not explicitly provided in the empirical studies on assets and housing markets listed above.
For annual data, Detken and Smets (2004) choose 1,000 for annual data simply following the
lead of Gourinchas et al (2001) which again lacks explanation about the reason for choosing
that level. On the other hand, Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) select 10,000 for annual data.
In all the other remaining papers in the above list of ECB papers, the parameter value is set
as 100,000 for quarterly data which by far exceeds the level widely used in the research on
business cycle.
Focusing only on the frequency of the data, it is plausible to set the level of λ as 1,600
since the quarterly data will be used in the regression analysis below as in the business cycle
research. However, considering the different property of house price data from macroeco-
nomic aggregate variables, three values of the parameter, 1,600, 10,000 and 100,000 are tried
preliminarily. Judging from the regression results, the level of 1,600 turns out to be the most
appropriate one for eliciting a meaningful relationship between the deviation of house prices
from their trend and the candidate determinants.
2.4.2 Results of Empirical Analysis
The first step to take for the regression is to extract cyclical components from the time series
of U.S. real house prices. The next step is to measure the degree of deviation of actual house
45Canova (2007) provides more detailed consideration about the choice of λ (pp. 83-84) and DeJong and Dave
(2007) explain the underlying logic for the value by frequency domain analysis (Ibid ; pp. 38-46).
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prices from the estimated trend by dividing the absolute value of the cyclical components
by the level of the trend components. Figure 2.6 illustrates the extracted trend from the
S&P/Case-Shiller(CS) 10-city composite index realized by the CPI index less shelter from
1987 Q1 to 2009 Q4.
Figure 2.6. Filtered Trend of House Prices in U.S.
The vertical distance between the two lines denotes the cyclical components which are
graphed in the left panel of Figure 2.7. The original values of the components are expressed
in absolute terms as illustrated on the right panel in the same figure and divided by the values
of the estimated trend components. Put in notations, DEVt = |Ct/Tt| × 100 where Ct and Tt
denote the estimated cyclical components and trend components respectively. As such, DEVt
gauges the degree of deviation of the observed house prices from their estimated trend.
In the next stage, the degree of deviation DEVt is regressed on the determinants of housing
prices which are represented by the following seven explanatory variables with one period
lag: interest rates (it−1), lagged dependent variable (DEVt−1), the rate of change in house
prices (HP gt−1) and income (INCt−1), the rate of change in real estate loan (CRDt−1) and
inflation (INFt−1), and demographic change (Dt−1) representing the rate of change in the
number of households. These variables take the absolute value of the original data and hence
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Figure 2.7. Cyclical Components of House Prices and Deviation from Trend
the coefficient of each change rate is interpreted as the influence of one unit change in the
independent variables on the degree of house price deviation from the estimated trend. The
simplified form of the regression equation is as follows.
DEVt = α+ ΨX
′
t−1 + t t = 1, · · · , T (2.24)
where X′t−1 refers to the row vector of the explanatory variables and Ψ is the vector of the
corresponding coefficients. Among the variables, both DEVt−1 and HP
g
t−1 are introduced into
the regression model to represent expectational effects, and CRDt−1 measures credit avail-
ability. It is necessary to give further explanation about the reason for these representations.
Firstly, expectation of the future degree of deviation is assumed to take the modified naive
form of expectations to reflect the strong inertia latent in house prices. The modification
lies in that the information utilized for forming expectations include not only the level of the
deviation degree but also the growth rate of house prices in the previous period. Agents are
assumed to form their expectations based on the deviations in the previous period and house
price changes. The following equation illustrates this specific form of expectations.
Et−1DEVt = ϕDEVt−1 + ψHP
g
t−1 (2.25)
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where Et−1 denotes expectation operator at the time t− 1.46
Secondly, regarding credit availability, there seems to be no proper measure since the vari-
able is hard to quantify in practice. In the absence of any correct metric for the variable,
using the conventional measure of credit such as consumer credit or real estate loans can be
a plausible proxy. Substituting this equation into the equation (2.24) and extending it yields
the regression equation below.47
DEVt =α + β1i t−1 + ϕDEVt−1 + ψHP
g
t−1 + β2INCt−1
+ β3CRDt−1 + β4INFt−1 + β5Dt−1 + t t = 1, · · · , T (2.26)
Table 2.2 presents the results of the regression using the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-city index as
the source data for the dependent variable. The sources and properties of the data for the
other variables are described in detail in Appendix A. The regression models (1) and (2) in
that table include the same set of independent variables except for interest rates it−1. The
interest rate is short-term in the former model whereas it is long-term in the latter one. The
purpose of using a different type of interest rates in these two models lies in comparing the
explanatory power of each type of interest rates. The results of models (1) and (2) are both
consistent with the hypothesis that the factors except for interest rates and expectations turn
out to exert an insignificant influence on the volatile components of house prices. To find a
model better fitting the data, these insignificant variables are removed and further regressions
are conducted on the remaining variables. In model (3), the sign of the long-term interest rate
is negative, which runs contrary to the prediction that interest rates amplify the volatility of
house prices rather than dampen them. Furthermore, the coefficient proves to be insignificant
even at the 10% significance level. Compared to model (3), the coefficients of the short-term
interest rate and other explanatory variables in model (4) show positive signs as expected and
46This equation is specified by employing the naive type of expectation in which economic agents consult only
the information of the current period.
47The specification of the regression equation is based on the preliminary regressions results obtained by using
the general-to-specific approach in which only one-period lagged variables appear to be relevant.
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Table 2.2. Determinants of House Price Deviation from Trend
House price data source : S&P/Case-Shiller House Price Index(1987.Q1 - 2009. Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable(DEVt): DEVt = |Ct/Tt| × 100
Constant -1.397 -1.672 -0.552 -0.848
(-1.795) (-2.482) (-1.443) (-2.826)
Nominal interest rates (it−1)
Long-term 0.317 -0.104
(0.315) (-0.112)
Short-term 1.335 *** 1.301 ***
(3.462) (3.390)
Lagged dependent variable(DEVt−1) 0.848 *** 0.852 *** 0.859 *** 0.862 ***
(18.733) (20.449) (20.137) (21.614)
House price change(HP gt−1) 0.116 *** 0.093 *** 0.105 *** 0.080 ***
(3.339) (2.812) (3.647) (2.874)
Income change(INCt−1) 0.523 ** 0.520 ** 0.444 * 0.448 *
(2.000) (2.172) (1.761) (1.914)
Real estate loan(CRDt−1) 0.046 0.049
(1.268) (1.463)
Inflation (INFt−1) 0.043 0.045
(0.754) (0.391)
Demographic change (Dt−1) -0.091 -0.183
(-0.140) (-0.307)
Adj.R2 0.861 0.889 0.863 0.880
DW 1.721 1.972 1.815 1.931
AIC 3.502 3.362 3.457 3.326
Note: The asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively and t-statistic
appears in the parentheses. DW and AIC represent Durbin-Watson statistic and Akaike informa-
tion criteria respectively.
are statistically significant.
Based on model (4), the degree of deviation fluctuates mainly due to the changes in the
short-term interest rates and the expectations which are assumed to be a linear combination of
one-quarter lagged degree of deviation (DEVt−1) and the house price change rate (HP
g
t−1) as in
the equation (2.25). To interpret the coefficients, an increase of 1%p in the short-term interest
rates heightens the degree of deviation by 1.30%p further from the estimated trend. Turning
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to the expectational effects, the total magnitude of the coefficient is 0.94 which is slightly
below that of interest rates. The reason why interest rates generate stronger volatility needs
a separate investigation, but a possible conjecture is that interest rates exercise their influence
throughout the whole time period whereas the modified form of expectations specified above
plays a more critical role in the extreme phases such as the pronounced housing boom and
bust periods. In contrast, the influence of income is relatively limited compared with these
of interest rates and expectations as the degree of deviation increases by 0.45%p in reaction
to a 1% change of income level. All of these results lend support to the hypothesis that the
trend path of housing prices is driven mainly by the variables changing slowly and smoothly
while the cyclical components are generated by changes in interest rates and expectations.
Figure 2.8 shows that this prediction is consistent with the actual paths of the federal funds
rate (FFR) and the degree of deviation.
Figure 2.8. Short-term Interest Rates and Degree of Deviation
The limitation of the results from model (1) in Table 2.2 is that the error term t is likely
to be serially correlated considering the low level of Durbin-Watson (DW ) statistics.48 The
problem may arise from the asymmetric coverage of the data used for the dependent variable
48Considering the high level of t-statistic for interest rates and expectation, the test results may not differ even
though the standard errors of the coefficients are measured correctly.
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and explanatory variables.49 The data for calculating the dependent variable DEVt is the
S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Composite Index which covers the major cities in the U.S. while
the data for all the other explanatory variables are nationwide.50 To check whether widening
the coverage of the dependent variable can improve the robustness of the regression results in
Table 2.2, the 10-City Index is replaced by the national house price index (NHPI) published
by the FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Agency) to calculate the degree of deviation.51 Even
though it is not appropriate to elaborate on the detailed differences in the calculation methods
of these two indices, it is worth mentioning the relative advantages. The advantage of the
10-city index lies in its allowing for quality change by employing the sophisticated weighting
methodology, while the disadvantage is that the index has a relatively short history starting
from 1987. In contrast, the national house price index (NHPI) has a longer time series
starting from 1975 and covers more transactions, but it lacks consideration of quality variation
occurring to the samples at different time points.
Among the regression results obtained using NHPI data in Table 2.3, model (3)′ delivers
the most consistent result with that of model (4) in Table 2.2 having a higher level of DW
statistic. Firstly, as can be recognized in model (1)′ and (2)′, inflation and demographic
changes have no explanatory power for the extent of house price deviation from the trend.
Secondly, interest rates exercise the strongest influence on the degree of deviation. There also
exist several conspicuous differences between the two sets of regression results. Firstly, the
type of interest rate which proves to be relevant is not short-term but long-term in the new
regression. Secondly, income changes prove to be insignificant and changes in real estate loans
is significant even though their influence appears to be trivial. However, notwithstanding
these differences, the regression results of the models using different house price indexes
49There are alternative ways to overcome a serial correlation problem, such as White or Newey-West testing
techniques. However, as the asymmetric coverage of the data appears to be a more influential reason for the
problem, it is probable that using the house price data covering the whole nation is an appropriate solution.
50The list of 10 cities includes Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego,
San Francisco and Washington D.C.
51Before the FHFA was founded in 2008 combining the former Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and the GSE mission office at the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the NHPI was published by OFHEO.
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are not fundamentally incompatible. For example, the income change in regression model
(4) is significant only at the 10% level similar to the case of model (2)′. In addition, the
influence of changes in real estate loans in model (3)′ is negligible as in model (1). Thus, if we
ignore the slightly different implications, the regression results produced using the different
data on housing prices reconfirm the hypothesis about the dominant role of interest rates
and expectations in driving the cyclical components of housing prices fluctuating about the
trend.52
It is difficult to compare these results presented above with those in existing literature
previewed in the earlier sections since the dependent variable used for the regression analysis
has not been analysed in the past empirical studies. Nevertheless, the most remarkable
difference is that income changes are insignificant in the regression results above whereas
they are among the most noticeable determinants of housing prices. However, this difference
arises possibly because the explanatory power of income change is confined to the trend
components extracted from house prices. In light of that, comparison of the above results with
the findings in Agnello and Schuknecht (2011), which are referred to in the previous section, is
more pertinent because the fundamental motivation underlying each analysis is similar. They
regressed the probability of the boom and bust events on the common determinants of house
prices using the sample data of 18 countries from 1980 to 2007. In their finding, changes in
real GDP per capita turn out to have the most potent power for determining the probability
of housing boom and bust occurrences. To point out a couple of limitations of the results, the
expectational factor is not considered explicitly even though the extraordinary boom phases
of the housing market are more likely to be driven by excessively optimistic expectation. As
a result, the omission of expectations may over-estimate the influence of GDP. An additional
limitation is that GDP can be a poor proxy for the ability to able to buy a house since it
includes various types of taxes and capital depreciation.
52There is a possible limitation of these regression results: the dependent variable DEV and the growth rate
of house pricesHP g are highly persistent and hence the one-period lagged terms of these variables may not
be able to correctly capture the effects of expectation.
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Table 2.3. Determinants of House Price Deviation from Trend
House price data source : National House Price Index(1987.Q1 - 2009. Q4)
(1)′ (2)′ (3)′ (4)′
Dependent variable(DEVt): DEVt = |Ct/Tt| × 100
Constant -0.421 0.261 -0.598 *** -0.227
(-0.893) (0.541) (-1.996) (-0.806)
Nominal interest rates (it−1)
Long-term 2.105 *** 2.122 ***
(3.359) (3.460)
Short-term 0.013 0.545 ***
(0.043) (1.912)
Lagged dependent variable(DEVt−1) 0.693 *** 0.688 *** 0.694 *** 0.685 ***
(8.076) (7.495) (8.248) (7.784)
House price change(HP gt−1) 0.187 0.169 0.205 * 0.178
(1.514) (1.283) (1.777) (1.467)
Income change(INCt−1) 0.031 0.010
(0.382) (0.119)
Real estate loan(CRDt−1) 0.042 * 0.029 0.047 ** 0.040 **
(1.781) (1.174) (2.089) (1.696)
Inflation (INFt−1) -0.025 -0.034
(-0.751) (-0.952)
Demographic change (Dt−1) -0.093 -0.002
(-0.213) (-0.005)
Adj.R2 0.597 0.578 0.608 0.591
DW 2.202 2.137 2.306 2.278
AIC 2.764 2.891 2.707 2.795
Note: The asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively and t-statistic
appears in the parentheses. DW and AIC represent Durbin-Watson statistic and Akaike informa-
tion criteria respectively.
2.5 Conclusion
Our analysis supports the conclusion that house prices in the U.S. from 1987 to 2009 have been
driven mainly by interest rates and expectations. These results support the dominant role of
short-term interest rates in the housing market: something which has been taken for granted
in the debate on the sources of the sub-prime crisis. Nevertheless the results fall short of
confirming the accountability of monetary policy decisions for the volatile evolution of house
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prices in the U.S. since the majority of mortgage contracts are linked to long-term interest
rates. However, it can be inferred from the stable term structure between short-term and
long-term interest rates that the decreases in policy rates are also fundamentally responsible
for fostering the abnormalities in the housing market.
An additional implication from the results is that expectations have not been given enough
attention as a prime driver of the housing cycle. Further research is necessary for understand-
ing the actual behaviour of public’s expectations and its influence on house price fluctuations.
Two apparent limitations of the empirical results presented above are worth mentioning.
The first one is related to the presumption that the path of the extracted trend components
depends more on income change and demographics. Despite its plausibility, this should be
verified more rigorously since this is the main rationale for the regression strategy. The second
problem, which is common to other empirical studies, is the possibility that the proxy vari-
ables may misrepresent the original ones. The modified form of expectation calculated by the
linear combination of the lagged dependent variable and house price change may cause mea-
surement errors since the behavioural form of expectations varies depending on the specific
situation of the housing market as elaborated before.
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Monetary Policy Transmission via
Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage
Markets
3.1 Introduction
It has been maintained that the deregulation and liberalization of housing finance since the
1980s have broadened credit availability which in turn has led to more pronounced fluctuations
in housing prices. Specifically, banks and governmental mortgage agencies were allowed under
the liberalization process to produce a wide range of mortgage loan products, set lending
interest rates at their own discretion, determine the level of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio based
on their own judgement rather than regulatory prescriptions, and so forth. Moreover, non-
bank financial corporations were given permission to enter the mortgage market, thereby
heightening the degree of competition in this market.1 Consequently, easier credit supply
to the housing market has increased the volatility of the demand for housing and house
1 The characteristics of housing finance in each country is distinct. IMF (2008) and Calza et al (2009) provide
indicators of the differing developments in mortgage financing in industrialized countries. ECB (2009) surveys
the recent circumstances of housing finance in the Euro area since 1999.
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prices, and in turn amplified further repercussions of the housing sector on consumption and
residential investment. These developments in housing finance retain substantial implications
for the analysis of monetary policy transmission. Recent findings support the view that the
financial liberalization process has rendered the housing sector and the rest of the economy
more responsive to a monetary policy shock as interest rates affect credit availability more
significantly in a deregulated environment (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003; IMF, 2008; Calza et
al, 2009).2 3
The aforementioned findings are obtained under an assumption that mortgage market char-
acteristics are exogenously determined by the financial deregulation process. Recently, a line
of research has raised the issue of a possible causal link between an accommodative mone-
tary policy stance and bank lending behaviour. Researchers pursuing this line of reasoning
highlight the observed facts regarding lending markets in the run-up to the recent housing
boom which numerous developed countries underwent. During that period, lending criteria
were loosened appreciably, the minimum down-payment decreased considerably while policy
rates were deemed relatively lower than a specific judgement criterion, for example, the Tay-
lor rule or estimated neutral interest rates. The crux of the findings of these researchers is
that low interest rates for such a protracted period increased banks’ appetite for higher risk
in lending and other investments. This transmission channel of monetary policy is labeled
the risk-taking channel by Borio and Zhu (2008). However, the underlying rationale for the
risk-taking channel has been highlighted by central bankers. Greenspan (2010), for example,
ascribes the failure of the banking system during the recent financial crisis to the possibility
that the prolonged period of a relaxed policy stance might have driven banks to neglect the
negative tail of investment risk (Greenspan, 2010); this comment implies that the overall per-
2 Regardless of the recognized importance of credit availability in housing finance, there exist a limited number
of findings about the relationship between credit availability and house prices. The reason for this is that
there are few trustworthy measures of credit availability itself. Even though the amount of mortgage debt
seems a plausible proxy for the variable, the amount registered in banks’ books is not a proper measure
since it is the realized value of credit availability. Furthermore, changes in mortgage depend on other factors
besides it.
3 Another relevant finding is in Almeida et al (2006) which confirms that the response of house prices to
income shocks is more rapid in those countries having a higher ceiling on the LTV ratio
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ception of risk was positively biased. Voices from the European Central Bank (ECB) have
expressed apprehension from a similar viewpoint; low interest rates for a prolonged period
abet moral hazard in banks’ investments imbuing them with a myth that the cental bank may
not be able to reverse interest rates rapidly because of worries about asset market collapse
(ECB, 2005; Trichet, 2005; Papademos, 2006).4
These reflections provide a motivation to consider the relationship between low interest rates
and banks’ risk taking attitude. I submit the hypothesis that a positive monetary policy shock
causes banks to raise the LTV ratio and supply ample liquidity to the housing market, thereby
rendering the path of house prices and consumption more volatile. In a nutshell, this chapter
has two aims: firstly, to verify the existence of the risk-taking channel in the mortgage market,
and secondly, to estimate the repercussions of an expansionary monetary policy shock on the
economy as a whole via this channel. These aims are attained through a two-stage analysis.
To examine the existence of the risk-taking channel, namely, a negative relationship between
monetary policy rates and the LTV ratio, two kinds of empirical analyses, i.e. regression
and VAR, are conducted using U.S. time series data. Although there are various indicators
of the degree of banks’ risk-taking, the LTV ratio is chosen as an effective one as mortgage
lenders tend to set the ratio depending on their own perception of the risk latent in housing-
collateralized lending. Subsequently, a DSGE model is developed incorporating an estimated
regression equation for the risk-taking channel to analyze its role in a broader economy. In the
DSGE model, the LTV ratio is defined as a function of policy rates and house price inflation
and is set less than unity. This variable plays a key role in amplifying and propagating an
initial shock to the economy.5 In addition, the model follows the lead of Iacoviello (2005)
and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). These papers adapted the financial accelerator mechanism of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to investigate the dynamics of the housing sector and its spillover
into the rest of the economy.
4 The government’s intervention to relieve troubled banks through bailout programs also has been referred to
as a cause of the ‘too big to fail’ myth.
5 The ceiling on the LTV ratio in practice can exceed one, as in the U.S. which raised the maximum ratio
up to 125%. However, only a small portion of borrowers can take advantage of this ceiling as other income
requirements and lending criteria should be satisfied.
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There are two notable contributions in this chapter which set it apart from the rest of the
literature on bank risk-taking and financial friction in lending. Firstly, this analysis is the
first attempt, to the best of my knowledge, to delve into the effects of the risk-taking channel
employing a general equilibrium framework. Secondly, the model in this chapter endogenizes
the LTV ratio for the first time.
To elaborate on the second point, the LTV ratio in existing models is assumed to be a fixed
constant (Monacelli, 2008; Calza et al, 2009; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). An improvement over
the constant LTV ratio is the assumption of a time-varying exogenous stochastic process as
in Parie´s & Notarpietro (2008) and Gerali et al (2010), but still this stochastic ratio is not
affected by other variables in the model. However, in practice, since banks adjust the LTV
ratio on the basis of an evaluation of default risk and the redeemable value of collateral in
case of foreclosure, the existing way of treating the LTV ratio in economic models is clearly
unsatisfactory. Endogenizing this ratio bases the model more firmly on realistic aspects of
housing finance. An additional advantage of introducing the LTV ratio in this manner is the
resultant parsimony of the model. As opposed to the models in, for instance, Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2008), and Gerali et al (2010) which introduce a
separate block for financial intermediation, the supply side of credit can be reflected in my
model by allowing the LTV ratio to vary depending on the banks’ decision.
The main findings of the analysis are twofold. First, the results from the regression and
VAR analysis lend firm support to the assertion that there is a negative relationship between
short-term interest rates and the LTV ratio. It implies mortgage suppliers have tended to be
more aggressive in housing-collateralized lending in the period of low interest rates. Secondly,
a positive monetary policy shock in the model with the risk-taking channel included produces
enhanced deviations of consumption and financial debt from the steady state than the model
without this channel. These findings can shed light on the conundrum why central bankers,
before the sub-prime crisis, failed to forecast the catastrophic results stemming from low
interest rates for a prolonged period; presumably they dismissed the risk-taking channel when
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analyzing the transmission effects of their monetary policy decisions. Furthermore, the results
justify the need for central banks to pay more attention to the possible existence of more
as yet undiscovered transmission channels of monetary policy and for financial supervisory
authorities to regulate banks’ risk-taking behaviour.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of
the rationale for, and summarises existing findings on, the risk-taking channel. It also presents
an explanation for the working of the risk-taking channel in bank lending and its repercussions
on the housing market and broader economy. In section 3.3 empirical evidence for the risk-
taking channel in the U.S. mortgage banking sector is presented. In section 3.4, a baseline
DSGE model is developed and, in the following section, the monetary policy transmission is
analyzed in the absence of the risk-taking channel. In section 3.6, the risk-taking channel is
accommodated in the baseline model to examine how the transmission effects change in the
presence of the channel. Section 3.7 sets out the conclusion.
3.2 Risk-taking Channel and Mortgage Lending
This section provides a short summary of the theoretical considerations underlying the risk-
taking channel and summarises relevant empirical findings. I will then demonstrate the im-
plications of the channel for the mortgage market and its impact on the housing market and
the economy as a whole.
3.2.1 Rationale and Empirical Findings
The risk-taking channel was introduced explicitly by Borio and Zhu (2008) as an additional
monetary policy transmission channel. It is defined as follows:
the risk-taking channel in the transmission mechanism (is) defined as the impact
of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance and hence on
the degree of risk in the portfolios, on the pricing of assets, and on the price and
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non-price terms of the extension of funding. (Ibid, pp. 9)
This issue has received growing interest in academia due to the failure of the global banking
system caused partly by the excessive risk-taking behaviour of mortgage suppliers observed
in the first half of the last decade. The Fed maintained that the overheated housing market
prior the crisis was not associated with past monetary policy decisions (Greenspan, 2010;
Bernanke, 2010). However, an alternative possibility was proposed that an accommodative
monetary policy stance for the extended period might affect the risk-taking behaviour of
economic agents, especially financial intermediaries. Thereafter, the main focus has been
on the causal chain or correlation between an easy policy stance and banks’ risk-taking. A
preliminary consensus has been established that two necessary conditions must be fulfilled:
‘too low’ interest rates as the first condition and for ‘too long’ a period as the second one.
The question naturally follows: in what ways does a loose monetary policy stance encourage
banks to take more risk? There are three possibilities. The foremost and fundamental driver,
from my viewpoint, would be the tendency of ‘search for yield’ in the period of low interest
rates as noted by Rajan (2006) and others. To take an example from the banking sector6,
the yields of bonds are more likely to be lower than these of other investments such as
stock and collateralized lending to households. While the exposure to stock is circumscribed
within a ceratin level since it is classified as a highly risky asset and hence harmful for
satisfying minimum capital requirements set by the BIS (Bank for International Settlements),
collateralized lending ensures higher profitability and also limited possible loss in the case of
default. These two attractions drive banks to expand lending against housing as collateral by
loosening lending criteria and increasing lending to borrowers with low creditworthiness.
Secondly, during a period of low monetary policy rates coupled with moderate economic
growth as during the Great Moderation, banks are more likely to neglect the possibility that
assets held by them can turn sour or non-performing and borrowers’ real income growth can
become negative in the future. To apply this reasoning to the mortgage market, if the value
6 Investment banking or shadow banking is not considered in this example.
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of collateral and the income level of borrowers were increasing, then mortgage suppliers would
perceive the risk in lending as lower than they would otherwise. The underestimation of risk
results mainly from the expectation that robust growth in income and collateral value will
persist into the distant future. Finally, as pointed out by the ECB sources, banks are more
likely to undertake riskier and more profitable investments as long as interest rates remain
low in the belief that the lender of last resort will come to the rescue in order to prevent the
overall economy from collapsing. If it were not for the ‘too big to fail’ myth, preference for
a riskier position could be subdued to some extent and the degree of moral hazard could be
lessened.7
Empirical findings on the risk-taking channel has been increasing recently. Drawing on
expansive and detailed data on individual bank loans from the Spanish Credit Register in
the period from 1984 to 2006, Jime´nez et al (2008) find that lower overnight lending rates
cause banks to loosen lending criteria and expand credit line to borrowers with mediocre
credit records despite higher default risk. These findings gain support from Ioannidou et al
(2009) who provide the evidence that the default probability of bank loans rises and lending to
riskier borrowers tends to increase in Bolivia as the U.S. federal funds rates (FFR) decrease.8
In another study, Altunbas et al (2010) investigate whether low interest rates affect the risk
position of 643 banks in 15 industrialized countries using balance sheet data for the period from
1998 to 2008. Banks’ risk is measured by the expected default frequency (EDF), an indicator
for the probability that a company will default in a certain time horizon. They find that the
low short-term interest rates for a sustained period caused an increase in banks’ default risk.
Gambacorta (2009) provides evidence on the negative relationship between interest rates and
banks’ default risk by using an econometric approach similar to the one employed in Altunbas
et al (2010).9 Delis and Kouretas (2011), by consulting the balance sheet information of
7 Essentially the first and second points are in line with Borio and Zhu (2008) who explain how the risk-taking
channel works in general instead of focusing on bank lending.
8 The authors maintain that the U.S. FFR is a proper measure of Bolivian monetary policy stance since over
90 percent of Bolivian deposits and credits are transacted in the U.S. dollar.
9 The data used is obtained from the balance sheets of 600 banks in Europe and U.S. during the period
2007-2008.
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banks in the Euro area during the period 2001-2008, find that the ratio of risky asset value
to total asset value, as well as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, increased.
Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011) focus explicitly on the influence of monetary policy rates on
relaxed lending standards. By using the responses from bank lending surveys carried out in
the Euro area and U.S., they identify the positive influence of an accommodative policy stance
on the loosening of lending standards during the period from 2002 Q4 to 2008 Q3.
A similar strand of research in the U.S. has also recently been in the spotlight. Adrian and
Shin (2009, 2010b) stress the importance of the role of short-term interest rates in generating
business cycle by causing dramatic changes in the banking sector’s credit supply. In a recent
paper, Adrian and Shin (2010a) introduce the concept of risk-taking channel and maintain
that banks are liable to estimate risk as lower and hence take a riskier investment position
as lower short-term interest rates widen the margin between the interest rate on deposits and
return on the assets in the balance sheet. However, their research is theoretical and hence
needs sound support from empirical research.
3.2.2 Implications of Risk-taking Channel for Mortgage Market and Econ-
omy
The empirical studies reviewed in the previous sub-section suggest that lower interest rates
lead banks to soften lending criteria and supply more credit than they would otherwise. The
specific dependent variables in these analyses include the probability of banks’ default in the
future, the ratio of risky asset value to the total asset value and the percentage of banks
tightening their lending standards. Given the importance of the effect of leverage on general
consumption and housing purchases, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio needs to be added to the list
of measures of banks’ risk appetite. The rationale for considering the LTV ratio as a measure
of risk-taking attitude is consistent with the rationale for the risk-taking channel. During
a prolonged period of an accommodative monetary policy stance, collateralized lending to
households satisfies the dual targets of profitability and safety. This leads banks to expand
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lending against housing as collateral by raising the LTV ratio even though the collateral
value stays constant. There are additional factors inducing banks to lower the LTV ratio.
As long as house price inflation triggered by low interest rates continues, lenders would take
the default risk of borrowers less seriously compared with the period of a bearish housing
market. Furthermore, if low interest rates are maintained for an extended period, expectation
of robust house prices in the future would encourage complacency in evaluating the risk of
mortgage lending. Lenders can also decrease the price of lending as long as households’ net
worth is increasing given the low interest rate environment. As such, the realized appreciation
of housing prices and expectation about further increases induce banks to perceive the overall
risk of mortgage lending as lower and to increase the LTV ratio. Enhanced credit supply and
higher value of housing will persist until interest rates reverse their direction.
The risk-taking channel operating in the mortgage market has unambiguous implications
for the wider economy. More funds would be available to households than in the absence of
the channel. The funds borrowed against housing are spent not only on purchasing houses but
also on consuming other durable and non-durable goods. Residential investment increases as
the demand for housing expands fueled by ampler liquidity with low borrowing costs. Notable
is that once the channel begins to operate, a self-reinforcing feedback loop would come into
play between risk-taking, mortgage lending supply, house prices and real economic activity.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the causal chain running from low interest rates to the housing market
and macroeconomic activities via the risk-taking channel.
3.3 Empirical Estimation of Risk-taking Channel
In this section, we examine the presence of the risk-taking channel in the U.S. mortgage
market. Two empirical methodologies are employed: simple regression and VAR approach.
However, before conducting the analysis, we first discuss some relevant aspects of the data on
the LTV ratio.
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Figure 3.1. Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
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3.3.1 Data
There does not exist an officially compiled historical series on the LTV ratio. Hence, one
has to depend on work done by other researchers to obtain this database. In this regard, a
special comment should be given about the LTV time series estimated by Duca et al (2011)
for first-time home buyers in the U.S. The series is very useful for researchers in the field
of housing since the frequency is very high (quarterly) and the time span extends as far
back as 1979.10 The estimated data can be broadly classified into two types depending on
the type of mortgage issuers; private mortgages and all types of mortgages including those
from government-sponsored agencies such as the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
The series for private mortgages is considered more pertinent for an analysis of the risk-
taking channel since the mortgages from the FHFA omit non-standard loans which convey
substantial information on the risk-taking behaviour of private mortgage lenders.
The data series has proven to be highly reliable judging by its close co-movement with
the data on the auto loan LTV ratio published officially by the Fed.11 The property of an
automobile as a durable good justifies the comparison. Figure 3.2 shows the long-term series
of the two kinds of LTV ratios regarding home mortgages and auto loans, respectively, from
1980 Q1 to 2007 Q4. These two time series appear to have an upward trend, although there is
pronounced decoupling between them during the period from 1985 to 1989. Especially after
1990, the co-movement of the two trends is pronounced in the same figure.
To evaluate the correlation between the trends of both time series, the trend components
of each time series are extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing
parameter 100,000. The trend components are graphed in Figure 3.3. Not surprisingly, and
as expected from the original data series, the correlation coefficient turns out to be 0.9930
which implies a near perfect co-movement. This lends great plausibility to the data series
10Using the estimated data, the paper evaluates the influence of credit condition changes on house prices.
11The data can be downloaded from the ′Terms of credit′ menu on the webpage of
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist
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estimated by Duca et al (2011) and we will use this in our subsequent estimations.
Figure 3.2. Auto Loan and Home Mortgage LTV Ratio in U.S.
Data Source: Federal Reserve, Duca et al (2011)
Figure 3.3. Trend Components of Auto Loan and LTV Ratio
Data Source: Federal Reserve, Duca et al (2011)
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3.3.2 Estimation
3.3.2.1 Regression Analysis
To examine whether the risk-taking channel exists or not in the U.S. mortgage market, that
is, if lenders take on more risk by increasing the LTV ratio as interest rates decrease, the
following regression equation is estimated with the LTV ratio as the dependent variable.
LTVt = α+ β1LTVt−1 + β2FFRt−1 + β3HPGt−1 + t (3.1)
The determinants of the LTV ratio in the current period, LTVt, includes the one-quarter
lagged LTV ratio, LTVt−1, the lagged Federal Fund Rates (FFRt−1), which are the overnight
interest rates fluctuating closely around policy rates, the lagged growth rates of real house
prices, HPGt−1 which is computed using the National House Price Index (NHPI) published
by FHFA. The equation above hypothesizes that mortgage lenders set today’s LTV ratio based
on the level of short-term interest rates and house price inflation in the previous period while
avoiding overly rapid changes by adjusting the LTV ratio in the previous period to a small
extent. The inclusion of house price inflation is justified on the basis of the reasoning about
the risk-taking channel. As house prices continue to rise for a prolonged period, lenders are
more likely to focus on the positive side in the distribution of the housing price risk and hence
increase the LTV ratio. The apparent positive correlation in Figure 3.4 between the house
prices and the LTV ratio in the U.S. from 1995 to 2007 seems to support this speculation.
The regression results for two different time periods are shown in Table 3.1. The first time
period for estimation is from 1980 Q1 to 2009 Q2 to utilize all the data on the regression
variables. The coefficient of FFRt−1, which is of main interest, is significant at the 10%
significance level as well as that of HPGt−1. The signs of the coefficients are consistent with
the risk-taking channel hypothesis above; low interest rates and the robust housing market
induce lenders to assume more risk by raising the LTV ratios and become more willing to
103
Chapter 3. Monetary Policy via Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
Figure 3.4. Mortgage LTV Ratio and House Price Growth in U.S.
Data Source: Federal Reserve Board, Duca et al (2011)
supply credit.
Table 3.1. Estimation of LTV Equation using Level Data
1980 Q1 - 2009 Q2 1985 Q1 - 2007 Q2
value t-statistic p-value value t-statistic p-value
α (constant) 28.855∗∗∗ 4.701 0.000 40.392∗∗∗ 5.124 0.000
β1 (LTVt−1) 0.676∗∗∗ 9.917 0.000 0.558∗∗∗ 6.466 0.000
β2 (FFRt−1) -0.135∗ -1.974 0.051 -0.425∗∗∗ -3.195 0.002
β3(HPGt−1) 0.104∗∗∗ 1.729 0.087 0.146∗ 1.692 0.094
R2 = 0.643 , DW = 2.283 R2 = 0.649, DW = 2.153
In the regression for the second time period from 1985 Q1 to 2007 Q2, the coefficients of
these two variables prove to be significant again.12 Notably, the coefficient of FFRt−1 is
significant even at the 1% significance level. The statistical significance improves since the
new time period excludes the data from 2007 Q2 to 2009 Q2. Over theose two years, the
12The motivation for starting the sample period from 1985 lies in the possibility that the financial liberalization
might begin exerting its real influence only after the mid-1880s. Moreover, the samples after the breakout
of the sub-prime crisis are excluded because the relationship between interest rates and house prices in the
post-crisis period is positive which is abnormal from the viewpoint of the established empirical findings.
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housing market crash subdued the LTV ratio despite appreciable decreases in policy rates, as
the shaded area in Figure 3.5 illustrates. Overall, the two sets of regression results corroborate
the existence of the risk-taking channel in the U.S. and support inclusion of the channel when
we inspect the effects of monetary policy decisions on the mortgage market. In terms of
macroeconomic modeling, this implies that the LTV ratio should be allowed to vary based
on changes in interest rates and house prices to analyze the full aspects of monetary policy
transmission.
Figure 3.5. Mortgage LTV Ratio and Federal Fund Rates in U.S.
Data Source: Federal Reserve Board, Duca et al (2011)
Since the equations estimated using the level data are not suitable for the log-linearized
DSGE model to be presented in the following section, a separate equation needs to be es-
timated using detrended or demeaned data. As the overall fitness of regression using the
detrended data by HP filter is not satisfactory, demeaned data are used for all variables in
the regression equation. Demeaning implies that the long-term average is assumed to be the
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steady state of each variable. The regression equation to be estimated is given below.13
L̂TV t = γ1L̂TV t−1 + γ2F̂FRt−1 + γ3ĤPIt−1 + t (3.2)
where the hatted variables represent percentage deviation from the steady state and HPI
represents the level of the house price index from the FHFA (instead of the growth rate
denoted by HPG in the preceding regression analysis).14
Table 3.2. Estimation of LTV Equation using Demeaned Data
1980 Q1 - 2007 Q2 1995 Q1 - 2007 Q2
value t-statistic p-value value t-statistic p-value
γ1 (L̂TV t−1) 0.427∗∗∗ 4.885 0.000 0.329∗ 2.012 0.036
γ2 (F̂FRt−1) -0.577 -1.335 0.185 -3.207∗∗∗ -4.370 0.000
γ3 (ĤPIt−1) 0.128∗∗∗ 4.568 0.000 0.181∗∗∗ 6.235 0.000
R2 = 0.676 , DW = 2.045 R2 = 0.792, DW = 2.214
Table 3.2 shows the two sets of regression results for the different time periods. For the first
time period from 1980 Q1 to 2007 Q2, the coefficient of F̂FRt−1 turns out to be insignificant
even at the 10% significance level, whereas it is highly significant for the second time period
from 1995 Q1 to 2007 Q2. Based on the statistical significance, the regression equation for the
latter time period is set as the benchmark LTV equation to be incorporated into the DSGE
model. To express it in an equation form, the estimated equation of (3.2) is given by
L̂TV t = 0.211 L̂TV t−1 − 3.207 F̂FRt−1 + 0.181 ĤPIt−1 + t (3.3)
The estimated coefficients imply that lenders respond more aggressively to the deviation
13Not only for the purpose of obtaining a dynamic solution to the model but also by the assumption of naive
type of backward-looking expectation, the dependent variables take only one-period lagged terms.
14A separate regression equation is estimated which includes realized federal funds rates instead of nominal
ones. The estimation results reveal that the magnitude of the coefficient of γ2 is slightly below the level
obtained by the estimation of the equation including nominal FFR. This implies that the regression result
is robust.
106
Chapter 3. Monetary Policy via Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
of short-term rates from the steady state than that in house prices. A basic intuition is
provided by the fact that the risk-taking channel induces low interest rates to influence lenders’
behaviour in more ways than house prices do. In a low interest rate environment, lenders
expect higher house prices, search for higher yield and estimate downside risk to collateral as
lower.
The error term, t, which is a shock to the LTV process, retains an important implication for
the housing market. The shock encompasses, for instance, the changes in regulation relating to
the discretion of mortgage lenders to decide on their LTV ratio, the invention of new lending
products such as exotic mortgages, and changes in the degree of information asymmetry
between lenders and borrowers. For example, if the financial authorities grant more latitude
to mortgage lenders in determining the LTV ratio or allow them to sell mortgage products
with a smaller downpayment, then the ratio will increase given a specific level of house prices
and interest rates.
3.3.2.2 VAR Analysis
A VAR analysis is now employed to examine the existence of the risk-taking channel. A specific
representation of the relationship to be identified by VAR will differ from one obtained through
regression analysis between the three variables of interest, i.e. short-term interest rates, house
prices and the LTV ratio. However, as each variable in a VAR model is also expressed in a
similar type of equation to a regression equation with the LTV ratio as a dependent variable,
the same qualitative aspect of the risk-taking channel, if it exists, can be ascertained through
an impulse response analysis. The specific VAR model is defined as below.
Γyt = c+A(L)yt + Σet (3.4)
where y is a vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is the parameter matrix in the lag operator
L, and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks. The vector y includes
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three endogenous variables, (i) the federal funds rates denoted by INT , (ii) the growth rates
of the house price index, HPG, and (iii) the LTV ratio. The model is estimated using the
same data as in the regression analysis from 1980 Q1 to 2007 Q2. In order to let the impulse
response of the LTV ratio be more sensitive to a monetary policy shock, the data after 2007
Q2 is excluded.
The three structural shocks from the model are identified through Cholesky decomposition
which include a monetary policy shock and shocks to house prices and the LTV ratio. The
endogenous variables are ordered as follows:
yt = [INTt, HPGt, LTVt] (3.5)
This recursive identification scheme restricts interest rates, INT , from responding contem-
poraneously to the house price growth (HPG) and the LTV ratio. In a similar vein, LTV
bears no influence on HPG in the same quarter. These restrictions are harmonious with
the fundamental purpose of this VAR analysis for diagnosing the existence of the risk-taking
channel, despite the common observations that these three variables exert influences on each
other simultaneously. The lag order of the model is set as 2 based on Schwarz information
criterion and the F -statistics for model reduction.
Figure 3.6 includes the impulse responses of each endogenous variable to the three structural
shocks. Our main interest lies in whether the LTV ratio responds negatively to a monetary
policy shock. In addition, we can see whether LTV reacts positively to HPG as indicated by
the results of the regression analysis presented above. The left panel of the bottom row in
the same figure is of primary interest to us. It shows that the response path of the LTV ratio
to a monetary policy shock and it is consistent with the hypothesis presented above on the
risk-taking channel. A positive increase of 100bp in short-term interest rates leads LTV to
decrease by a maximum of 0.5%. This implies that an expansionary monetary policy shock
will result in higher the LTV ratio through the risk-taking channel. The impulse response
108
Chapter 3. Monetary Policy via Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
Figure 3.6. Impulse Response from VAR Analysis
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Data Source: Federal Reserve, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Duca et al (2011)
function is consistent with the regression results presented above.
The second panel in the bottom row of that figure shows that a positive shock to house
prices increases the LTV ratio. The result also confirms the legitimacy of the regression
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result despite the relatively subdued magnitude of the response of the LTV ratio. As stated
previously, lenders are likely to underestimate the risk latent in housing-collateralized lending
as housing prices appreciate. Another notable feature of this impulse response analysis is the
response of HPG to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The first panel in the middle
row is consistent with recent findings using a VAR approach (Bjørnland and Jacobsen, 2010;
Musso et al, 2010) in that an increase in short-term interest rates induces housing prices to
deflate.
3.4 Developing a DSGE Model
In this section, a DSGE model will be developed to analyze the influences of the risk-taking
channel on the overall economy. The model features two types of households which are patient
households (savers) and impatient households (borrowers). Households supply firms with
labor as an input to production and spend their labor income to accumulate residential housing
and consume other goods. Savers who are more patient than borrowers save a fraction of their
labor income and lend the funds to borrowers facing a borrowing constraint. In return for the
funds lent, savers earn interest from borrowers. Firms produce wholesale consumption goods
using only labor. Monopolistically competitive retailers buy the intermediate goods from
firms and price these goods for sale. However, as in Calvo (1983), only a certain proportion
of retailers can adjust retail prices subject to the predetermined probability that a random
signal arrives. The restriction on price re-optimization introduces nominal rigidities into the
model.
A simplifying assumption is introduced regarding the use of housing. Housing in this econ-
omy is solely for residential purposes unlike that in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) where it is used for production purposes as well. In these two papers, the production
technology comprises housing as an input. This simplification makes the model consistent
with the estimation of the LTV ratio equation in Section 3 since data comprising only home
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mortgages was used for the estimation.15
3.4.1 Patient Households
There is a continuum of identical patient households (savers) denoted by P . A representative
patient household maximizes a lifetime utility function given as below.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtP
[
lncPt + jlnh
P
t −
(LPt )
ϕ
ϕ
+ χln
(
MPt
Pt
)]
(3.6)
Consumption cPt , holding of housing h
P
t and real money balances
MPt
Pt
affect the level of
utility positively whereas hours worked LPt brings disutility to households. βP refers to the
discount factor with 0 < βP < 1, j and χ denote preference for housing and real money
balances respectively, and ϕ is related to the elasticity of labor supply. The budget constraint
faced by patient households when maximizing expected utility is given as follows.
cPt + qt(h
P
t − hPt−1) + sPt = wPt LPt +
Rt−1sPt−1
pit
+ Ft + T
P
t −∆(
MPt
Pt
) (3.7)
where qt denotes real house prices (
Qt
Pt
), st is real savings, w
P
t is real wages. Patient households
consume goods and accumulate housing while saving a certain fraction of the total income
which comprises labor income, real interest income
Rt−1 sPt−1
pit
, dividends from the retailers (Ft)
and transfer from the central bank (Tt).
16 Increments in real money balances are funded by
the various sources of total income.
15 If data on the LTV ratio of business properties were available, this baseline model can be expanded to include
an entrepreneurial sector. We leave this for future research.
16Nominal interest income from lending st to borrowers at the previous period is Rt−1St−1 where St−1 is
nominal savings equal to Pt−1st−1. Hence nominal interest income from lending the savings can be rewritten
as Rt−1Pt−1st−1. Dividing it with overall price level Pt renders real interest income at the current period
(Rt−1st−1Pt−1)/Pt. Since Pt−1/Pt is the reciprocal of the gross inflation rate pit = Pt/Pt−1, the real interest
income at the current period is expressed finally as (Rt−1sPt−1)/pit.
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3.4.2 Impatient Households
The group of impatient households (borrowers) denoted by B, also has unit mass and maxi-
mizes the same type of utility function as savers.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtB
[
lncBt + jlnh
B
t −
(LBt )
ϕ
ϕ
+ χln
(
MBt
Pt
)]
(3.8)
However, the discount factor of the impatient households is less than that of the patient
ones, i.e. βB < βP . This condition ensures that the borrowing constraint for the impatient
households binds near the steady state with reasonably small shocks.17 The budget constraint
is different from that of savers only in that impatient households are the borrowing entities
and pay interest to savers.
cBt + qt(h
B
t − hBt−1) +
Rt−1bBt−1
pit
= bBt + w
B
t L
B
t + T
B
t −∆
(
MBt
Pt
)
(3.9)
where bt refers to the debt owed to patient households.
Additionally and importantly, the impatient households are subject to a borrowing con-
straint the role of which lies at the heart of propagation and amplification of a monetary
policy shock in this model. The impatient households provide the current housing stock as
collateral and borrow funds against the expected value of the collateral in the next time pe-
riod. However, mainly because of the uncertainty latent in future house prices and borrowers’
ability to repay the debt, the impatient households are entitled to borrow only a fraction of
the total collateral value. To express the constraint,
bt ≤ mt Et(qt+1 h
B
t pit+1
Rt
) (3.10)
This borrowing constraint implies the total amount of real debt should be less than a
17Appendix B-1 proves that the borrowing constraint binds at the steady state.
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fraction of the discounted expected value of the housing provided as collateral.18 mt is the
the LTV ratio with 0 < mt < 1 and the multiplicative term mtEt (qt+1 h
B
t pit+1/Rt) can be
considered as the upper bound of the collateral value which lenders can secure in redeeming
a possible default in the following period. Put differently, (1 −mt) fraction of the collateral
value is considered by the lenders as the minimum sum of various costs to be incurred by a
default such as the cost for legal proceedings, foreclosing and reselling collateral.
Even though mt is time-varying in practice and determined by the patient households in the
model with the risk-taking channel to be presented later, we assume for the moment it is fixed
as m to provide a benchmark for measuring the effect of the risk-taking channel. Henceforth,
I will designate the version of the model with the fixed LTV ratio as the baseline model and
the LTV-endogenized version as the risk-taking model.
3.4.3 Wholesale Goods Firms
The firms produce wholesale goods Yt by hiring labor from households using the following
technology in which labor is a unique input.
Yt = A (L
P
t )
α (LBt )
(1−α) (3.11)
where A represents total factor productivity and α is the labor income share of patient house-
holds. Since the main focus of the analysis is put on the transmission effects of the shocks
to monetary policy and the LTV ratio, we ignore technological shocks and set A=1 for the
purpose of simplicity. The wholesale firms maximize profit, i.e. revenue of Yt/Xt less cost of
wPt L
P
t + w
B
t L
B
t , as below.
max
LPt ,L
B
t
Yt
Xt
− wPt LPt − wBt LBt (3.12)
where Xt is the markup of final goods over wholesale goods defined by a ratio of retail prices
18 In nominal terms, Bt ≤ mtEt
(
Qt+1ht
Rt
)
, and if both sides are divided by Pt,
Bt
Pt
≤ mtEt
(
ht
Rt
Qt+1
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt
)
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to wholesale ones, Pt/P
w
t .
3.4.4 Retailers
To introduce price rigidities into the model, monopolistic competition and Calvo-type price
optimization are assumed at the retail level as in the standard New Keynesian model. A
continuum of retailers of mass unity buy wholesale goods from the firms at Pwt and sell them
to consumers at Pt. Aggregate final goods index (Y
F
t ) is the integration of demand of each
retailer, indexed by i, for intermediate goods as follows.
Y Ft =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
(3.13)
where ε represents the elasticity of substitution among differentiated intermediate goods and
is over unity (ε > 1). The aggregate price index also derives from integration of the individual
price index which the retailers are facing.
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
(3.14)
Given these two aggregate indices, retailers maximize the expected lifetime utility function
under a standard type of budget constraint. The maximization yields the following individual
demand function for final goods which each retailer faces.
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Y Ft (3.15)
Taking the demand function and the wholesale price, Pwt , as given, each retailer chooses the
optimal price P (i)∗t to maximize the current value of the profit made under the condition that
the chosen price remains effective. However, only a fraction, 1-θ, of retailers receive random
signals during each period and reset the prices while the remaining fraction θ maintains the
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same price as in the previous period. The optimal price can be obtained by solving the
following problem.
max
P (i)∗t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Λt,k
(P ∗t (i)
Pt+k
− X
Xt+k
)
Y ∗t+k(i)
}
= 0 (3.16)
where Y ∗t+k(i) = (P
∗
t (i)/Pt+k)
−εYt+k is the demand for each retailer’s differentiated goods and
Λt,k = βP (c
P
t /c
P
t+k) is the usual stochastic discount factor of the patient household. Without
price rigidities, θ = 0, the first order condition of this maximization problem boils down to
the condition that the optimal price P (i)∗t needs to be equalized to the real marginal cost
times the desired markup X = εε−1 . Retailers rebate profits Ft = (1 − 1/Xt)Yt to patient
households. The first order condition of the maximization problem is given as below.
P ∗t = X
∞∑
k=0
 (θβ)kEt
(
Λt,kY
∗f
t+kP
−1
t+k
)
∑∞
k=0(θβ)
kEt
(
Λt,kY
∗f
t+kP
−1
t+k
)
Et( 1
Xnt+k
)
(3.17)
Under the Calvo pricing environment, the aggregate price dynamics of the economy is as
follows.
pi1−εt = θ + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
)1−ε
(3.18)
where pit refers to gross inflation
Pt
Pt−1 . Linearizing the equation (3.17) around the steady
state and combining it with (3.18) above yields the standard New Keyensian Phillips Curve
(NKPC).19
3.4.5 Monetary Policy
In order to close the model, the central bank is assumed to determine nominal policy rates
Rt in response to the deviations of inflation and output from the desired level. The specific
19A detailed description of the derivation of NKPC is given on pp. 43-49 of Gali (2008).
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type of the Taylor rule is given by
Rt = R
rR
t−1
(
pi1+rpit−1
(Yt−1
Y
)rY
rr
)1−rR
eRt (3.19)
where rr and Y denote the steady-state real interest rate and output respectively, and eRt
is an independently and identically distributed monetary policy shock with zero mean and
variance σ2R. The exponent rR represents the degree of inertia in adjusting policy rates in
practice.
3.4.6 Equilibrium
If the necessary conditions for optimization and a set of market clearing conditions are sat-
isfied, the model reaches a unique stationary equilibrium in the absence of shocks to the
system.20 The market clearing conditions are for the housing market, H = hPt + h
B
t , the
total output, Yt = c
P
t + c
B
t , and the lending market, st = b
B
t . The housing stock is assumed
to be fixed for simplicity. As stated above, impatient households borrow up to the maxi-
mum amount savers are willing to lend. By linearizing the set of first-order conditions and
market-clearing ones around the steady state, the baseline model boils down to a system of
14 log-linearized equations as presented in Appendix B-3.
3.5 Analysis of Monetary Policy Transmission in Baseline Model
3.5.1 Parameter Values for Calibration
To conduct a qualitative analysis of the monetary policy transmission using the baseline
model, I choose specific values for parameters based mainly on Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and
related papers with a similar motivation and model structure, for example, Iacoviello (2005),
Calza et al (2009) and Gerali et al (2010). The number of parameters to calibrate is 12 and
20Appendix B-2 includes the necessary conditions for each sector.
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the chosen values of the parameters are listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
Households
βP 0.99 Patient households’ discount factor
βB 0.95 Borrowers’ (Impatient households’) discount factor
ϕ 1.01 Labor supply aversion
j 0.12 Weight on housing in households’ utility function
α 0.64 Labor income share of patient households
Price Rigidities
X 1.05 Steady-state gross markup
θ 0.75 Probability of maintaining prices
TFP
A 1.00 Total Factor Productivity
Monetary Policy
rR 0.73 Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule
rpi 0.27 Inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule
rY 0.13 Output gap coefficient of the Taylor rule
the LTV ratio
m 0.87 LTV ratio
The values of the parameters in Table 3.3 are somewhat different from those in other studies.
For examples, Gerali et al (2010) sets the impatient households’ discount factor βB to be 0.98
and Gali (2008) sets the price rigidity parameter θ to be 0.66. However, the differences in these
parameter values do not substantially affect the quantitative aspects of the baseline model
analysis. Furthermore, the choice of the parameter values specified on Table 3.3 ensures a
proper solution to the model which is similar to that one used in , following Iacoviello and
Neri (2010). Given the prime role of the borrowing constraint, it is worth elaborating on
the level of long-term average the LTV ratio. There have been few statistical sources for
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calculating a long-term average the LTV ratio which can be considered a steady-state value
for the parameter m. As there is no consensus on the level of average m, researchers have
used different values for it. Referring to Table 3.4 in respect of the U.S., Monacelli (2008)
sets the annual average of the LTV ratio as 0.75 for the period 1952-2005, Iacoviello (2005)
chooses 0.55, while Iacoviello and Neri (2010) use 0.85. For the Euro area, Calza et al (2009)
use 0.7.
Table 3.4. Average LTV Ratio for Home Mortgage
Literature the LTV
ratio
Period Country Data Source
Calza et al(2009) 0.701) - Euro Area various sources2)
Iacoviello (2005) 0.55 - U.S. -
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) 0.85 1973-2006 U.S. Finance Board’s
Monthly Survey
Monacelli (2007) 0.75 1952-2005 U.S. Federal Housing
Finance Board
Note: 1) Gerali et al (2010) follows the same value of Calza et al(2009).
2) For more details, see the Table 1. on pp. 38 in the paper.
In contrast to the literature mentioned above, I used the quarterly LTV data estimated by
Duca et al (2011) for the U.S. in the previous section. The average of the quarterly LTV ratio
from 1980 Q1 - 2008 Q4 is 0.87 which is close to that in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
3.5.2 Impulse Response to Monetary Policy Shock
I will focus on the impulse responses of the main variables of interest to a monetary policy
shock: consumption, house prices and debt. The main task of this analysis is in examining
if the risk-taking transmission channel of monetary policy generates enhanced effects on the
paths of these variables. Figure 3.7, in which the time period is one quarter, plots impulse
responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock, i.e. a negative shock to nominal interest
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rates (Rt). The transmission process starts with a decrease in Rt which reduces the real in-
Figure 3.7. Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
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terest rate by the Taylor principle. The sufficient condition for satisfying the Taylor principle,
as clarified by Bullard and Mitra (2002), is rpi > 1 in the Taylor rule specified above which
implies that real interest rates rise with an increase in the nominal interest rates.
Lower level of real interest rates induce households to expand consumption. In particular,
the interest rate channel exerts a stronger influence on the consumption of impatient house-
holds than patient ones. The assumption that the discount factor of impatient households
is lower than that of patient households implies the former has an incentive to increase cur-
rent consumption by expanding their borrowing. Another transmission mechanism operates
through the changes in house prices caused by an upward pressure on demand in the hous-
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ing market. As the impatient households spend the additional funds borrowed not only in
consuming final goods but also in buying houses, housing prices increase. In turn, the appre-
ciation in the collateral value increases the maximum amount the impatient households can
borrow. Owing to this so-called equity withdrawal effect, households again can consume more
than previously. This second channel is an application of the credit cycle in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) to the housing market and analogous to the financial accelerator mechanism in
Bernanke et al (1999). These two channels, the interest rate channel and house price channel,
compose the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Iacoviello (2005) and explain why
the impatient households’ consumption deviates further from the steady state than that of
patient households.21 22 These two transmission channels can be illustrated by the following
causal flows in which hatted variables denote percent deviations from the steady state.
 Interest Rate Channel
 Patient Households : Rˆt ↓ −→ rˆrt ↓ −→ cˆPt ↑ and sˆPt ↓
 Impatient Households : Rˆt ↓ −→ rˆrt ↓ −→ bˆBt ↑ −→ cˆBt ↑
 House Price Channel: Equity Withdrawal Effect
 Impatient Households Rˆt ↓ −→ rˆrt ↓ −→ bˆBt ↑ −→ qˆt ↑ −→ bBt ↑↑ −→ cˆBt ↑
To get an idea of the quantitative influence of the equity withdrawal effect, I compare the
impulse response of consumption in the baseline model with that from the model in which
impatient households cannot borrow with housing as collateral. Figure 3.8 juxtaposes the
impulse responses of consumption to a positive monetary policy shock from the baseline
model with that of the model without a borrowing constraint. As shown in the same figure,
the impatient households in the economy without equity withdrawal borrow and consume less
than they would otherwise. This means that a monetary policy shock is amplified through
borrowing against collateral in the baseline model.
21The term house price channel is sometimes termed the collateral channel.
22There is one more channel titled the debt deflation channel in Iacoviello(2005).
120
Chapter 3. Monetary Policy via Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
Figure 3.8. Comparison of Impulse Responses of Consumption
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3.6 Effects of Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
In this section, I will examine whether the risk-taking channel in the presence of a positive
monetary policy shock generates more volatile paths of the main variables relative to the base-
line model. With this in mind, the regression equation for the risk-taking channel estimated
in Section 3 is incorporated into the baseline model. Endogeneizing the LTV ratio also allows
us to examine how a shock to this ratio affects the whole economy.
3.6.1 Monetary Policy Shock
3.6.1.1 Backward-looking LTV Ratio Decision Rule
The main hypothesis of this analysis is that the risk-taking channel intensifies the effects of
a monetary policy shock in the baseline model since lenders raise their LTV ratio in reaction
to the shock. Accordingly, impatient households can borrow more than they would otherwise
and increase their consumption and holding of housing stock. By incorporating the bench-
mark LTV equation into the baseline model, we will examine whether the hypothesis can be
supported by the risk-taking model. In this model, banks reset the level of the LTV ratio in
every period on the basis of the rule expressed in equation (3.20), that is, based on short-term
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interest rates and house prices in the previous period.
mˆt = γ1 mˆt−1 + γ2 Rˆt−1 + γ3 q̂t−1 + eˆt (3.20)
where mˆ, Rˆ and hatq refer to the deviation of the LTV ratio, interest rates and house prices,
respectively, from their steady states. t refers to an exogenous shock to the decision process.
23
Low interest rates in the previous period drive them to take more risk for the reasons state
previoiusly. To reiterate, these reasons include higher yields from collateralized lending than
bonds, underestimation of downside risk to house prices, expectations of robustness in future
house prices, and a belief in the ‘too big to fail’ myth.
Table 3.6 lists the parameter values of the LTV decision rule above. The values are based
on the results from the estimation of the regression equation (3.3).
Table 3.5. Parameter Values for Backward-looking LTV Decision Rule
γ1 γ2 γ3
Value for Calibration 0.7 -3.2 0.3
Figure 3.9 shows the impulse responses to an unexpected decrease in policy rates by 0.5%p.
The solid line depicts the results from the risk-taking model while the dashed line illustrates
the same impulse responses from the baseline model as in Figure 3.7. It is evident that the
traditional interest rate and house price channels in the risk-taking model generate similar
positive responses of the variables of interest as the baseline model does. However, the risk-
taking channel pushes up consumption to a higher level during the first year. Specifically,
in the risk-taking model, the expansionary monetary policy shock induces consumption to
deviate positively by 6.5% from the steady-state whereas it generates an increase of 5.0% in
the baseline model. The additional increment in the deviation of consumption results from the
increase in borrowers’ debt. As suggested by our previous discussion about the risk-taking
23 In the model, banks are assumed to deposit and lend funds at the same interest rate and not to impose any
transaction cost. For the purpose of simplification, savers are assumed to act as lenders and banks at once.
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channel, lower interest rates lead lenders to forecast higher house prices in the future and
consequently to under-estimate the risk of collateralized lending. Lenders are now willing
to provide more funds even if there is no change in the collateral value or income level of
borrowers.
The difference in the paths of the economy generated by the baseline model and the risk-
taking model sheds some light on why central bankers failed to forecast the full effects of the
long-lasting accommodative policy on the economy. The two traditional channels, i.e., interest
rate and collateral channels, might be taken into account in the estimation of the future path
of the economy. However, missing the causal chain between low policy rates and bankers’
lending behaviour might lead policy makers to underestimate the influence of their decision
to maintain low interest rates for a prolonged period in the first half of the last decade.
To continue our discussion, two peculiar features of the impulse responses of house prices
and borrowers’ debt are noted below.
Firstly, comparing the impulse responses, there exists no difference in the two paths of house
prices over the first four quarters. This indicates that the impact of the risk-taking channel
on consumption results mainly from the decline in policy rates and a subsequent increase in
debt rather than the increase in house prices in the first four quarters. In a sense, this is
at odds with the hypothesis of the risk-taking channel. In the hypothetical economy, lenders
adjust their risk-taking attitude by responding to changes not only in policy rates but also
in house prices. Fluctuations in house prices send strong signals to mortgage lenders about
how risky collateral will be in the future. The risk-taking model presented here fails to reflect
the causal chain running from realized house prices to lenders’ risk-taking attitude in the first
four quarters. However, house prices do increase sharply after the first year in the risk taking
model. This shows that it takes a while for the risk taking channel to have its full impacts;
nevertheless eventually house prices do increase much more with the risk taking channel. This
is not inconsistent with observations during the recent housing boom.
123
Chapter 3. Monetary Policy via Risk-taking Channel in Mortgage Market
Figure 3.9. Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
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Secondly, the impulse response of borrowers’ debt shows no response in the first period and
then a rapid upturn in the second period. This result arises from the assumption that lenders
decide their LTV ratio on the basis of interest rates and house prices in the previous quarter.
As seen from Figure 3.10, the impulse response of the ratio reveals an unnatural kink possibly
because of the backward-looking behaviour of lenders. Under this backward-looking decision
rule, the response of borrowers’ debt to policy change appears to have a more volatile path
than the other economic variables. To overcome these shortcomings, an alternative rule is
introduced below.
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Figure 3.10. Impulse Response of LTV Ratio
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3.6.1.2 Forward-looking LTV Ratio Decision Rule
To make the assumption on the behaviour of lenders more consistent with reality, a forward-
looking decision rule of LTV ratio is introduced below. Lenders adjust the LTV ratio on the
basis of the observed level of policy rates and house prices in the current period and also
their own expectations of the evolution of these two variables in the next period. Another
distinction from the backward-looking rule is the absence of the lagged LTV ratio itself. The
omission of the term implies that gradualness in adjusting the LTV ratio is not in the lenders’
interest per se.
mˆt = ξ1 Rˆt + ξ2 q̂t + ζ1 Et(Rˆt+1) + ζ2 Et(q̂t+1) + eˆt (3.21)
The parameter values in the forward-looking decision rule are obtained by a regression us-
ing the same data used in estimating the backward-looking equation. The responsiveness to
the contemporary policy rate is lower than that of the backward-looking rule. The forward-
looking coefficient, i.e., ζ1 is still lower. This result makes sense in that lenders put less weight
on their own expectation of policy rates because of the uncertainty inherent in forecasting.
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Table 3.6. Parameter Values for Forward-looking LTV Decision Rule
ξ1 ξ2 ζ1 ζ2
Value for Calibration -1.95 0.21 -1.77 0.16
The impulse responses to a shock to monetary policy with a 50bp decrease are illustrated
in Figure 3.11. As anticipated, the two risk-taking models with a backward-looking rule and
forward-looking rule generate more volatile paths of the economic variables than the baseline
model. However, even though the two risk-taking models share the common characteristics of
the risk-taking channel, the overall economy displays enhanced deviations in the case of the
forward-looking rule. In other words, a monetary policy shock is amplified more when lenders
adjust their LTV ratio depending on their forecasts for policy rates and house prices rather
than on past information on these variables.
House prices, in particular, show a further deviation from the steady state. As lenders expect
future policy rates and housing prices will move and they use these expectations when deciding
the LTV ratio for every period, they supply more credit to borrowers. If lenders employed only
the information in the previous period, their willingness to make loans might be less than it
would otherwise. As a result of more mortgage supply, borrowers can consume more housing
and non-residential goods. House prices and consumption display more fluctuations. As such,
the model employing the forward-looking LTV decision rule overcomes the shortcomings of
the model with the backward-looking rule.
This result provides a forceful insight into the role of the expectations of credit suppliers in
the housing market. In retrospect, it is acknowledged that the housing bubble in the run-up
to the sub-prime crisis could not have developed only due to the irrational and myopic ex-
pectations of housing buyers. One of the main driving forces in the housing market at that
time was the infinitely elastic credit supply in response to the demand for loans. Regarding
the behaviour of bankers, some researchers have raised the possibility that bankers at that
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time were as irrational as home buyers in forming their expectations of future housing mar-
ket situation. The impulse responses generated by the model with the forward-looking rule
supports this hypothesis. If lenders draw on their own expectations in deciding the LTV ratio
instead of using the realized value of policy rates and housing prices, the economy shows a
more volatile path than it would otherwise.
Figure 3.11. Impulse Responses by Forward-looking LTV Decision Rule
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3.6.2 LTV shock
We now turn to what happens to the whole economy if a shock to LTV ratio decision process
arrives using the forward-looking decision rule introduced above. The shock to the decision
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process can be a wider latitude to adjust downpayment or change the ceiling on the LTV ratio
which are caused by changes in banking regulations. In the context of risk-taking attitude
of lenders, the shock can be interpreted as changes in the preference for the risk related
to housing-collateralized lending which can be caused, for example, by lenders’ optimistic
expectation about future house prices and economic activities.
Figure 3.12. Impulse Responses to an LTV Shock
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Figure 3.12 shows the impulse responses to a positive shock to the LTV decision process
which has the magnitude of one percent deviation from the steady-state the LTV ratio. The
positive shock implies that lenders become more aggressive in expanding housing-collateralized
loans. After the shock hits the economy, lenders supply more credit given a specific level of
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housing value and borrowers can increase debt not only for consumption but also for house
purchases. As the first panel in the same figure reveals, the shock increases the LTV ratio
instantaneously by one percent from the baseline, which implies heightened credit availability
and leads to a corresponding increase in borrowers’ debt. The impulse responses of consump-
tion and house prices are in line with expectation: total consumption increases by 0.8% and
house prices rise further 0.05%. The central bank reacts to these output and inflation gaps
by increasing policy rates. However, since the gaps are narrow enough to be bridged by a soft
response, the magnitude of rate hike is not substantial.
As noted above, an LTV shock exerts only limited influence on the variables compared with
a monetary policy shock. The extent to which the variables deviate from the steady state in
the presence of an LTV shock are quite smaller than when a monetary policy shock hits the
economy. For example, borrowers’ consumption deviates by only 0.6% in response to an LTV
shock whereas a monetary policy shock causes it to deviate by almost 6% as shown by Figure
3.11. Similarly, the response of housing prices to an LTV shock is less than with a monetary
policy shock; house prices change by only 0.01% with the LTV shock whereas they deviate by
2% in reaction to a monetary shock. These differences can be explained by the difference in
the channels through which these two shocks are transmitted. As elaborated above, monetary
policy is transmitted through three channels: the interest rate channel, house price channel
and risk-taking channel. These channels have a long-lasting effect on the economy. On the
other hand, an LTV shock directly affects only the amount of lending by patient households
to borrowers. Only a 1% deviation of the LTV ratio falls short of exerting strong impact on
the behaviour of economic variables, which is consistent with the reality.
However, the qualitative property of the simulated paths of consumption and house prices
are consistent with what we observed in certain developed countries during the period before
the sub-prime crisis. Mortgage lenders enhanced the LTV ratio to 100 percent, in some
extreme cases, even up to 120 percent, and consequently existing home owners could withdraw
more equity from their houses. The funds borrowed against housing as collateral were spent
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in purchasing houses and consuming other goods. The increased demand for housing pushed
house prices to an unsustainable level. The loop reiterated itself until mortgage related assets,
such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), turned non-performing as a result of the housing
market crash and the functioning of the whole banking sector was then crippled.
3.7 Conclusion
The motivation for the analysis originates from the following queries: (i) Why did central
banks and most macroeconomists fail to forecast the rapid economic downturn after the sub-
prime crisis? (ii) How did the prolonged period of low interest rates affect banks’ mortgage
supply? (iii) Does there exist any unidentified relationship between the accommodative mon-
etary policy maintained for a protracted period and the devastating aftermath of the financial
crisis?
To answer these questions, a micro-founded model is developed which incorporates the
hypothesized risk-taking channel of monetary policy into a workhorse DSGE model featuring
housing-collateralized lending and a borrowing constraint. In the model, lenders become
increasingly aggressive towards risk by increasing the LTV ratio as a reaction to a decrease
in policy rates. There are two prominent reasons for lenders assuming more risk. These
include search for yield and the tendency to under-estimate risk in housing-collateralized
lending in the presence of robust growth in collateral value. The specific procedure for setting
up a DSGE model which mobilizes the risk-taking channel underwent two steps. First, two
kinds of empirical analysis were conducted using U.S. data during the period from 1980 to
2007: (i) a set of simple regressions with the LTV ratio as the dependent variable and (ii)
a VAR model with short-term interest rates, the LTV ratio, and house prices as endogenous
variables. In turn, the estimated regression equation chosen as a benchmark equation merges
into the baseline model to make the risk-taking channel operative. The overarching aim of the
risk-taking model is investigating whether the risk-taking channel amplifies an expansionary
monetary policy shock. Additionally, the model enables us to see how the economy behaves
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in response to a shock to the LTV decision process.
The analysis of impulse responses generated by the risk-taking model confirms the hypoth-
esis that with the risk-taking channel, the trajectories of consumption and mortgage debt
in the model become more volatile. If the risk-taking channel operates, an initial monetary
policy shock produces more significant deviations of consumption and borrowers’ debt from
the steady state relative to the baseline model. In particular, if lenders decide the LTV ratio
using their own expectations about the future paths of policy rates and house prices, the
risk-taking channel turns out to have a greater effect on the economy as a whole.
From the analysis, we can derive several implications for monetary policy implementation
and financial regulation. First and foremost, to evaluate accurately the influence of monetary
policy decisions on economic and financial activities, we need to take into account the im-
pact generated through the risk-taking channel in addition to the impact from the traditional
transmission channels. If the effects are not given proper consideration, accommodative mon-
etary policy decisions can instead destabilise the whole economy since the response of banks
and households to the easy stance will be underestimated. Secondly, regulations on the LTV
ratio can contribute to the stability of the economy by curbing the aggressive risk-taking
behaviour at the credit supply side. If the risk-taking channel is operating, counter-cyclical
regulatory interventions in the lending market (by imposing a lower ceiling on the LTV ratio)
can smooth the paths of financial and real economic variables alike.
For future research, two points are worth mentioning. To capture the whole picture of the
influence on house prices and the whole economy, we need to consider the risk-taking channel
on the credit demand side in the mortgage market. Secondly, the process of expectation
formation still remain a “black box” in evaluating, both empirically and theoretically, the
effects of monetary policy decisions on the housing sector. Hence we need to invest more of
our resources in identifying and estimating the effects produced via the expectation channel.
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Chapter 4
Monetary Policy and Credit-driven
Volatilities
4.1 Introduction
Two main reflections on monetary policy analysis and its implementation have captured the
interest of central bankers and academics since the sub-prime crisis broke out. Firstly, the
transmission channels of monetary policy were not fully identified and this failure led to
underestimation of the actual impact of policy decisions on the housing market and overall
economy. Secondly, the failure has arguably been accountable for bringing about the ongoing
Great Recession to some extent. With hindsight, if the Federal Reserve (Fed) had forecasted
accurately the negative repercussions of its accommodative stance on the economy during
2002-2006, it might have chosen a different path for policy rates.
The first reflection has led a group of researchers to explore transmission channels previ-
ously ignored in monetary policy analysis. In particular, a policy transmission route dubbed
the risk-taking channel has received increasing attention as an additional link between mon-
etary policy and bank lending. Although the theory for this channel is in its early stage
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at present, recent empirical findings lend firm support to its existence with respect to bank
lending standards and risk position (Jime´nez et al, 2008; Altunbas et al, 2010; Delis and
Kouretas, 2011, Maddaloni and Peydro´, 2011).1 Chapter 3 applies the risk-taking channel
to mortgage lending and finds that the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in the U.S. tends to rise
as short-term interest rates decrease. Furthermore, the chapter integrates the transmission
channel into a DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) framework to investigate the
inter-relationship between monetary policy, mortgage lending, housing prices and consump-
tion. These findings imply in tandem that lower policy rates resulted in expansion of the
credit lines by encouraging banks to take risk to an excessive extent and, as a consequence,
the surfeit of credit fueled the housing boom and robust economic activities prior to the crisis.
In conjunction with the first reflection, a separate policy issue has drawn attention. That
is whether, in the run-up to the crisis, adherence to the conventional strategy of waiting until
the housing boom dissipates was appropriate from the viewpoint of macroeconomic stability.2
The conventional stance was based on the academic findings of Bernanke and Gertler (1999,
2001) who maintain that the intervention of monetary policy in asset markets may not be
effective for smoothing asset prices and can instead be detrimental to the whole economy.
Even though critics outside central banks voiced opposition to this argument as in Ceccheti et
al (2000), it remained only a suggestion and fell short of affecting the actual implementation
of monetary policy. However, as the impact of the housing bubble turned out to be more
harmful than previously estimated and the financial sector arguably played an important role
in the evolution of the crisis, the issue has received renewed interest in light of the interaction
between the housing market and macro-financial stability. The sceptics disagreeing with the
conventional stance argue that the conventional strategy, which focuses only on output and
inflation gaps, can cause economic instability if the influence of the housing sector on the
wider economy is underestimated.
1 A short summary of these empirical findings is provided in Chapter 2.
2 Kohn (2006) uses the phrase conventional strategy to refer to the implicitly orthodox stance of the Fed on
asset market fluctuations which is to wait until the asset market bubble bursts and then respond immediately
to minimize the negative repercussions of declining asset prices on the real sectors of the economy. See also
Greenspan (1999).
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For instance, Parie´s and Notarpietro (2008), using a DSGE framework find that shocks
to the housing sector both in the U.S and Euro area influence non-residential consumption
significantly through the collateral channel and a monetary policy rule reacting to house
prices improves social welfare. The simulation results in Kannan et al (2009) have a similar
implication for monetary policy implementation that policy intervention can be a means to
minimize negative repercussions from the housing sector on the economy. Their model shows
a shock to housing-collateralized lending rates, that varies depending on policy rates, causes
overall economic instability; an alternative monetary policy rule reacting to credit is more
effective for decreasing undesirable macroeconomic volatilities relative to the standard Taylor
rule. Lambertini et al (2011) presents a similar conclusion; a policy rule only aiming to
stabilize inflation is sub-optimal.3
This chapter, as an extension of attempts to accommodate these reflections, aims to demon-
strate that (i) an expansionary monetary policy shock intensifies credit-driven volatilities
through two additional transmission channels and (ii) an alternative policy rule, which re-
sponds to credit growth as well as output and inflation gaps, enhances macroeconomic stabil-
ity.
The two transmission channels incorporated into a DSGE framework are the preference
channel and risk-taking channel. Monetary policy rates affect the preference for housing
through the preference channel. As regards the preference channel, there are various reasons
for assuming a link between policy rates and the preference for housing. Firstly, if the user
cost of housing becomes cheaper as interest rates decrease, potential home buyers facing
credit constraint regard the purchase of housing as more attractive than consumption of non-
residential goods. Although there is no literature on the link between the preference for
housing and the user cost, Orgaki and Reinhart (1998) can be employed to support the above
argument. Based on the relationship between the user cost of durable goods and the marginal
3 Erceg and Levin (2006) presented simulation results showing that interest rates affect the durable goods
sector more than nondurables sector, and a policy rule aimed only at stabilizing changes in the price of final
goods rarely improves social welfare.
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rate of substitution (MRS) between durables and nondurables derived from the Euler equation
of consumer utility maximization, the paper notes that changes in MRS depend on interest
rate levels. It argues that interest rates need to be taken into account to prevent a bias in the
estimation of the MRS. Secondly, during the boom period of the housing market, psychological
factors heavily influence the preference for housing. Case and Shiller (1988), using responses
obtained from a questionnaire survey, report that home buyers determine the price they are
willing to pay based mainly on their expectation of future housing prices. Expectation of
future capital gains can make people move away from non-residential goods to buy housing.
In addition, Case and Shiller (2003) note that first-time home buyers are anxious about
being priced out of the housing market during a period of continued house price appreciation.
The anxiety leads to placing more emphasis on housing relative to other consumption goods.
Taking into account the causality chain running from low interest rates to a housing boom
and subsequently to psychological aspects, a change in monetary policy rates is an important
catalyst for shifting the preference towards housing. Incorporating the preference channel, in
other words, endogenizing the link between monetary policy and housing preference, is fairly
exploratory in that there exists, to the best of my knowledge, no similar attempt not only in
models featuring housing but also in other macroeconomic models. However, this experiment
can be considered as a necessary intermediate step to overcome the shortcomings caused by
the assumption that preferences are simply an exogenous process in studies on housing, as in
Iacoviello and Neri (2010).4
Through the risk-taking channel, monetary policy influences banks’ perception of risk re-
lated to housing-collateralized lending. As housing is used as collateral, if lower interest rates
induce housing prices to appreciate, lenders are more likely to estimate downwards the de-
fault risk and the resultant loss. The low risk-perception encourages them to take more risk
in lending by raising the LTV ratio. 5
4 These shortcomings are set out in Section 4.2.
5 Chapter 3 provides a more detailed explanation about how monetary policy decisions are transmitted to
mortgage lending through the risk-taking channel.
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With an expansionary monetary policy shock, the model incorporating these two additional
channels produces larger volatilities which are driven mainly by the rapid expansion of credit.
The two channels mentioned above work at the heart of the transmission mechanism in the
model economy. As the demand for housing increases by the preference shifting towards
housing through the preference channel and borrowing capacity increases by a hike in the
LTV ratio through the risk-taking channel, the creditlines are increased further vis-a`-vis the
case where such channels do not exist. In turn, the buildup in credit fuels the housing market
and consumption of goods from other sectors, and finances entrepreneurial investments. As
such, the economic scenario presumed by the model describes the circumstances preceding the
sub-prime crisis in which bankers took excessive risk and households displayed an overheated
demand for housing.
The second aim of this chapter lies in exploring an optimal monetary policy which can best
react to credit-driven volatilities in terms of welfare maximization. On the premise that the
central bank minimizes the loss defined as the weighted average of variances of output and
inflation gaps, the performance of alternative policy rules are compared. Among the candidate
rules, a policy rule which also allows for the volatility of credit performs best compared with
all the other rules including the standard Taylor rule.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides rationales and em-
pirical evidence for the preference channel and the risk-taking channel. Section 4.3 describes
the model and Section 4.4 presents an analysis of the impulse responses to an expansionary
monetary policy shock. Section 4.5 compares the performance of different monetary policy
rules. The last section sets out my concluding remarks.
4.2 Rationale and Empirical Evidence for Endogenizing Hous-
ing Preference and LTV Ratio
To achieve the aims of this chapter, a DSGE model will be developed endogenizing the
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preference for housing and the LTV ratio to reflect the impact of monetary policy decisions
through the preference channel and risk-taking channel. The incorporation of these two
channels differentiates the model from a workhorse model featuring the housing market and
credit constraint in similar strands of research. In the following subsections, the rationale for
the endogenization is demonstrated using empirical evidence obtained from VAR and simple
regression methods.
4.2.1 Rationale for Endogenizing Housing Preference and LTV Ratio
The DSGE model to be developed borrows its basic framework from Iacoviello (2005) which
has been the workhorse DSGE model for analyzing the role of the financial constraints and
housing market for the whole economy (Parie´s and Notarpietro, 2008; Gerali et al, 2010;
Lambertini et al, 2011). Despite its popularity, it appears to fall short of capturing significant
aspects of housing market dynamism. Particularly, it assumes the variables which affect the
demand for housing and borrowing of credit-constrained agents as fixed or exogenously deter-
mined. These variables include the preference for housing in the utility function of households
and the LTV ratio in the borrowing constraint. The housing preference represents households’
subjective appetite for housing. In the common type of utility function, it measures the weight
of economic agents assigned to housing relative to non-residential consumption goods. A rise
in the weight assigned to housing leads to a hike in the demand for housing and induces
agents to borrow more funds from financial intermediaries and, as a resutl, house price appre-
ciation follows. The LTV ratio, on the other hand, affects the affordability of housing since
it determines the maximum amount of borrowing against housing as collateral even if income
levels and housing values remain constant. This ratio plays an essential role in generating
the collateral channel effects in the monetary policy transmission (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997;
Iacoviello, 2005).
However, the relationship between monetary policy decisions and these two variables has
been neglected in the workhorse model by assuming that the preference for housing simply
follows an exogenous AR(1) process and the LTV ratio is fixed at its long-term average. This
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assumption fails to capture the full impact of monetary policy transmission on the economy
through the housing market and financial sector and hence has the following shortcomings.
Firstly, the disconnect between monetary policy and the two variables in the existing model
may subdue the impulse responses of financial variables and housing prices to changes in policy
rates. The failure in identifying the transmission mechanism results in underestimation of the
first-round effects of monetary policy decisions on the supply of credit and the evolution of
housing prices. Moreover, it may lead to downplaying the spillover effect of the developments
in the housing market on the overall economy. Secondly, if house price volatility is driven
purely by an exogenous shock, this is not very helpful in understanding the root causes behind
the boom-bust cycle of the housing market. Amazingly, a housing preference shock explains
as much as 27% of the variance in the housing prices of the U.S. at business cycle frequencies
in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). That finding renders the housing preference shock as integral to
the analysis of the U.S. housing market fluctuations. However, the reasons for the preferences
shifting towards housing still remains unclear.6
A question naturally arises in relation to the above reasoning whether the influence of
monetary policy on the preference for housing and the LTV ratio can be corroborated by
sound empirical findings and which factors change the preference.
To begin with the preference channel, there seems to be no finding supporting the existence
of it. Even the previously cited papers having a model featuring the housing sector pay
scarce attention probing into an understanding and empirical testing about the determinants
of housing preference. However, under the assumption that the preference follows an AR(1)
process, Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) suggest the following factors as
possible reasons for its movement: (i) changes in the availability of funds to buy housing
relative to other goods, (ii) positive expectation of future house-price movements.7
6 In Iacoviello and Neri (2010), an example of a shock to preference for housing includes a tax benefit applied
to home buyers. However, in the past empirical evidence on the determinants of house price volatilities, a
tax treatment exerts fairly limited influence on the demand for housing.
7 Temporary tax benefit can be another shifter of housing preference. However, its influence is limited to a
specific group of home buyers rather than pervasive.
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The first and second factors correspond to the user cost of housing and psychological factors,
respectively, which were elaborated on in Chapter 2. A further question arises about what
causes the changes in the available funds needed for the purchase of housing and optimistic
expectations. Firstly, as Himmelberg et al (2005) notes, interest rates are a crucial determi-
nant of the user cost of housing. This can be explained by consideration of the determinants
of user cost.8 Below is the primitive form of the equation for the user cost of housing which
is formulated in Poterba (1984).
w = [(1− θ)(i+ τp) + δ + p− qg] (4.1)
where θ denotes a marginal tax rate for the ownership of housing, i is mortgage interest
payment, τp is property taxes, δ is after-tax depreciation, p is repair cost and qg is capital
gain on housing.9 In equation (4.1), the interest rate directly influences the mortgage interest
payments in the function. Additionally, it affects another argument of the house price appreci-
ation qg in the user cost since interest rates have been found to affect housing prices negatively
to a substantial degree in normal circumstances.10 These direct and indirect effects make in-
terest rates the most influential determinant of the user cost of housing. Secondly, interest
rates also influence psychological anticipation of future housing prices due to the common
sense belief that lower interest rates result in housing price inflation. Case and Shiller (1988)
provide evidence that changes in interest rates are the most common answers to the survey
question asking what ignites a housing boom. This means that low interest rates are more
8 In the context of durable goods, empirical findings confirm the significant role of interest rates for expenditure
on durable goods through their influence on the user cost, as shown by Hamburger (1967), Mishkin (1976),
Mankiw (1985), Erceg and Levin (2006).
9 The interest rate can be nominal or real. There was a heated debate in the late 1970s and early 1980s
following the Great Inflation as to whether nominal or real interest rates were relevant for housing prices;
real or nominal. However, since then the difference has been considered peripheral and nominal interest
rates have been used as an explanatory variable in empirical studies. In addition, the interest rate can be
short-term or long-term. Since there seems to be a stable term structure between the two kinds of interest
rates as Chapter 2 clarifies in the case of the U.S., this distinction appears to be irrelevant for our analysis.
10Several empirical findings lend firm support to the conclusion that interest rates are the main driver of house
price fluctuations. Examples are Meen (2002), OECD (2004), Hofman et al (2005), Oikarinen (2005), Iossifov
et al (2008).
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likely to instill optimism in the participants in the housing market under normal conditions.11
All in all, interest rates as an instrument of monetary policy affect the housing preference
directly through the user cost of housing and indirectly through expectations.12 The preference
channel can be decomposed into two separate channels; the user cost channel and expectation
channel as illustrated below.13
 User Cost Channel
 R ↓ −→ M ↓ −→ J ↑
 Expectation Channel
 R ↓ −→ qeg ↑ −→ J ↑
where R denotes monetary policy rates, M is payment of mortgage interest, J is the preference
for housing and qeg refers to expectations of future capital gain on housing.
A shift in preference towards housing implies an increase in the weight on housing in the
standard utility function used in the literature. The generic form of the utility function is
given as follows.
U(ct, ht) = ln ct + Jt lnht (4.2)
where c and h refer to consumption of non-residential goods and housing stock, respectively,
and J denotes housing preference. As both the weight on housing and the marginal rate
of substitution between housing and other consumption goods, J reflects the change in the
preference for housing and affects the relative allocation of available financial resources. Figure
4.1 illustrates its allocative role through consumers’ utility maximization.
11The normal conditions include stable income growth, an efficiently functioning financial sector, absence of
strong negative shocks to the economy, et cetera.
12As for durable goods, only the user cost affects the preference of consumers. Monacelli (2009) notes that
lower policy rates generate a substitution toward durable goods.
13 If the realized capital gain on housing qg in equation (4.1) is replaced by expectations of future capital gain q
e
g
as in Mishkin (2007), the expectation channel merges into the user cost channel. However, this specification
of the user cost has a shortcoming in that it obfuscates the distinction between these two channels.
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Figure 4.1. Effect of Change in Housing Preference
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In the first period, households maximize their utility with the consumption bundle (c1, h1)
and housing preference J1. As interest rates decrease at the beginning of the second period,
they regard housing as more attractive since debt financing becomes cheaper and housing
prices are expected to rise. Subsequently, the marginal utility of housing increases and hence
the slope of the indifference curve J2 becomes steeper than J1. Meanwhile, the level of utility
remains the same, i.e. U(J1) = U(J2) in the same figure. The stronger preference for housing
leads to the new consumption bundle (c2, h2) by allocating more funds to housing given the
same budget constraint.
Turning to the risk-taking channel in terms of the relationship between monetary policy
stance and the LTV ratio, there hardly exists any relevant empirical evidence for the link
except the one provided in Chapter 3.14 In that chapter, both the simple regression and VAR
analysis confirm the existence of the negative relationship between the Federal Funds Rate
(FFR) and the LTV ratio in the U.S. for the period 1980-2007. That empirical finding implies
that mortgage lenders, including commercial banks and housing finance agencies, raise their
LTV ratio in response to decreases in FFR. The theoretical basis for this finding is in Rajan
14However, recent literature, such as Jimene´z et al (2008) inter alia, on the relationship between monetary
policy stance and risk-taking behaviour of banks reveals that banks are liable to take more risk in lending
in a low interest rate environment.
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(2006) and Borio and Zhu (2008). In these papers, lower interest rates propel investors and
financial intermediaries to tolerate more risk to search for higher yield and perceive downside
risks to their investments as lower. This transmission route is dubbed the risk-taking channel
by Borio and Zhu (2008). In the context of mortgage lending, lenders are prone to evaluate the
default risk of borrowers regarding mortgages as lower in the boom phase of a housing market
which is bolstered by an accommodative monetary policy stance for an extended period.
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence for the negative impact of policy rates on the LTV ratio using U.S. data
is documented in detail in Chapter 3; here empirical findings from VAR and regression are
provided solely for the relationship between monetary policy rates and housing preference only.
These two empirical methods require the time series of housing preference. However, since
preference for housing is not directly observable, it is indirectly inferred from the optimality
condition for households’ utility maximization in the workhorse model.
In the simplest form of optimization problem, households maximize lifetime utility by con-
suming housing and other goods as follows.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (ln ct + Jt lnht) (4.3)
under the following budget constraint
ct + qt (ht − ht−1) = It (4.4)
Above, ct and ht denote consumption of goods and holding of housing respectively, Jt is
a weight on housing relative to other consumer goods. In the budget constraint, qt refers to
housing price and It is income. Then Euler equation for this specific optimization program is
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given as below.
qt
ct
=
Jt
ht
+ β Et
(qt+1
ct+1
)
(4.5)
Assuming perfect foresight and rearranging (4.5) delivers the following definition of housing
preference.
Jt = τ
qt ht
ct
(4.6)
where τ is a scale parameter equal to (1−β). Under the standard assumption about the value
of discount factor β, τ is approximately 0.01.
In the optimality condition, Jt is defined as the ratio of the value of household residential
structure to the total personal consumption expenditure. Following this definition, the time
series of housing preference is constructed using U.S. data on the residential structure value in
the Flow of Funds and private consumption expenditure in the National Income and Personal
Accounts (NIPA).15
Using the data, a VAR analysis is conducted to identify the relationship between the Fed-
eral Funds Rate (FFR) and the preference for housing through impulse response functions.
Monetary policy tightening raises borrowing cost. A higher borrowing cost leads households
to diminish the weight on housing which will result in a reduced demand for mortgage loans,
leading eventually to house price depreciation. To validate this hypothesis, the following VAR
model is estimated using U.S. quarterly data over the sample period 1980 Q1-2006 Q4.
Γyt = c+A(L) yt−1 + Σet (4.7)
where yt, a vector of endogenous variables, includes six variables: the Federal Funds Rate
(FFRt), the weight on housing (Jt)
16 , the change rates of household mortgages (MORt)
15The Flow of Funds and NIPA are published by the Fed and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) respectively.
16To ensure the stationarity of the time series of Jt, changes in the value of the real household residential
structure (qt ht) and the real PCE on goods are used instead of the levels.
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and the real house price index (HPIGt), the percent change of real Personal Consumption
Expenditures (PCE) on durable goods (DURt) and nondurables (NDURt).
17 Using the
notations, yt can be defined in the following vector form.
yt = [FFRt, Jt, MORt, HPIGt, DURt, NDURt] (4.8)
To identify a monetary policy shock, the standard Cholesky decomposition method is em-
ployed and the variables are ordered as in the equation (4.8). Figure 4.2 displays the estimated
impulse responses of the six endogenous variables to one standard deviation innovation in the
Federal Funds Rate. The vertical axis measures percent changes of FFR and the weight on
housing J , and change rates for the remaining variables. As shown in the same figure, the
weight on housing decreases by 40 basis point during the second quarter following a negative
monetary policy shock arrives and this impact persists thereafter.18 The shock to policy rates
causes a spike in lending rates which renders the purchase of housing less attractive than
before. As a consequence of the weaker preference for housing, the amount of mortgage loans
for buying housing shrinks on the one hand while house prices depreciate on the other hand.
Even though existing literature has not allowed for the housing preference explicitly, the result
of this impulse response analysis is consistent with past empirical findings about the relation-
ship between interest rates and house prices in which interest rates are negatively associated
with housing prices. The contribution of our analysis lies in revealing the additional channel
through which interest rates are transmitted to housing prices. In addition, the two panels in
the bottom row of Figure 4.2 reveal that monetary policy tightening also negatively affects
personal consumption expenditure on both durable and nondurable goods. These findings
are consistent with the results of the VAR analysis in Erceg and Levin (2006) and Monacelli
(2009).
17The data source of FFRt and MORt is the Fed. The real house price index is obtained by deflating the
nominal house price index obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) by the PCE price
index from NIPA.
18The strong persistence in the impulse response reflects the inertia in the data on Jt.
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Overall, the results from the analysis of the impulse responses corroborate the hypothesis
that monetary policy rates negatively influence the preference for housing. In addition, the
resulting preference shift affects house prices and the demand for mortgages.
Figure 4.2. Impulse Response to a Negative Monetary Policy Shock
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Federal Fund Rate
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Household Mortgage Change
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Weight on Housing
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Real House Price Change
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Expenditure on Durables
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Expenditure on Nondurables
Note: The dashed line represents two standard error bands.
Data Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Housing Finance Agency
To reinforce the empirical grounds for the causality running from monetary policy rates to
housing preference, a simple regression analysis is conducted regressing the weight on housing
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(Jt) on its one-quarter lag (Jt−1) and one quarter lagged Federal Funds Rate (FFRt−1) over
the period 1980 Q1 - 2008 Q4. As the time series of Jt includes a unit root, the Cochrane-
Orcutt method is employed to eliminate serial correlation in the error term. The estimated
regression equation is as follows:
Jt = 0.4330 Jt−1 − 0.29FFRt−1 + t
R¯2 = 0.26 DW = 1.93
(4.9)
where the coefficient of FFRt−1 is significant at the 1% significance level. The estimated
equation reveals that if the federal funds rate increases by 1%p, the weight on housing de-
creases by 0.29%p. This result reconfirms the negative relationship between monetary policy
rates and housing preference.
Since empirical evidence from both VAR and regression analysis is supportive of the hypoth-
esis that preference for housing reacts negatively to changes in policy rates, this relationship
is incorporated into the model developed in the following section.
4.3 The Model
The model set out below modifies the framework of Iacoviello (2005) in two dimensions.
First, the weight on housing in the utility function of households is endogenized drawing on
the empirical findings presented in the previous section. Second, the banking sector plays
a role in ensuring a lending market equilibrium by adjusting the LTV ratio to variations in
monetary policy rates and house prices.
4.3.1 Households
There are two types of households: the patient and the impatient. Impatient households
are assumed to value relatively more the utility of the current period than patient ones.
On the other hand, patient households are almost indifferent to the timing of consumption
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and hence are able to save by deferring consumption to subsequent periods. To maximize
utility, impatient households have an incentive to borrow funds from banks in which patient
households have deposited their savings for consumption and purchase of housing in the future
time periods.
A representative household of each type of household maximizes the same form of lifetime
utility function as follows.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtp
[
ln cp,t + Jt lnhp,t − (Lp,t)
ϕ
ϕ
+ χ ln
(
Mp,t
Pt
)]
(4.10)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ln ci,t + Jt lnhi,t − (Li,t)
ϕ
ϕ
+ χ ln
(
Mi,t
Pt
)]
(4.11)
The subscripts p and i denote patient (savers) and impatient (borrowers) households re-
spectively. c is consumption of non-residential goods, h is stock of housing, L is labor hours
and M/P refers to real money balance. The parameter ϕ measures aversion to labor supply.
A crucial distinction between these two maximization problems exists in the difference
between the discount factors of patient and impatient households. Patient households discount
future consumption less than the other type of households, i.e., βp > βi. This condition ensures
that the borrowing constraint of impatient households binds at a steady state.19
Jt denotes the weight on housing relative to non-residential goods which captures the sub-
jective preference for housing. It depends both on economic and non-economic factors that
affect the attractiveness of housing. As mentioned in the previous section, policy rates are
among the most potent shifters of housing preference. Drawing on this reasoning and the
findings from the regression analysis presented above, the law of motion for Jt is defined as
below.
ln Jt = (1− ρJ) J¯ + ρJ ln Jt−1 − γR lnRt−1 + uJ,t (4.12)
19The proof is in Appendix B-1 of Chapter 3.
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where ρJ measures persistence in the preference for housing and γR is the responsiveness of
housing preference to changes in policy rates. J¯ is the steady state of Jt and assumed to be 0.12
as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). uJ,t is a shock to housing preference which is independently
and identically distributed with variance σ2J . This shock captures relatively less important
shifters of housing preference. For instance, they include changes in tax treatment such
as a temporary exemption from stamp duty and common perception of the value of home
ownership during a certain time period.
Both types of households face budget constraints in solving their utility maximization prob-
lems. The main characteristic of the budget constraint of patient households is that they save
a portion of their income and deposit the fund (st) at banks to earn interest income at the
(gross) rate R. Their utility maximization is subject to the following flow of funds.
cp,t + qt (hp,t − hp,t−1) + st = wp,t Lp,t + Rt−1 st−1
pit
+ Ft + Tp,t −∆
(
Mp,t
Pt
)
(4.13)
where w is real wage and R denotes the interest rate applied to deposited funds. q is real
housing price and pi denotes gross inflation. F is dividends received from retailers and T refers
to net transfers from the government.
Impatient households also supply labor to entrepreneurs. However, they borrow funds from
banks because they are relatively more impatient. Their flow of fund is as follows.
ci,t + qt (hi,t − hi,t−1) + Ri,t−1 bi,t−1
pit
= bi,t + wi,t Li,t + Ti,t −∆
(
Mi,t
Pt
)
− ξi,t (4.14)
where Ri is the lending rate applied to loans to impatient households which is determined by
banks and bi refers to the funds borrowed from banks. The last term ξi,t is housing adjustment
cost defined as (ψh (hi,t − hi,t−1)2 qt hi,t−1)/2.
An additional constraint is imposed on the maximization problem of impatient households.
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This is a borrowing constraint expressed by the inequality below.
bi,t ≤ mi,tEt
(
qt+1 hi,t pit+1
Ri,t
)
(4.15)
where mi,t is the LTV ratio for bank loans to impatient households. The maximum amount
that can be borrowed by impatient households changes with the value of housing as collateral
(as in the typical model with a collateral constraint). However, the important distinction
here is that the borrowing capacity varies with the LTV ratio which is controlled by banks.
Even if real housing prices remain fixed at a certain level, impatient households can increase
borrowing if banks increase the LTV ratio.
4.3.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using the labor of both patient and impatient
households (Lp, Li), capital (K) and housing (he) as inputs. The production technology is
given as below.
Yt =AtK
µ
t−1 h
ν
e,t−1 (Lp,t)
α(1−µ−ν) (Li,t)(1−α)(1−µ−ν)
At = ρAAt−1 + uA,t
(4.16)
Above, At represents total factor productivity (TFP) and uA,t is a technology shock with
variance σ2A. Entrepreneurs maximize lifetime utility accruing from consumption as follows.
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βte ln ce,t (4.17)
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under the following budget constraint
Yt
Xt
+ be,t = ce,t + qt (he,t − he,t−1) + Rt−1be,t−1
pit
+ It + wp,t Lp,t + wi,t Li,t
+
ψK
2δ
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1 +
ψh
2
(
he,t − he,t−1
he,t−1
)2
qt he,t−1
(4.18)
where It ≡ Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 and the last two terms on the righthand side refer to the
adjustment costs of capital and housing respectively. Like impatient households, entrepreneurs
face the same form of borrowing constraint as equation (4.15).
be,t ≤ me,t Et
(
qt+1 he,t pit+1
Rt
)
(4.19)
Analogous to the relationship between the discount factors of patient and impatient house-
holds, βe is assumed to be less than βp to ensure that the borrowing constraint binds at a
steady state.
4.3.3 Banking Sector
The main function of the banking sector is financial intermediation between savers and bor-
rowers.20 Bankers are only interested in minimizing the possible loss incurred by default on
loans collateralized by housing or by legal penalties imposed by the government in the case
of a banking failure.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtf LL (4.20)
where LL refers to the loss function.
Bankers face the following constraint in this minimization problem:
Rt−1 dt−1 + li,t + le,t = dt +Ri,t li,t−1 +Re,t le,t−1 (4.21)
20The banking sector includes all financial intermediaries which supply housing-collateralized lending.
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where d is deposits from patient households (d = s) and R denotes the deposit rate which
appeared in the budget constraint of patient households. The li and le are loans to impatient
households and entrepreneurs respectively and li = bi and le = be. The interest rates Ri and
Re refer to the corresponding lending rates. The constraint can be interpreted as a regulatory
stipulation that bankers should clear the lending market at all times.21
To simplify the analysis, conversion of deposits to loans is assumed to be costless as in a
frictionless model in which deposit rates are equal to lending rates, Rt = Ri,t = Re,t. As
the borrowing constraints of impatient households and entrepreneurs bind at a steady state,
li,t = (qt+1 hi,t pit+1)/Rt and le,t = (qt+1 he,t pit+1)/Re,t. Then the equation (4.21) can be
re-expressed using these equalities as follows:
Rt dt−1 +mi,tEt
(
qt+1 hi,t pit+1
Rt
)
+me,tEt
(
qt+1 he,t pit+1
Rt
)
= dt + qt pit (mi,t−1 hi,t−1 +me,t−1 he,t−1)
(4.22)
To minimize the loss by ensuring the market equilibrium of dt = li,t + le,t, bankers adjust
the LTV ratio (mt) in every time period based on their judgement of default risk in housing-
collateralized lending.22 Since the default risk is mainly affected by changes in housing value,
bankers should forecast housing prices in the next period to decide the LTV ratio. Bankers
are assumed to understand that policy rates affect housing prices negatively and that the
historical path of housing prices has shown strong inertia. Accordingly, the main indicators
they consult in forecasting the future housing value are policy rates and house prices. Under
favourable conditions of low policy rates and rising housing prices, bankers forecast the housing
value to continue to rise in the following period. This evaluation leads bankers to perceive
the default risk of housing-collateralized lending as lower and tolerate more risk by raising the
21A possible motivation for market clearance can be a penalty to be imposed in the event of the failure of
intermediation.
22Bankers in practice determine their risk-taking level mainly from the incentive to maximize aggressively
the margin between the rates of deposit and lending under various constraints. However, their decision on
risk-taking is assumed to be rather passive to minimize the loss under the simplifying assumption that a
unique interest rate Rt prevails.
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LTV ratio. Taking into account the time lag between monetary policy and its effects on the
housing market, the policy rates in the last period enter their LTV decision rule. Drawing on
the findings from empirical analyses in Chapter 3, the LTV decision rule employed by bankers
is specified as below.
mt = ρmmt−1 − φRRt−1 + φq qt−1 + um,t, um,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2m) (4.23)
According to this rule, bankers increase their LTV ratio if policy rates decrease or house
prices appreciate in the previous period.
4.3.4 Price Rigidities and Monetary Policy Rule
The core assumption of price rigidity in the New Keyensian model is briefly explained here.23
A continuum of retailers of mass unity buy wholesale goods from firms at Pwt and sell them to
consumers at Pt. The prices in the consumption sector become rigid as only a fraction 1-θ of,
and not all, retailers under monopolistic competition reoptimize sales price in each period.24
Under this Calvo-style pricing assumption, the optimization process of retailers delivers New
Keyensian Phillips Curve (NKPC) as below.
ln (pit − pit−1) = βpEt lnpit+1 − lnpit − κ ln
(
Xt
X
)
(4.24)
where pi is gross inflation, a markup Xt = Pt/P
w
t , and κ =
(1−θ)(1−βp θ)
θ .
To close the model, a Taylor-type monetary policy rule is assumed as follows:
Rt = R
ρR
t−1
(
pirpit−1
(Yt−1
Y
)rY
rr
)1−ρR
uR,t (4.25)
23A more detailed explanation is documented in Chapter 3.
24As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), housing prices are presumed to be relatively more flexible.
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where rr and Y denote the steady-state real interest rate and output, respectively, and uR,t
is an independently and identically distributed monetary policy shock with variance σ2R. The
parameter ρR is for interest rate smoothing, and rpi and rY refer to the responsiveness of policy
rates to inflation and output respectively.
4.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing condition for the housing market is Ht = hp,t + hi,t + he,t where the
housing stock Ht is assumed to be fixed and normalized to 1. The goods market equilibrium
condition is satisfied by Yt = cp,t + ci,t + ce,t + Kt + (1 − δ)Kt−1. In order for the lending
market to be in equilibrium, Dt = Li,t + Le,t. Appendices C-1 and C-2 provide, respectively,
the first-order conditions for the optimization problems and the log-linearized system of the
model.
4.4 Impulse Response Analysis
The main aim of the model is to provide the evidence that a shock to monetary policy decisions
generates more pronounced effects through the additional transmission channels discussed
previously. This is characterized by two ways: (i) excessive risk-taking by bankers, and (ii)
response of the preference for housing to changes in interest rates. These two characteristics
were observed during and after the period when policy rates were argued to remain below
the Taylor rule prescriptions.25 Taylor (2007) contended that during the period from 2002 to
2005 there existed a significant deviation of short-term interest rates from the counterfactual
level estimated by his eponymous rule.26 According to Taylor’s argument, the model economy
is assumed to be hit by an unexpected shock to monetary policy.
25The link between low policy rates and excessive risk-taking of financial institutions has been recently found
in several empirical findings, e.g. Ioannidou et al (2009), Altunbas et al (2010), Delis and Kouretas (2011),
Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011).
26As mentioned before, this argument was later rebuffed by the staff at the Fed which includes Bernanke (2010)
and Dokko et al (2010).
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We now provide a list of the parameter values used in the model before an analysis of
impulse responses to an unexpected easing of policy stance.27
4.4.1 Parameter Calibration
Most parameter values are borrowed from Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
except those in the housing preference equation and LTV decision rule. The parameter values
for the law of motion of housing preference Jt are based on the regression results presented in
the previous section while the LTV ratio (mt) rule is parameterized using values from Chap-
ter 3. Table 4.1 lists the calibrated values of the parameters. The discount factor of patient
households βp is set as 0.9925; this implies a steady state annualized real interest rate of 3
percent. To ensure that the borrowing constraints of impatient households and entrepreneurs
bind at a steady state, βi and βe are set lower than βp as 0.96. The labor supply aversion
parameter ϕ =1.01. The shares of capital (µ), housing (ν) and labor (α) are set as 0.3, 0.03
and 0.64 respectively. The Calvo pricing parameter θ is 0.75, which is close to the estimate in
Christiano et al (2005), and the steady state markup X is 1.05. The parameter for housing
preference persistence (ρJ) is set at 0.9 reflecting the strong persistence in the data on Jt.
The responsiveness of housing preference (γR) is 4.5 implying that housing preference is highly
sensitive to interest rates. This can be justified in certain circumstances such as in the recent
episode of the housing bubble during which market participants raised the leverage ratio to a
record high level. The LTV decision rule parameters, ρm, φR and φq take the values 0.7, -3.2
and 0.3. In the monetary policy rule, as the central bank adjusts interest rates gradually, ρR
is set at 0.73. The parameters for the responsiveness to inflation (rpi) and output (rY ) are
0.27 and 0.13, respectively.
27 Impulse responses of shocks to technology, LTV and housing preferences are provided in Appendix C-3.
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Table 4.1. Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
βp 0.9925 Patient households’ discount factor
βi 0.9600 Borrowers’ (Impatient households’) discount factor
βe 0.9600 Entrepreneurs’ discount factor
ϕ 1.0100 Labor supply aversion
µ 0.3000 Capital share in output
ν 0.0300 Housing share in output
α 0.6400 Labor income share of patient households
δ 0.0350 Depreciation rate of capital
ψK 2.0000 Capital adjustment cost
X 1.0500 Steady-state gross markup
θ 0.7500 Probability of maintaining prices
ρA 0.6500 TFP persistence
ρJ 0.9000 Housing preference persistence
γR 4.5000 Housing preference sensitivity to policy rates
ρm 0.7000 the LTV ratio persistence
φR -3.7000 the LTV ratio sensitivity to policy rates
φq 0.3000 the LTV ratio sensitivity to housing prices
ρR 0.7300 Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule
rpi 0.3400 Inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule
rY 0.1300 Output gap coefficient of the Taylor rule
4.4.2 Monetary Policy Shock
The main aim of the analysis is to study how the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
operates in the presence of the preference channel and risk-taking channel. The benchmark
model set up above (termed the endogenous model hereafter) endogenized housing prefer-
ence (Jt) and LTV (mt). The contribution from these features in the endogenous model is
highlighted by comparing it with the exogenous model where the housing preference follows
a stochastic AR(1) process and the LTV ratio is fixed as in the existing literature.28 In ad-
dition, the impulse responses from the model having a flexible price and no collateral effect
are presented to illustrate the effects of imperfections such as a sticky price and collateral
28For example, the literature includes Iacoviello (2005), Parie´s and Notarpietro (2008), Gerali et al (2010) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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constraint in both the endogenous and exogenous model.
Figure 4.3 plots the responses of the variables in the models to an unanticipated 50 basis
points decrease in policy rates. Both the endogenous and exogenous models reveal the effects
generated through the standard collateral channel. As policy rate decreases, households and
entrepreneurs borrow more funds from bankers for consuming goods and purchasing houses.
The increased demand for housing induces housing price inflation. In turn, appreciation in
housing value expands the borrowing capacity of households and entrepreneurs. Analogous
to the financial accelerator mechanism, the collateral channel working in these models results
in greater impact on housing prices, consumption and investment compared with the model
featuring flexible prices and no collateral effect.
Besides the collateral channel, the change in policy rate has an effect through the two
additional channels in the endogenous model. Lower policy rates shift households’ preference
toward housing as the user cost of housing diminishes and it also imbues economic agents
with an optimistic expectation of future house prices. This impact leads to more borrowing
by impatient households and pushes up house prices further than in the exogenous model and
increases further the value of collateral.
On the other hand, bankers evaluate the default risk of households as lower since they
observe housing prices growing robustly and expect a looser monetary policy stance to keep
fueling the appetite for housing. Both this observation and optimistic expectations about
the future prompt bankers to take more risk by increasing the LTV ratio. As impatient
households and entrepreneurs are prepared to borrow to their ceiling amount to maximize their
utility, bank lending expands in tandem with increases in the LTV ratio.29 The confluence
of these two additional channels intensifies further the impact of a monetary policy shock on
29There are various ways to take on more risk in the mortgage market. For instance, bankers ease lending
criteria and invent exotic mortgage products such as the interest-only mortgages.
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Figure 4.3. Impulse Responses to Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
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bank lending and housing prices vis-a`-vis the case of the exogenous model. Increases in the
credit to households and entrepreneurs also expands consumption of non-residential goods
and investment. Thus, these two channels amplify the effects of monetary policy on the real
sector. These reinforcing relationship between bank lending, housing prices, consumption and
investment is initiated by the easing of the monetary policy stance in the first phase and is
then driven further by credit expansion thereafter. As seen in the Figure 4.3, the substantial
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deviations of the variables in the model from their steady states are caused fundamentally by
the deviation of debt. In this sense, the model economy can be designated as a credit-driven
economy.
The developments in the endogenous model upon the arrival of an expansionary monetary
policy shock comply with features observed prior to the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. and in
several other developed countries. As interest rates continued to decrease, potential home
buyers aggressively took advantage of the opportunity to finance the purchasing of homes by
increasing their leverage to a fairly high level. Ampler credit fueled the demand for housing,
in turn, pushing up house prices for an extended period. Then, the increase in the value
of housing allowed households to refinance mortgages at a lower cost and withdraw a con-
siderable amount of equity by providing their housing as collateral. For mortgage lenders,
the appreciation in housing prices acted as a strong incentive to supply more mortgages by
increasing the the LTV ratio irrespective of the creditworthiness of borrowers. The upward
spiral of housing prices and mortgage lending supported stable growth in consumption ex-
penditure and residential investment in the period of the Great Moderation while elevating
housing prices to an unsustainable level.
In summary, endogenizing the impact of monetary policy on the housing preference and
bank risk-taking can better explain the apparent co-movements between credit, housing prices,
consumption and investment which were observed in the run-up to the sub-prime crisis.
4.5 Monetary Policy Reaction to Credit-driven Volatilities
We now assess the benefits of alternative monetary policy rules in stabilizing the overall
economy. The loss function of the central bank is defined as the discounted sum of variances
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of inflation and output gaps following the lead of Levin et al (1999).30
W = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtc [λ var(Yˆt) + (1− λ) var(pit)] (4.26)
where Yˆt denotes output gap and pit is the rate of inflation. The time preference rate of
the central bank βtc is set as 0.995 and λ, the indicator of relative preference for minimizing
output and inflation volatility, is fixed at 0.5 as in Gilchrist and Saito (2008) and Kannan et
al (2009).31
The standard Taylor rule in equation (4.25) can be re-expressed in logarithm as follows.
ln
(
Rt
R
)
= ρR lnRt−1 + (1− ρR)
(
rpi lnpit−1 + rY ln
(
Yt−1
Y
))
(4.27)
A common alternative interest rate rule in the literature only adds asset prices or housing
prices denoted by qt to the Taylor rule (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; Iacoviello, 2005). How-
ever, in recent research, financial indicators such as credit growth are added to the policy
rule to evaluate the contribution of monetary policy reaction to financial and macroeconomic
stability.32 Since the model above features credit constraints and financial intermediation, I
also allow for the departure of debt from its steady state (in addition to deviation of housing
prices) in specifying alternative rules as follows.
ln
(
Rt
R
)
= ρR lnRt−1 + (1− ρR)
(
rpi lnpit−1 + rY ln
(
Yt−1
Y
)
+ rq ln qt + rB ln bt
)
(4.28)
where bt is total debt of impatient households (bi,t) and entrepreneurs (be,t) in the economy.
30The gap is measured by deviation from the steady state. As the steady state of inflation is assumed to be
zero in the model, the level equals the gap.
31 In turns out in the analysis below that the qualitative aspect of the loss function is robust to different values
of λ.
32For instance, Kannan et al (2009) augments the Taylor rule by adding the growth rate of nominal credit
while Gray et al (2011) added possible default of the banking system to the rule.
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The performances of each of the following six rules are compared: (i) Taylor rule with
inflation only (IR); (ii) standard Taylor rule (TR); (iii) Taylor rule augmented by housing
prices (TRH); (iv) Taylor rule augmented by debt (TRB); (v) TRB responding aggressively
to debt volatility (ATRB); (vi) Taylor rule augmented by debt and housing prices (TRBH).
The specific values of the parameters for each rule are set out in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Monetary Policy Rules
Rule ρR rpi rY rq rb
IR 0.7 1.5 - - -
IB 0.7 1.5 - 0.3 -
TR 0.7 1.5 0.2 - -
TRH 0.7 1.5 0.2 0.3 -
TRB 0.7 1.5 0.2 - 0.3
ATRB 0.7 1.5 0.2 - 1.0
TRBH 0.7 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.3
Note: IR ≡ Policy rule responding only to inflation, IB ≡ Policy rule responding to
inflation and debt, TRH ≡ Taylor rule augmented by housing price, TRB ≡ Taylor rule
augmented by debt, ATRB ≡ Aggressive TRB, TRBH ≡ Taylor rule augmented by debt
and housing price.
Table 4.3 displays the relative performance of the policy rules. The following points are
noteworthy: first, the augmented Taylor rule allowing for debt volatility (TRB) reduces the
loss more than the standard Taylor rule (TR). Second, the gains attained by the augmented
rule including housing price fluctuations (TRH) are marginal compared with TR. Third,
responding aggressively to the debt volatility (ATRB) minimizes the loss function. Finally
and most importantly, the rule responding to inflation and debt volatility rather than output
gap (IB) performs better than the standard Taylor rule TR.33 The final two observations
provide an implication for monetary policy during a period characterized by excessive risk-
taking and an overheated demand for housing. The central bank has to consider responding
to credit volatility if it judges that the economy is being propelled by the rapid growth of
credit rather than solid economic fundamentals. Attention should, in particular, be drawn to
the fact that a more aggressive stance towards credit growth performs better for the purpose
33The loss from the standard Taylor rule with aggressive response to output gap (rY = 1.0) is 0.0285 which is
higher than the augmented Taylor rule aggressively responding to debt, ATRB.
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of macroeconomic stability.
Table 4.3. Performance of Policy Rules to Monetary Policy Shock
Rule Performance Rank Loss SD of Yˆ SD of pi
IR 7 0.4891 0.9840 0.1000
IB 2 0.1263 0.4715 0.1739
TR 6 0.1801 0.5988 0.0413
TRH 5 0.1726 0.5716 0.1257
TRB 4 0.1538 0.5164 0.2024
ATRB 1 0.0044 0.0833 0.0099
TRBH 3 0.1463 0.5051 0.1937
Notes: 1. IR ≡ Policy rule responding only to inflation, IB ≡ Policy rule responding
to inflation and debt, TRH ≡ Taylor rule augmented by housing price, TRB ≡ Taylor
rule augmented by debt, ATRB ≡ Aggressive TRB, TRBH ≡ Taylor rule augmented
by debt and housing price.
2. SD denotes standard deviation.
In our analysis, the augmented Taylor rule, which reacts positively to excessive debt growth,
performs best in stabilizing the economy subject to a monetary policy shock.
Figure 4.4 displays the impulse responses of policy rates, housing prices, output and inflation
in response to a TFP shock under two rules: (i) the standard Taylor rule (TR above) and
(ii) the augmented Taylor rule responding aggressively to debt with rb = 1 (ATRB). The
alternative rule dampens appreciably the deviations of housing prices and output from the
steady states while the gain with inflation is relatively marginal. An additional benefit is
the smoother path of policy rates which can lessen the negative repercussions on the whole
economy resulting from rapid adjustments of the policy stance.
Overall, the results from this analysis provide credence to the arguments from recent re-
search that adding financial indicators to a policy rule can enhance macroeconomic stability
when the economy is vulnerable to financial instability (see for instance, Curdia and Wood-
ford, 2009; Kannan et al, 2009; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gray et al, 2011).
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Figure 4.4. Impulse Responses to TFP Shock under Different Policy Rules
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4.6 Conclusion
Two main reflections following the sub-prime crisis have received growing attention among
central bankers and academic economists. First, the failure in identifying transmission chan-
nels through the financial sector and housing market led to an underestimation of the full
influence of monetary policy decisions on the overall economy. Subsequently, these failures
led to the inadequate reaction of policy makers to the rapidly increasing leverage and demand
for housing. The second reflection from the academic perspective is that prevalent macroe-
conomic models, whether they be Neoclassical or New Keyensian, ignored the role of the
financial sector, in particular, the implications of financial intermediation, for business cycle
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fluctuations.
The first aim of this chapter was to accommodate these reflections into an existing workhorse
model featuring the housing market and credit constraint by endogenizing additional trans-
mission channels of monetary policy. Secondly, we tried to find an optimal monetary policy
reaction function that could moderate the volatilities of a monetary policy shock.
The model included two additional transmission routes of monetary policy decisions: (i)
direct impacts on the housing demand through the preference channel ; and (ii) the risk-
taking channel operating in the banking sector. An expansionary monetary policy shock
increases the preference for housing as the borrowing costs decrease and people hold optimistic
expectations of future capital gains. Furthermore, as the increased demand pushes up the
price of housing offered as collateral, bankers perceive a lower default risk of collateralized
lending. The combination of low risk-perception and higher risk-tolerance leads to aggressive
mortgage lending on the part of banks by increasing the LTV ratio.
The integration of these channels into the workhorse framework of Iacoviello (2005) entails
more prominent fluctuations of credit, housing prices and real variables when there is an
unexpected decrease in policy rates. The main reason for this lies in the different paths of
the total debt between the endogenous and exogenous models. In the endogenous model,
borrowing capacity is expanded by a rise in the LTV ratio and the demand for housing
increases as preference shifts toward it with a monetary policy shock. This increases debt,
which in turn drives up house purchases, consumption and entrepreneurial investment. As
such the model economy is propelled mainly by rapid credit growth and, for that reason, it is
designated as the credit-driven economy.
A normative question can be asked whether it suffices for the central bank to respond with
the conventional Taylor rule to credit-driven volatilities in achieving stable paths of inflation
and output. Comparing the performance of alternative policy rules reveals that positive
reactions to debt volatility can improve significantly macroeconomic stability relative to the
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standard Taylor rule. On the other hand, the benefit from responding to housing prices turns
out to be negligible.
These results deliver several useful implications for implementing monetary policy to attain
the goal of macroeconomic stability. First, if the unambiguous symptoms of the credit-driven
economy are detected, such as rapid growth in collateralized debt and housing prices alike, the
central bank needs to consider the debt-responding rule as a short-term strategy to stabilize
the economy. For implementing the strategy efficiently, a close monitoring of the mortgage
market and timely procurement by the central bank of the relevant information are prereq-
uisites. Second, the economy can become more stable by reacting to credit volatility instead
of housing price fluctuations. Lastly and most importantly, as we learned from the recent
crisis, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has been undergoing drastic changes
due to several factors. These factors include innovative developments of the financial sector,
increases in the amount of information accessible to the public, and increased rationality in
expectation formation. To overcome this formidable challenge that monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism is possibly evolving rapidly without being noticed, central banks need to
pay close attention to hitherto undiscovered transmission channels to make monetary policy
implementation more effective in fulfilling its mandate of sound economic growth and price
stability.
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There have been remarkable achievements in the research on the role played by monetary
policy decisions in generating the housing cycle and on an optimal reaction of monetary policy
to exuberance in the housing market. Regarding the first issue, several empirical findings after
the sub-prime crisis demonstrate that monetary policy decisions to maintain low policy rates
for the extended period have stimulated the demand for housing through multiple transmission
channels and are largely accountable for the recent housing boom and bust episode. Moreover,
researchers find that an aggressive policy reaction to abnormal behaviour of credit and asset
prices is recommended for maximizing social benefit relative to the traditional approach.
The main points presented in this thesis are broadly in line with the above findings. Firstly,
interest rates, particularly short-term policy rates, have played a prime role in generating the
past housing cycles thorough several transmission channels. Secondly, monetary policy easing
can amplify the volatility of the overall economy through the housing market by reinforcing
not only the risk-taking tendency of mortgage suppliers but also the preference of economic
agents toward housing. Lastly, the central bank can enhance macroeconomic stability if it
responds to an excessive growth of credit and asset prices by raising its policy rates. Further
implications derive from these main findings. As a result of rapid liberalization in the financial
sector and increased accessibility of the public to information, the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy may have underwent drastic changes. The challenge demands that central
bankers should pay a special heed to the possibility that novel transmission channels, such
as the risk-taking channel and preference channel discussed in this thesis, may magnify or
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distort the originally intended impact. Turning to the regulatory issue, imposition of a lower
ceiling on LTV ratio or limitation on the growth rate of bank credit can be a useful measure
in conjunction with monetary policy reactions to inhibit overshooting of house prices and
prevent its negative spillover effects to the real sector.
The focus of this thesis is on searching for a relevant monetary policy reaction in the
boom phase of the housing cycle. However it is also crucial to find how the central bank
should implement monetary policy in the downturn of the housing market. Even though the
Federal Reserve reacted to the housing market crash and its subsequent systemic breakdown
of the banking sector by lowering policy rates effectively to zero and continuous rounds of
the quantitative easing, central banks of the countries experiencing a negative aftermath
emanating solely from the housing market slowdown (such as Korea) may require a different
policy path. Specifically, it is debatable whether central banks should attempt to deflate the
remaining bubble in the housing market by tightening monetary policy for hastening economic
recovery or to bolster the current level of house prices by easing their policy stance in order
to reduce the volatility of economic activities. This issue, exactly like the question about
whether the central bank should step in amidst a housing market boom, is accompanied by
several intricacies. First, it continues to be necessary to judge whether the current level of
house prices is overly inconsistent with economic fundamentals. Second, the derivative effects
of policy rate changes on other economic sectors should be evaluated as accurately as possible.
A cost-benefit analysis of two alternative policy stances is required.
An additional research topic for the future is understanding how expectations in the housing
market are formed and measuring the transmission effects of monetary policy conditional on
them. Over the past decade, it has become widely recognized that expectations are among
the key drivers of the housing cycle and exert powerful influences in the boom phase of the
housing market. Several characteristics of home-buyers’ expectations have been recognized.
For example, as confirmed by several empirical studies introduced in Chapter 2, expectations
are formed in a backward-looking fashion. One of the most important recent findings pre-
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sented by Case et al (2012) suggests that long-term expectations of future house prices was
a more potent driver of the bubble phenomenon in the U.S. than short-term ones. However,
Shiller (2012) mentions that it is still not fully understood why the public had extravagant
expectations in the midst of the housing boom and why they changed so swiftly to a sober
state. These questions will be among the important ones to ask in research on housing in the
foreseeable future.
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A. Data Source for Regression of House Prices Deviation in U.S.
Data Change Rate Data Source
Nominal House Price Index
S&P/Case-Shiller House Price Index Standard & Poor’s
National House Price Index FHFA
Deflator for Real House Price Consumer Price Index less shelter BLS
Short-term Interest Rate Federal Funds Rate Change in the level
against previous
quarter (%p)
Fed
Long-term Interest Rate National Average Mortgage Interest Rate
(Average maturity of 27.5 years from
1987 to 2009)
Change in the level
against previous
quarter (%p)
FHFA
Income Disposable Personal Income per capita 4-quarter change (%) BEA
Real Estate Loan Commercial Banks’ Real Estate Loan for
Home and Commercial Estate
4-quarter change (%) Fed
General Price Level Consumer Price Index
(Base Period : 1982-84=100)
4-quarter change (%) BLS
Demographic Change Number of civilians aged 15 to 54 4-quarter change (%) BLS
Note: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis), BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Federal Reserve, FHFA (Federal Housing
Finance Agency)
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B-1. Proof of the Borrowing Constraint Binding at Steady
State
The Euler equation derived from the patient households’ optimization is given by
1
cPt
= βPEt
( Rt
cPt+1pit+1
)
and the corresponding steady state is
1
cP
= βP
R
cPpi
and as inflation is assumed to be zero at the steady state, namely, pi = 1,
R =
1
βP
(S1)
Turning to the Euler equation for the impatient households,
1
cBt
= βBEt
( Rt
cBt+1pit+1
)
+ λtRt
and the corresponding steady state is
1
cB
= βB
R
cBpi
+ λR (S2)
Substituting (S1) into (S2) and arranging the terms about λ yields
λ =
βP − βB
c
(S3)
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Since βP − βB > 0 by the assumption, λ is over zero at the steady state. As the original
λt measures the increment in the lifetime utility of impatient households accrued by increases
in borrowing, there is always a scope for increasing utility as long as λ is positive. Hence
impatient households borrow the upper limit of the borrowing constraint.
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B-2: Necessary Equilibrium Conditions
1. Patient Households as Lenders
1
cPt
= βPEt
( Rt
cPt+1pit+1
)
(N1)
wPt = c
P
t (L
P
t )
η−1 (N2)
qt
cPt
=
j
hPt
+ βPEt
(qt+1
cPt+1
)
(N3)
mt = m
ρm
t−1(R
ρR
t−1q
ρq
t−1)
1−ρmemt (N4)
2. Impatient Households
1
cBt
= βBEt
( Rt
cBt+1pit+1
)
+ λtRt (N5)
wBt = c
B
t (L
B
t )
η−1 (N6)
qt
cBt
=
j
hBt
+ Et
(
βB
qt+1
cBt+1
+mtλtqt+1pit+1
)
(N7)
cBt + qt(h
B
t − hBt−1) +
Rt−1bBt−1
pit
= bBt + w
B
t L
B
t + Tt −∆(
MBt
Pt
) (N8)
bt = mtEt(
qt+1h
B
t pit+1
Rt
) (N9)
3. Firms
wPt = α
Yt
XtLPt
(N10)
wBt = (1− α)
Yt
XtLBt
(N11)
Yt
Xt
= wPt L
P
t + w
B
t L
B
t (N12)
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4. Retailers
P ∗t = X
∞∑
k=0
 (θβ)kEt
(
ΛtkY
∗f
t+kP
−1
t+k
)
∑∞
k=0(θβ)
kEt
(
ΛtkY
∗f
t+kP
−1
t+k
)
Et( 1
Xnt+k
)
Pt =
[
θP εt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε
(N13)
5. Central Bank
Rt = [Rt−1]rR
[
pi1+rpit−1
(Yt−1
Y
)rY
rr
]1−rR
eRt (N14)
6. Market Clearance
cPt + c
B
t = Yt (N17)
hPt + h
B
t = H¯ (N18)
sPt = b
B
t (N19)
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B-3. Log-linearized Conditions
1. Patient Households as Lenders
cˆPt = Etcˆ
P
t+1 − rˆrt (L1)
qˆt = βPEt(qˆt+1) + ιhˆ
B
t + cˆ
P
t − βPEt(cˆPt+1) where ι = (1− βP )
hB
hP
(L2)
mˆt = ρmmˆt−1 + (1− ρm)(ρRRˆt−1 + ρq qˆt−1) + eˆmt (L3)
2. Impatient Households
qˆt = (1−mβP )cˆBt − βB(1−m)EtcˆBt+1 + [βB +m(βP − βB)]Etqˆt+1
+m(βP − βB)mˆt −mβP r̂rt − q
cB
j
hB
hˆBt (L4)
cB cˆBt = −qhB∆hˆBt −RbB(Rˆt−1 + bˆBt−1 − pit) + bB bˆBt + (1− α)
Y
X
(Yˆt − Xˆt) (L5)
bˆBt = mˆt + Etqt+1 + hˆ
B
t − r̂rt (L6)
3. Aggregate Supply
Yˆt = Xˆt + ηLˆ
P
t + cˆ
P
t (L7)
Yˆt = Xˆt + ηLˆ
B
t + cˆ
B
t (L8)
Yˆt = αLˆ
P
t + (1− α)LˆBt (L9)
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4. Inflation Dynamics: New Keyensian Phillips Curve
pˆit = βPEtpˆi
t+1 − κXˆt
where κ =
(1− θ)(1− βP θ)
θ
(L10)
5. Central Bank
Rˆt = rRRˆt−1 + (1− rR)
[
(1 + rpi)pˆit−1 + rY Yˆt−1
]
+ rRRˆt−1 + eˆRt (L11)
6. Equilibrium in Goods, Housing and Lending Markets
Yˆt =
cP
cP + cB
cˆPt +
cB
cP + cB
cˆBt (L12)
0 = hP hˆPt + h
BhˆBt (L13)
sˆPt = bˆ
B
t (L14)
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C-1. Necessary Equilibrium Conditions
1. Patient Households
1
cp,t
= βpEt
(
Rt
pit+1cp,t+1
)
(N1)
qt
cp,t
[
1 + ψh
(
∆hp,t
hp,t−1
)]
=
Jt
hp,t
+ Et
{
βp
qt+1
cp,t+1
[
1 + ψh
(
∆hp,t+1
hp,t
)
hp,t+1
hp,t
− ψh
2
(
∆hp,t+1
hp,t
)2]}
(N2)
wp,t = (Lp,t)
ϕ−1
cp,t (N3)
cp,t + qt(hp,t − hp,t−1) + St
=
Rt−1St−1
pit
+ wp,tLp,t +Nt + Tp,t − ∆Mp,t
Pt
− ψh
2
(
∆hp,t
hp,t−1
)2
qthp,t−1 (N4)
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2. Impatient Households
1
ci,t
= βiEt
(
Ri,t
pit+1ci,t+1
)
+ λi,tRt (N5)
qt
ci,t
[
1 + ψh
(
∆hi,t
hi,t−1
)]
=
Jt
hi,t
+ βiEt
[
qt+1
ci,t+1
(
1 + ψh
(
∆hi,t+1
hi,t
)
hi,t+1
hi,t
− ψh
2
(
∆hi,t+1
hi,t
)2)
+ λi,tmi,tqt+1pit+1
]
(N6)
wi,t = (Li,t)
ϕ−1
ci,t (N7)
χ
mi,t
=
1
ci,t
− βiEt
(
1
ci,t+1
pit+1
)
(N8)
ci,t + qt(∆hi,t) +
Ri,t−1bi,t−1
pit
= bi,t + wi,tLi,t + Ti,t − ∆Mi,t
Pt
− ψh
2
(
∆hi,t
hi,t−1
)2
qthi,t−1 (N9)
bi,t = mi,tEt
(
qt+1hi,tpit+1
Rt
)
(N10)
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3. Entrepreneurs
1
ce,t
= βeEt
(
Re,t
pit+1ce,t+1
)
+ λtRt (N11)
qt
ce,t
=
1
ce,t
[
ψh
(
∆he,t
he,t−1
)
qt
]
+ λtme,tEt(qt+1pit+1)
+ βeEt
{
1
ce,t+1
[
ν
Yt+1
he,tXt+1
+ qt+1 + ψh
(
∆he,t+1
he,t
)
qt+1
(
he,t+1
he,t
− 1
2
(
∆he,t+1
he,t
))]}
(N12)
wp,t = α(1− µ− ν) Yt
XtLp,t
(N13)
wi,t = (1− α)(1− µ− ν) Yt
XtLi,t
(N14)
1
ce,t
[
1 +
ψK
δ
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)]
= Et
{
βe
ce,t+1
[
µ
Yt+1
Xt+1Kt
+ (1− δ) + ψK
δ
(
It+1
Kt
− δ
)(
1
2
(
It+1
Kt
+ δ
)
+ 1− δ
)]}
(N15)
Yt
Xt
+ be,t = ce,t + qt(∆he,t) +
Re,t−1be,t−1
pit
+ wp,tLp,t + wi,tLi,t + It
+
ψK
2δ
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1 +
ψh
2
(
∆he,t
he,t−1
)2
qthe,t−1 (N16)
be,t = me,tEt
(
qt+1he,tpit+1
Rt
)
(N17)
Yt = AtK
µ
t−1h
ν
e,t−1(Lp,t)
α(1−µ−ν)(Li,t)(1−α)(1−µ−ν) (N18)
It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 (N19)
3. Housing Preference
Jt = (1− ρJ) J¯
J
ρJ
t−1
R
γR
t−1
uJ,t (N20)
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5. Retailers
∞∑
k=0
(θβp)
kEt
{
Λtk
[
P ∗t (z)
Pt+k
− X
Xt+k
]
Y ∗t+k(z)
}
= 0 (N21)
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t−1)1− (N22)
Ft =
(Xt − 1)
Xt
Yt (N23)
6. Central Bank
Rt = R
ρR
t−1
(
pirpit−1
(Yt−1
Y
)rY
rr
)1−ρR
uR,t (N24)
7. Banking Sector
mt =
mρmt−1 q
φq
t−1
R
φR
t−1
um,t (N25)
8. Market Clearance
H = hp,t + hi,t + he,t (N26)
Yt = cp,t + ci,t + ce,t + It (N27)
Dt = Li,t + Le,t (N28)
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C-2. Log-linearized model
1. Aggregate Demand
βpcˆe,t = βpEtcˆe,t+1 + βeEtpˆit+1 − βpRˆt − (βp − βe)λˆt (L1)
cˆe,t = cˆe,t+1 − ζ
(
Yˆt+1 − Xˆt+1 − Kˆt
)
+ ψK
[
Iˆt − Kˆt−1 − βe
(
Iˆt+1 − Kˆt
)]
(L2)
cˆp,t = Etcˆp,t+1 − Rˆt + Etpˆit+1 (L3)
βpcˆi,t = βpEtcˆi,t+1 − (βp − βi)λˆi,t − βpRˆt + βiEtpˆit+1 (L4)
ce
Y
cˆe,t +
cp
Y
cˆp,t +
ci
Y
cˆi,t +
I
Y
Iˆt − Yˆt = 0 (L5)
where ζ = 1− βe(1− δ)
2. Housing Market
qˆt = γeEtqˆt+1 + (1− γe) Et
(
Yˆt+1 − hˆe,t − Xˆt+1
)
+ ψemˆe,t Et
(
λˆt + pˆit+1 + cˆe,t+1
)
+ cˆe,t − Etcˆe,t+1 (L6)
qˆt = βpEtqˆt+1 + (1− βp)
(
Jˆt − hˆp,t
)
+ cˆe,t − βpEtcˆe,t+1 (L7)
qˆt = γhEtqˆt+1 + (1− γh)
(
Jˆt − hˆi,t
)
+ ψhmˆi,t Et
(
λˆi,t + pˆit+1
)
+ cˆi,t − βiEtcˆi,t+1 (L8)
0 = hehˆe,t + hphˆp,t + hihˆi,t (L9)
where γe = βe +me(βp − βe), ψe = me(βp − βe), γh = βi +mi(βp − βi)
andψh = mi(βp − βi).
3. Housing Preference
Jˆt = ρJ Jˆt−1 + γRRt−1 + uˆJ,t (L10)
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4. Borrowing Constraint
bˆi,t = mˆi,t + Etqˆt+1 + hˆi,t + Etpˆit+1 − Rˆt (L12)
bˆe,t = mˆe,t + Etqˆt+1 + hˆe,t + Etpˆit+1 − Rˆt (L11)
5. Aggregate Supply
Yˆt = Xˆt + ϕLˆp,t + cˆp,t (L13)
Yˆt = Xˆt + ϕLˆe,t + cˆi,t (L14)
Yˆt = Aˆt + µKˆt−1 + νhˆe,t−1
+ α(1− µ− ν)Lˆp,t + (1− α)(1− µ− ν)Lˆi,t (L15)
pˆit = βpEtpˆit+1 − κXˆt (L16)
6. Flows of Funds
be
Y
bˆe,t =
ce
Y
cˆe,t +
heq
Y
(hˆe,t − hˆe,t−1) + I
Y
Iˆt +
Rbe
Y
(Rˆt−1 + bˆe,t−1 − pˆit)
− (1− s′ − s′′) (Yˆt − Xˆt) (L17)
Kˆt = δIˆt + (1− δ)Kˆt−1 (L18)
bi
Y
bˆi,t =
ci
Y
cˆi,t +
qhi
Y
(hˆi,t − hˆi,t−1) + Rbi
Y
(Rˆt−1 + bˆi,t−1 − pˆit)− s′(Yˆt − Xˆt) (L19)
where s′ =
α(1− µ− ν) +X − 1
X
and s′′ =
(1− α)(1− µ− ν)
X
.
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7. Monetary Policy Rule
Rˆt = (1− ρR)
(
rpipˆit−1 + rY Yˆt−1
)
+ ρRRˆt−1 + uˆR,t. (L20)
8. Bankers: LTV Decision Rule
mˆt = ρmmˆt−1 − φRRˆt−1 + φq qˆt−1 + uˆm,t (L21)
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C-3. Impulse Responses to Technology, LTV and Housing Pref-
erence Shocks
Figure A. Impulse Responses to Technology Shock
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Note: The y-axis measures percent deviation from the steady state.
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Figure B. Impulse Responses to Positive LTV Shock
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Figure C. Impulse Responses to Positive Housing Preference Shock
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